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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the enrolment of local communities into the palm 
oil economy is constructing a particular, and complicated, mode of agricultural transformation. I 
look at the ways that local livelihoods are negotiated in response to diverse palm oil development 
pathways across three villages in the Kapuas Hulu district of West Kalimantan, Indonesia. This 
thesis uses a political ecology approach to examine the way agrarian communities adapt their 
local economic production and social relations in response to the forthright assertion of a 
capitalist economy upon their local landscape. I do this by examining: i) the multi-scalar 
institutional arrangements that shape agrarian change; ii) the processes through which land is 
made available for large-scale oil palm cultivation; and iii) the implications for local livelihoods 
and agrarian transformation.  
I show how the institutional arrangements that shape palm oil developments in Kapuas Hulu are 
a combination of: i) institutions and governance structures from within the global value chain; ii) 
institutions external to the value chain (including the government and NGOs); and iii) informal 
customary institutions peculiar to sites of production. Downstream palm oil companies shape 
palm oil development by negotiating contract farming with land holders, and by imposing codes 
of conduct on suppliers, and by providing local infrastructure to comply with their internal 
business codes. Government shapes the outcomes of palm oil development through a formal 
regulatory regime, spatial planning, and through the business interests of many state-based 
actors. In the interests of environmental sustainability, NGOs and conservation agencies contest 
and reshape these planning frameworks by resisting institutions they believe would create 
livelihood uncertainty under the palm oil economy. Customary tenure and cultural practices, 
including adat, reshape the effects of palm oil development on landscapes and livelihoods, 
although I also observe a noticeable shift away from customary swidden cultivation. It was 
common in my case study villages, for individuals to not actually resist palm oil, but to attempt 
to participate in the palm oil economy on their own terms, and customary institutions were 
sometimes employed to achieve this. 
The broader palm oil complex requires access to land. Large agribusiness firms have employed 
various strategies to gain access to land and effectively break the strong customary union of 
Dayak communities. I apply and further develop the “powers of exclusion” framework of Hall et 
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al. (2011), which explains processes of dispossession through regulation, legitimation, force and 
the market. This thesis found a more complicated situation whereby customary elites were 
intimately involved in processes of land dispossession where they were used as an extension of 
agribusiness interests, and where processes of legitimation were fueled through a discourse of 
national economic sovereignty in the borderlands. These local customary elites also employed 
legitimation and discursive strategies to marginalize opponents of palm oil, backing up their 
argument with national regulation, and even threats against other community members. In the 
midst of these institutional collisions, the ability of customary institutions to regulate resource 
access has been weakened as land markets have emerged, creating space for voluntary land 
dispossession.  
As a consequence of these processes, local livelihoods have been profoundly transformed. Even 
in those villages that have most successfully resisted palm oil development to date and 
maintained more traditional systems of natural resource access, they have become marginalised 
through more limited cash income opportunities whilst their daily needs have become more 
urgently dependent on cash. On the other hand, in many villages that have accepted palm oil 
development, households have often experienced local dispossession of their natural assets, but 
they are advantaged by better social and physical infrastructure and enhanced capacity to 
diversify income sources. In the process, swiddens are converted to oil palm. Livelihood 
outcomes are mixed, although a larger proportion of survey respondents reported improved well-
being over the last fifteen years as a result of these transformations, particularly as reflected in 
access to cash income, more secure residency, and the ability to invest in their children’s 
education. Spatial inclusion within the palm oil economy, however, has stimulated local 
processes of class differentiation. Wealthier and middle income households have secured access 
to capital, land and labour as the basis to diversify their cash income, whilst those households 
with fewer livelihood assets have become increasingly dependent on selling their own labour for 
cash in the palm oil economy. 
This thesis provides a unique focus on the political ecology of palm oil development in Indonesia 
by analysing the otherwise abstract interests of agribusiness capital through the framework of a 
global value chain and the actions of lead firms. Along with a focus on local customary 
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institutions in Kalimantan, this approach enriches our understanding of the institutional settings 
that inevitably mediate the processes of agrarian transformation in the modern economy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
During my field work in Janting, Badau sub-district,West Kalimantan, I met an Iban man and 
discussed palm oil development in his village. Working as a swidden cultivator, he explained to 
me the complexities of local reactions to palm oil development in his village. The convictions of 
environmental activists had made him aware of the detrimental effects of oil palm - to land and 
livelihoods in the present and future. 
He told me that he had observed the customary elite of his village acting as an extension of large 
agribusinesses by deceiving villages to gain access to land for development. Yet simultaneously 
he had an increasing need for cash to pay for schooling for his children, to cover the costs of 
motorcycles and electricity bills. Although he opposed large scale palm oil development, he 
cultivated palm oil in swidden fields and his son worked on palm oil plantations. In reality, 
regardless of attitudes toward large scale palm oil expansion, working on palm oil plantations 
and cultivating palm oil were important strategies to generate much needed cash in Janting.  
The villages where I conducted my field research were located in the border area of the Kapuas 
Hulu landscape. This frontier area is characterised by competing economic interests that arise 
due to the rapid expansion of palm oil. National elites have worried that economic intrusions 
from across the Sarawak border into Indonesian territory could become the basis of new 
territorial claims within Kapuas Hulu. These latent fears can be traced back to the territorial 
conflicts back in the 1960s, when competing territorial claims led to military conflict along  the 
Malaysia – Indonesia border.  As such, palm oil plantations in the frontline of the Sarawak 
border area were established to strengthen economic and territorial claims in this border region. 
Nationalist claims were verbally asserted, for example, by the past national political leaders, in a 
attempt to discursively justify the expansion of palm oil as an initiative to strengthen local 
economic development since at least 2005 (Wakker 2006).  
National elites have used various strategies to make land claims in this border area (Noveria, 
2016, p.255). Supported through political processes and central government policies, elites have 
established large scale plantations. Nonetheless in the frontier area, peasants like the farmer I 
interviewed often saw these policies as questionable.  
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In the areas of large-scale palm oil development, many remote communities across Indonesia are 
currently faced with a fundamental dilemma, one which appears to be deceptively dichotomous. 
Should they embrace the “opportunities” to become integrated within the palm oil economy, with 
its apparent benefits of improved infrastructure and cash-earning opportunities, or should they 
resist the juggernaut and prioritise greater autonomy over their lands and livelihoods, but risk 
ongoing economic marginalisation. This dilemma is currently being faced by several 
communities in Kapuas Hulu, which presents a spectrum of communities now fully immersed 
within the palm oil economy, some at its rapidly-transforming margin, and some currently just 
beyond its reach. 
Within the field of human geography, case studies such as this one shows that unique local 
spatial histories and spatial dynamics play an important role in outcomes (Campbell 2016). For 
instance, within Janting village, the contrasting opinions and decisions of villagers reflected 
complex spatial relations with different state institutions, environmental activists and 
corporations. These negotiations were complicated by a battle between local and national elites 
who have tried to garner local support for the expansion of agribusiness. National level elites 
have tried to consolidate palm oil cultivation within large-scale agribusinesses while local 
farmers continue to cultivate cash and food crops with weak recognition of their informal rights 
by state institutions. 
This thesis will examine how individuals within these village landscapes are becoming enrolled 
in the palm oil economy amidst a complex constellation of institutional social settings, while 
examining the strategies available to them to negotiate livelihood pathways.  
1.2 Oil palm in Indonesia  
Palm oil has demonstrated enormous commercial potential as the cheapest available vegetable oil 
processed for human consumption. Even compared to other vegetable oils, palm oil offers much 
more efficient and low-cost production. In the data presented by Sime Darby Plantation (2014) in 
Figure 1-1, the superior efficiency of oil palm (per unit of land) is suggested by the significant 
difference between harvested volume and total area planted for this crop compared against 
alternative vegetable oils.  
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Figure 1-1 Palm oil and other vegetable oils' yields 
 
Source: Sime Darby Plantation, Sustainability Report, 2014, p.34. 
As a result, foreign investors have been interested to make large-scale agribusiness investment in 
the Indonesian palm oil sector, motivated by vast supplies of cheap labour and large areas of 
apparently available land (R Cramb and McCarthy 2016a). In terms of financing, Malaysian and 
Singaporean foreign investors have dominated this investment in Indonesia due the limited land 
resources available for palm oil expansion in their own countries (Ibid, p.48). By investing in an 
expansion of land access, these agribusiness corporations can strengthen their prospects and 
attractiveness on various financial markets (Cramb and McCarthy 2016b, p.8). 
For Indonesian policy makers, there has been a variety of apparent economic advantages that 
have encouraged them to facilitate the expansion of investment in palm oil in the rural areas of 
Indonesia. By having greater investment in palm oil development, they can stimulate stronger 
export earnings and obtain foreign currencies that supports Indonesia’s balance of payments and 
protects the exchange rate. In their domestic economy, for example in Kapuas Hulu, local and 
national governments can gain levies and various taxes related to the industry, providing an 
important source of formal and informal revenue. The industry is also seen to create jobs in 
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many rural regions with few other employment opportunities, and with multiplier effects for the 
broader economy. 
Over time, the arrangements for large-scale palm oil operation have shifted away from direct 
smallholder participation in palm oil cultivation towards more limited involvement as they only 
receive dividends from those schemes through various shareholding arrangements (Cramb and 
McCarthy 2016a, p.35). In the government smallholding scheme in 1978, state institutions made 
direct interventions to facilitate smallholding palm oil partnerships between various PTPN 
(Perkebunan Nusantara, or Indonesian state-owned plantation companies) and smallholder 
farmers (Zen et al. 2016, p.85). Under this smallholding scheme, the state owned companies 
obtained 30 percent of all proposed palm oil plots, yet the remaining 70 percent was managed 
directly by smallholder farmers(Cramb and McCarthy 2016a, p.57). In those smallholding 
schemes, local smallholders could gain access to financial capital and inputs, and sell their fruits 
to the state-owned corporation at a price determined by the corporation (after repaying any debts 
incurred prior to the harvest). At the same time, these schemes tended to involve a significant 
cost for the government and the PTPNs, who would subsidise smallholder production and absorb 
the risks associated with the delivery of poorer quality product. As a result, a dominant narrative 
emerged, mainly from within the international donor community, that the industry was badly 
affected by inefficient government attempts to intervene in palm oil cultivation (Larson 1996). 
Donors came to believe, in the 1990s, that liberalisation of palm oil development in the hand of 
private investors would result in far more efficient business outcomes (Budidarsono et al. 2013).  
In addition, during the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, and with pressure from an IMF rescue 
package, the government had to admit they faced major financial deficits and were unable to 
continue subsidising smallholder development with fiscal allocations. As its financial woes 
mounted, the government had to admit that the price of cooking oil would inevitably increase 
(Gaskell 2015, p.41). After various attempts to prevent palm oil exports and to reserve 
production for domestic consumers, it became clear that these policies actually ended up with 
failures and inefficiencies (Ibid). As a result, the government made the decision to increasingly 
liberalise palm oil cultivation across Indonesia during the reformasi period (i.e. the period 
following the fall of Suharto in 1998).  
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The shifting of greater plantation ownership to the private sector resulted in both benefits and 
costs. For instance, in a context where many local governments had limited capacity and 
resources to improve public infrastructure, these public goods were often provided by those 
large-scale palm oil companies.  Hence, they improved accessibility within many remote areas 
where local people could access various markets faster. On the downside, with increased 
liberalisation of large-scale palm oil operations, private agribusiness complained that the 
incapability of smallholders was a significant cause of continued business uncertainty. For 
instance, agribusiness investors complained of a significant business risk arising from giving 
responsibilities for cultivation to smallholders within their estate (Cramb and McCarthy 2016a, 
p.34). These concerns were expressed in the way that labelled smallholder farmers as 
“unreliable” in terms of managing palm oil production (Ibid). As a result, policy changes allowed 
greater direct corporate control over palm oil estates, which left the communities (whose land 
was appropriated) to either receive monetary dividends through various shareholding 
arrangements or be paid as wage labour.  
Potter (2016, p.161) observes that, in 1997, smallholders in Sanggau had already mobilised their 
own land and labour to pursue their own investments in smallholding palm oil cultivation. This is 
despite the fact that, in some situations, independent smallholders have to pay higher 
transportation costs to sell their fruit in the distant mills (Potter 2016, 165). Nevertheless, and 
given the otherwise difficult circumstances of their lives, the sale of oil palm fruit would provide 
an important alternative cash income opportunity for them. Most frequently, however, 
smallholders would combine oil palm cultivation with various other farm and non-farm activities 
(Cramb and McCarthy 2016a, p.32).  
Many of the households I visited in Kapuas Hulu were simultaneously composed of consumers 
of palm oil products, labourers for palm oil plantations and direct cultivators of oil palm. In a 
lunch meal taken in Janting, instant noodles were served for lunch in an Iban family home. In the 
noddle’s ingredient, it was written that palm oil is part of their raw material. The head of the 
household offered this simple food - which was to be prepared by his wife. During lunch, his 
wife explained to me that instant noodles were an important part of their daily diet, 
supplementing rice and other produce that came from their farms. To meet the increasing needs 
of the cash economy, the adult son worked in the surrounding palm oil plantation from 7 am in 
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the morning until 2 pm in the afternoon. In another strategy, the household had even converted 
some tracts of their swidden fields into oil palm fields to supplement their household’s cash 
income. The household had multiple engagements with the palm oil economy. They can engage 
in casual labour for large-scale palm operations, while also negotiating the sale of harvested 
palm oil fruits to other palm oil companies. This study will explore the various institutional 
arrangements between villagers and the corporations that dominate the oil palm industry in 
Kapuas Hulu, while scrutinising the dynamic processes of livelihood change associated with the 
relentless expansion of oil palm cultivation.  
1.3 Kapuas Hulu  
In the process of developing my thesis, my travel from the main market town of Putussibau to 
Badau allowed me to experience the dense forest cover surrounding the Kapuas Hulu area. 
Kapuas Hulu is the furthermost upstream district in West Kalimantan, and it shares a long border 
with the Malaysian state of Sarawak (see Figure 1-2). The district of Kapuas Hulu is distant from 
Pontianak, the capital city of West Kalimantan, which is approximately 750 kilometres 
downstream from Putussibau. Yet from Putussibau to Lubok Antu in Sarawak, across the 
Malaysian border, the distance is only 160 kilometres. From Badau, it is only 24 kilometres to 
Lubok Antu, which can be reached by less than an hour’s driving by car.  
The first reason to select Kapuas Hulu for this research was to observe the dynamics of a border 
district between two national economies in a remote forest area. The close proximity to Sarawak 
and the long history of territorial competition provides an interesting and complex background to 
large-scale palm oil development. In Sarawak, large-scale plantation operations were established 
much earlier (in 1981) through a joint venture between native landholders and private 
agribusiness (Cramb 2007, p.219). More importantly, in 1990, Malaysian elites released 600 
thousand hectares previously under customary claims for palm oil development (Ibid) and in the 
following years, a profound agrarian transformation had taken place in Sarawak. However, 
during that initial period, no palm oil development occurred across the border in Kapuas Hulu. 
Subsequently, concerns amongst Indonesian political elites grew regarding the potential loss of 
national sovereignty associated with the frontier areas of Kapuas Hulu. The extremely 
underdeveloped state of the region has been seen as a risk, as it could lead to the economic 
expansion of Malaysian activities there and eventually in a possible territorial claim. The 
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competing nationalisms among these two nations can be traced back to various diplomatic and 
military tensions going back to the 1960s. At that time, the Indonesian government, led by 
President Sukarno, challenged Malaysia’s sovereign claims to Sarawak during the Konfrontasi 
conflict (Wadley and Eilenberg, 2005), when Sukarno accused the Malaysian federation of being 
a neo-colonial construction and the two countries engaged in an armed military conflict. Badau 
in particular become a hotspot in this conflict, which was exacerbated by cold war tensions as 
Sukarno was increasingly leaning towards the communist bloc. These tensions were 
subsequently suppressed during the Suharto regime, which assumed a far more pro-western 
stance on foreign affairs. To promote economic controls over the border areas, Suharto gave 
some large-scale logging concessions to a foundation belonging to the Indonesian army forces, 
PT Yamaker (Eilenberg 2014c). These logging operations, however, were generally 
unprofessional and inefficient, and failed to provide local jobs whilst simply locking up the land 
for security reasons (Ibid, p.165).  
Partially as a response to fears of Malaysian economic intervention, Indonesian national elites 
have been actively promoting large-scale palm oil development in Kapuas Hulu since around 
2000, with large-scale palm oil operations beginning in Silat Hilir in 2001 (Shantiko et al. 2013). 
In personal communication with local politicians, they expressed a concern that Silat Hilir was 
still located too far distant from the Sarawak border. At the same time, national elites and the 
military apparatus began to worry about the decentralisation of the issuing of logging permits to 
local governments, as this tended to result in the local government in Kapuas Hulu endorsing 
logging proposals from Malaysian investors and subsequently suffering a loss of control (Wadley 
and Eilenberg 2005). Those same Malaysian entrepreneurs frequently cooperated with local 
customary elites to facilitate illegal logging exports during the same reformasi period to Sarawak 
(Ibid, p. 20). In response to various media stories exposing such illegal logging along the border 
with Sarawak in 2005, the national government revoked the local authority to provide logging 
permits in Kapuas Hulu (Ibid). Then, in a further attempt to assert national control, in 2007, they 
provided land use permits to any large-scale palm oil developer willing to operate in Badau, 
Kapuas Hulu. Badau was considered a more strategic location due to its immediate proximity to 
Sarawak and, in 2012, large-scale palm oil corporations were granted permits to establish 
plantations in this border region (Shantiko et al. 2013).  
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The emergence of large-scale palm oil operations significantly impacted processes of land access 
for traditional swidden farmers. In a previous study, Clerc (2012, p.15) found many lands 
previously used for swidden cultivation had been converted to palm oil operations. The primarily 
political agenda to establish palm oil along the frontier of Kapuas Hulu has resulted in a vast 
landscape transformation away from mixed swidden systems towards an agro-industrial 
monoculture. Based on a search through local permit records1, it generally took between one and 
two years for a large palm oil developer to proceed from obtaining “local consent” to use 
community land through to being able to plant oil palm in the relatively ethnically diverse areas 
around Silat Hilir (see Figure 1-2). However, with the more homogenous Dayak communities 
living in Badau sub-district, large-scale palm oil developers faced greater difficulties in obtaining 
local consent for land appropriation2. In 2007, many local longhouse communities were resisting 
attempts by corporations to obtain land around Badau. This meant that, from around 2008 or 
20093, the companies initiated a new strategy to develop local cooperation by working closely 
with some village elites and through this process, they obtained local consent and permits in 
2012. The upper reaches of Kapuas Hulu thus presents an interesting case where fairly strong 
traditional Dayak communities demonstrated some (initial) resistance to the expansion of palm 
oil in their territories. 
Kapuas Hulu also provides insights into the competing agendas of environmental conservation 
and the imperative of economic development. During trips to Kapuas Hulu in 2016, I conducted 
several short visits to the village of Ulak Pauk at Embaloh Hulu, where people believed that 
large-scale palm oil development, as they witnessed it in the other villages, would bring 
destruction of local natural resources and the environment as well as resulting in land 
dispossession and cultural decline. These villages are located on the border of the Betung 
Kerihun National Park, which was formally established in 1995 and provides habitat for the 
Bornean Orangutan and several other primate species. At the same time, many individual 
households were struggling to find alternative incomes to meet their increasing cash needs4. The 
existence of a national park in Kapuas Hulu has even encouraged the establishment of local 
                                                          
1 Tracing local permit approvals in Kapuas Hulu of 2015.  
2 Ibid.   
3 Interview with J, Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016 
4 Interview with A, Ulak Pauk, Kapuas Hulu 2016 
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district initiatives to promote Kapuas Hulu as a conservation district5, with more than 50 percent 
of the territory classified as protected forest. Out of all this protected area, about 30 percent is 
within national parks (Taman Nasional), while the rest was demarcated as zone of protection 
forests (Hutan Lindung)6 . Simultaneously, and somewhat paradoxically, the local government 
has also provided land concessions for large-scale development, including both logging and palm 
oil development.  
International conservation and non-government agencies have been active in attempts to 
conserve the densely forested areas of Kapuas Hulu. Many of these organisations inevitably 
come into conflict with the many local advocates and interests for the expansion of palm oil. One 
of the successes of those opposed to palm oil expansion has been formalization of various 
regulations to restrict palm oil development. For instance, prior to 2011, various NGOs and 
conservation institutions had been protesting the expansion of palm oil in peatland. In 2011, 
along with pressure from global stakeholders, national elites agreed to a moratorium agreement 
to not convert the area of peatland to palm oil. In 2011, the conservation and activist movements 
prompted the government to revoke its palm oil plantation permits in forest areas7. Under the 
regulation8, any concessions must apply for forest release permits from the national forestry 
authority prior to converting forest to palm oil.  
While conservation organizations have convinced some local communities in Kapuas Hulu to 
oppose all palm oil plantations, a number of households in Badau and Silat Hilir continued to 
voluntarily plant palm oil on their own swidden farms. Some villagers in Badau and Silat Hilir 
have been straightforward in their response to palm oil cultivation, which they believe offered 
the best available opportunity to generate cash income at present and into the future9. Some 
longhouse community members in Janting also explicitly rejected the presence of any external 
people in their villages, particularly NGO activists who they thought were trouble-making. 
This research focuses on the areas that have been prioritised for palm oil development around 
Kapuas Hulu. As shown in Figure 1-2, large areas of palm oil concession have expanded from 
Silat Hilir in the south into Badau subdistricts further north. In Badau, agribusinesses had begun 
                                                          
5 Perda Kapuas Hulu No.20 tahun 2015.  
6 Appendix D, calculation of protection areas in Kapuas Hulu, West Kalimantan 
7 http://www.bpk.go.id/news/sawit-resmi-tak-boleh-masuk-hutan-tanaman 
8 UU Kehutanan No.41/1999 
9 Personal communication (pers. comm.) from several villagers in Badau and Silat Hilir, 2016.  
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negotiations for local land access at the end of December 2006, but were only formally granted 
land permits from local government in 2012. In Badau, two case study villages were included in 
the study: Janting and Badau. In Silat Hilir, a single village Miau Merah was studied. In each 
village, I obtained information and narratives about how changing land use and livelihoods 
remain relevant as discussions over environmental preservation policies continue and a ban on 
slash and burn farming remains contentious.  
Several visits were also made to villages without oil palm plantations, especially those located in 
Embaloh Hulu sub-district in the region between Lake Sentarum and the Betung Kerihun 
National Park. These visits involved extended interviews and insights into the views and 
attitudes of more traditionally-oriented Dayak communities, or at least those that had not (yet) 
become absorbed within the palm oil juggernaut.  
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Figure 1-2 Study site locations 
 
 
 
12 
 
NB: Large-scale palm oil development expands closer to international border of Indonesia - Sarawak (Malaysia). Maps have been made by author 
1.4 Political ecology approach 
This study adopts a political ecology approach to scrutinise the institutional changes and 
responses that arose from palm oil investors’ interest in Kapuas Hulu. A political ecology 
approach is used for several reasons. First of all, rather than simplifying problems, political 
ecology approaches seek to fully detail the multi-scalar complexities of natural resource 
management at the local level. Rather than narrowly focusing on scientific or technical 
perspectives, political ecologists pay close attention to political, economic, social and 
biophysical perspectives (Neumann 2005).  
Political ecology also has a long and rich history of examining how agrarian communities adapt 
to the influx and influence of external capital into their communities (Neumann, 2009, p.228). 
For political ecologists, multi-scalar analysis of the interaction between humans and the 
environment is unavoidable (Neumann 2005). In mapping natural resource outcomes, political 
ecologists do not depend solely on natural causes, but also on human behaviour and how 
different actors conserve or exploit natural resources. In such human interaction with the 
environment, political ecologists acknowledge the realities of unbalanced power relations among 
humans as well as conflicts over conserving some resources and exploiting others.  
From this perspective, many environmental problems can be perceived as essentially political 
economic issues, which arise from the social relations of production within a capitalist system 
(Neumann, 2009, p.228). For instance, we can see how in the Kapuas Hulu environment, local 
institutions might be produced by social and cultural norms that arise from everyday living, and 
how these institutions in turn shape environmental outcomes (Hodgson 2006). However, in the 
local setting, local institutions do not have a monopoly over the regulation of local resource 
usage and access. In reality, corporate and state actors, operating at other spatial scales, can 
conspire together to dictate control over land access for large-scale palm oil expansion.  
In this thesis, I will augment the standard political ecology approach with the insights from 
global value chain analysis, which helps to delineate the specific ways through which capitalist 
firms are able to exert power over suppliers and other actors. Within this framework, Fold and 
Neilson (2016, p.197) argue that while corporations (in their cocoa case study) are increasingly 
able to determine rules and standards in the global value chain, they act in a dialectical 
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relationship with various state-based institutions as well as NGOs. Within these complex 
relations of production, it is often lead firms who generate the opportunities and constraints for 
the participation of different actors (Neilson and Pritchard 2009). In their relationships with local 
smallholders, Fold and Neilson (2016, p.196) found that corporate cocoa interests were not 
always aligned with the development interests of local communities.  
In my thesis, I will examine the complex issues of how local institutional participation in palm 
oil development is largely a factor of unequal power relations. For instance, within Miau Merah 
and Janting villages, while people have planted oil palm, they have also expressed resentment 
over the injustices of land dispossession arising from large agribusiness interventions associated 
with palm oil expansion. This study combines political ecology and value chain approaches to 
examine unequal power relations and how they influence land control and access, and how 
production in a local setting is influenced by different institutional agendas. The challenge is to 
look at the way various institutions shape the spatial expansion of palm oil and its implications 
for communities.  
Neumann (2005) asserts that the question of power relations is not only relevant to the control of 
natural resources, but it is also relevant to the question of how environmental knowledge is 
constructed. Various actors assert their political influence in order to determine who has access 
to scientific knowledge and under what circumstances. For instance, those promoting 
development interventions often argue that privatising land and natural resources is a solution to 
enhance rural development. On the other hand, biodiversity conservation promotes state control 
of large territories effectively barring access of local actors. Political ecologists, meanwhile, 
question ‘which property rights are being secured for whom’ (Neumann 2009).  Development 
proponents use discourses to control access to natural resources, and political ecology 
approaches hence investigate how the production of natural resource knowledge, as a rational 
argument, is used to control land and natural resources (Ibid.).   
In the cocoa commodity chain, unequal relationships among corporations and smallholders occur 
where the discourse of ‘sustainability’ has been used to control the supply of cocoa from 
smallholders in the global market (as presented in the case of Indonesia by Fold and Neilson 
2016). In the Kapuas Hulu palm oil environment, there have been actions made by corporate and 
state actors which exclude and overlook smallholder participation in oil palm cultivation. 
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Corporate land has expanded in the form of HGU (Hak Guna Usaha)10 land leases, while local 
lands have increasingly come under corporate management and control. At the intersection of 
political ecology and value chain approaches, this research scrutinises land conversion and 
dispossession through palm oil development.  
1.5 Research questions  
Environmental activists have often claimed that local people reject oil palm due to issues of land 
dispossession. On the other hand, domestic agribusinesses assert the positive economic effects of 
oil palm development. In fact, both these claims come at the cost of undermining local 
aspirations and perspectives (Forsyth 2004, p.10). Rather than relying on compiling livelihood 
trajectories from secondary data sources, this study understands that the perceptions of different 
stakeholders are entangled with hidden interests and need to be carefully examined. In order to 
adequately describe local livelihood aspirations, this study will use a combination of observation, 
interviews and household surveys. 
In order to examine the complex interplay of various actors and institutions associated with the 
political ecology of palm oil development, I have set myself the task of answering the following 
central research questions in relation to Kapuas Hulu:  
1. What role do institutions perform in shaping the spatial expansion of oil palm cultivation?  
2. What are the processes involved with land conversion and land appropriation that enable the 
ongoing spatial expansion of the oil palm economy? 
3. How is the spatial expansion of oil palm transforming rural livelihood aspirations and 
strategies? 
1.6 Thesis structure  
The thesis comprises nine chapters. Chapter one consists of this introduction and research 
questions. Chapter two reviews the relevant literature and presents the key theoretical debates to 
which this thesis will contribute, including: the importance of institutions in shaping and 
                                                          
10 In Indonesian national regulation, Hak Guna Usaha (HGU) refers to leasing right that is given by the national land 
agency for private individual or entity over the long-term tenure, say 20 years or more, with possible extendable 
permit.   
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sometimes limiting the influence of corporate power along value chains; the application of 
political ecology to understand the processes through which land can be assembled for capitalist 
interests while excluding other actors; the shifting nature of contemporary rural livelihoods and 
agrarian transition; and the various controversial debates in the literature regarding oil palm 
expansion in Indonesia. Chapter 3 will provide details regarding the research methods used to 
gather information. The broader context of the global palm oil industry and the place of 
Indonesia within this industry will be presented in chapter 4, while chapter 5 will provide a 
detailed history and geography of Kapuas Hulu. The main empirical findings from the thesis will 
be presented across the subsequent three chapters. Chapter 6 will explain the role of mediating 
institutions in palm oil development in Kapuas Hulu. Then, the discussions of land access and 
exclusions will be discussed in chapter 7, following by an examination of livelihood outcomes 
associated with palm oil development in chapter 8. Finally, the thesis conclusion will be 
provided in chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONS, EXCLUSIONS AND RURAL 
LIVELIHOODS: AN OVERVIEW 
Within the palm oil industry, there are various institutions involved from large corporations to 
local community structures that provide labour and land, while in Kapuas Hulu, state supported 
agribusinesses have established tenure right mechanisms over local lands. This chapter will 
present the theoretical context of local institutions and how different powers are exercised to 
influence the cost and benefit structures at different points in the palm oil commodity chain. 
Political ecology here becomes relevant as a means to better understand unequal power relations 
throughout the commodity chain. In this thesis, political ecology is employed to assess local 
resource actions in the context of social relations of  production and the broader political 
economic structures they are a part of (Peluso 1992). 
Furthermore, Ribot (1998) associates resource access to powers of particular dominant actors 
who control natural resource allocation. Powerful actors control access through sanctioning some 
and dispossessing others and in the process accrue large benefits (Ribot 1998, p.336). This 
chapter develops a theoretical discussion of linkages between resource access and exclusions to 
understand the process of land conversions and dispossession within the palm oil plantation 
sector.  
The chapter will also provide a conceptual framework for understanding livelihood outcomes 
that arise from the influx of palm oil capital into Kapuas Hulu district. In this literature review, 
livelihoods are understood as complex processes of asset accumulation, labour work strategies 
and production which are shaped by local institutional factors. While political ecologists have 
long examined livelihood struggles of local communities in the context of large-scale 
plantations, it is the interaction with local institutions that seems to shapes livelihood outcomes 
(Cramb, 2007). Hence, the study assumes that livelihoods are the result of complex realities in 
the upstream palm oil environment. 
2.1 Institutions in agro-commodity chains  
The expansion of institutional relations throughout the palm oil economy can be described 
through examining agro-commodity chains. Agro-commodity chain analysis helps to understand 
how value is added to agricultural commodities, as they trace production from farms (upstream 
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production) to primary processors, exporters, importers, product manufacturers, retailers, and on 
to final consumers (as shown in figure 2-1).  
Figure 2-1 Agro-commodity chains 
 
Source: (Kulke 2007, 123) 
Within commodity chains, there is often a dynamic relationship among different players which 
governs the flow and allocation of profit and human resources throughout the chain  (Hasler 
2009, p.202). When examining the entire commodity chain, it becomes clear that different 
groups make their own rules to regulate and allocate resources among their members.  
Rules that arise from different institutions are heavily shaped by the broader context in which 
they arise, and Hodgson (2006, p.1) asserts that these rules regulate social relation(s). Rules here 
constrain and open up a variety of choices, actions and possibilities (Hodgson 2006, p.2). He 
asserts that institutions that arise from different norms are accepted by local communities in their 
human interactions. Institutions are codifiable when instincts, habits and norms are agreed 
collectively by their institutional members (Ibid, p.5). 
In the case of West Kalimantan palm oil development, Potter (2015b, p.747) describes how 
Dayak swidden farmers have made informal agreements to conserve garden-plots (tembawang) 
in particular sites which are viewed as collectively owned and cannot be converted into 
commercial crops. In my observation of the Dayak Iban, garden plots consist of various fruits 
such as palm fruits, other edible fruits, and green butter nut oil fruit (tengkawang).  Indeed, local 
institutions interact with broader institutions to manage their natural resources. In the broader 
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scale, state and international agencies deliver formal regulation to manage natural resources. 
Dick & Pradhan (2002) underscore the importance of recognising local institutional power 
dynamics which assert norms and interests (see figure 2-2). On the other hand, there are national 
and global institutions that can shape how local natural resources are allocated and controlled 
(Dick & Pradhan 2002, p.23). 
Figure 2-2 Webs of multi-level natural resource institutions 
 
Source: Dick & Pradhan, 2002 
In the multi-layered commodity chain, the political ecology approach helps to focus on local 
behaviours and social production in a broader, political economic setting (Peluso 1992, p.51). 
For instance, in the case of forest products in East Kalimantan, Peluso (1992) focuses on the 
issue of dynamic power relationships between local inhabitants who extract rattan, but 
simultaneously, on the broader political economic setting of logging industries who negotiate 
with state actors to retain control of forest resources through concessions or permits. The unequal 
power relations between local resource users and timber industries influences how local users 
extract forest products. Rattan extraction went from being regulated by local informal rules to 
being regulated by powerful timber industries (Ibid, p.53).  
For smallholder commodities like coffee or tea, corporate power is used to influence commodity 
production within global markets through a decentralised production process based on 
smallholder farms. For example, in the case of coffee and tea in South India, Neilson & Pritchard 
(2009) show conflicting interests of industrial actors who through their power to shape codes of 
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local institutions shape livelihoods and the participation of smallholder farmers. In the tea and 
coffee sector, industrial actors have assisted the smallholder farmers to improve their local cash 
crop production. In another cases, these industrial actors have powers to control production by 
placing numerous conditions and requirements upon smallholder producers (Neilson and 
Pritchard 2009, p.211). This control over local institutions was intended to hinder oversupply and 
to control price values as part of a corporate effort to maintain profitability (Ibid).  
For palm oil as a commodity, however, agribusiness corporations have been reluctant to 
decentralise their commercial production entirely into the hands of local producers. In the 
Indonesian and Malaysian palm oil industry, corporations often argue that smallholder farmers 
are unable to control production outputs and maintain standards, thus creating a significant risk 
on the production side (Cramb and McCarthy 2016a, p.34). Corporate interests have therefore 
exacerbated livelihood struggles as they have accumulated large tracts of land in an attempt to 
control upstream production and extract greater surplus.  
From a political economy perspective of palm oil development, Cramb (2016) asserts that 
different institutions have different interests which promote different relations between corporate 
actors, state actors, and local farmers. Within the value chain, corporations have attempted to 
control production as a way to maximise their surplus extraction and political patronage (Cramb 
2016, p.192). Private actors often fail to consider local livelihood trajectories and the different 
choices farmers are forced into between responding and rejecting global market forces (Ibid). For 
instance, in Sarawak, in opposition to the Dayaks who have rejected large-scale schemes, others 
have shown an interest in cultivating palm oil as long as they are able to receive a reasonable 
return (Ibid, p. 201).  
Within these different livelihood trajectories created by palm oil expansion, the political ecology 
approach can be employed to observe local institutional changes as a result of capitalist 
development. In the context of agrarian communities, Neumann (2009, p.208) challenges static 
conceptions of communities that see them as merely defending local cultures. In fact, agrarian 
communities adapt their local cultural practices in response to the external capitalist economy 
(Neumann 2009, p. 208).  
In this case study, the consolidation of natural resource acess by dominant powerful actors - 
regional capitalist actors – is occurring through large-scale plantation development in a way that 
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is problematic for the local community (in a simialr way to that outlined by Robbins 2011). From 
another perspective, smallholders in West Kalimantan, as explained by Semedi (2014), engaged 
with palm oil as a way to seek alternative cash income to meet basic household economic needs 
on their own terms. My thesis adopts an approach that acknowledges not only power relations 
and structures, but also the more complex issues of shifting social relations and livelihood 
strategies by individuals.    
In this thesis, political ecology is used to examine social relations of production in agrarian 
communities under the influence of a global capitalist economy. In Sanggau, West Kalimantan, a 
culture of local environmental preservation and labour organisation has emerged around swidden 
farming activities. Nevertheless, under palm oil expansion, Potter (2015, p.760) has detailed 
Dayaks changing their farming practice as they reduce their emphasis on swidden cultivation in 
favour of oil palm. While many still place inherent social value on swidden farming, they have 
also engaged in oil palm cultivation as a means to meet needs for cash. Hence, they made 
alternative institutional relationships to engage with distant mills to sell their fruits (Potter 2015a, 
p.165).  
In fact, in the maintainance of basic swidden cultivation, local engagement with oil palm 
demonstrates smallholders’ inovation and adaptive capacity in the context of a changed 
economic environment (Mertz 2015, p.739). For instance in Niah district, Sarawak, local farmers 
became aware that upland rice cultivation was unable to overcome the problem of nutrient 
depletion of upland soils. Hence,  they made a pragmatic decision to incorporate fertilisers in the 
upland environment as the way to offset nutrient losses (Ibid, p.736). This reflects the way 
smallholder farmers have shaped their agricultural practices by incorporating modern agricultural 
practices into their swidden cultivation practices. Hence, from the political ecology perspective, 
local farmers have been marginalised from local resources as capitalist actors have asserted 
control over land and production systems (Neumann 2009). Commodity chain analyses provide a 
significant contribution to the field by tracing market expansion and community participation 
and the resultant distribution of benefits and exclusions (Ribot 1998). 
2.2 Resource exclusions 
The process of acquiring land for palm oil cultivation can be understood as a process of gaining 
access to property. Ribot & Peluso (2003) define property as a claim to benefit from things, 
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where things can become natural resources. In the Kapuas Hulu environment, various properties 
are claimed through different institutions. For instance, customary leaders can claim tembawang 
(or forest garden) on behalf of the village to be used collectively as their common property on 
the basis of customary rules. The state can claim the forest area as state land on the basis of state 
regulation, and private entities can enclose land as private property on the basis of formal 
certificates they have acquired from the purchase of that land.  
The concept of access has a broader relation to property. Access concerns an ability to benefit 
from a natural resource (Ribot and Peluso 2003, p.154), and it underlines broader social relations 
to property rights or ownership.  For instance, in primary forest areas, the local community can 
acquire access to natural resources with permission from the state apparatus. Hence, in the 
intersection of broader relationships of owners and the people who enjoy the benefits of accruing 
natural resources, access refers to those who actually benefit (Ibid, p.154). In the above example, 
swidden cultivators can benefit by utilising forest products by gaining permission from the state 
authority, who legally “own” certain areas of forest.  
Examining access brings up questions of power in natural resource management as it scrutinises 
the various mechanisms, processes and social relations that are exercised to influence the 
abilities of different people to benefit from natural resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003, p.154). For 
example, Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002) consider the intersection of property and access in 
the case of water resources where they examine the different institutions that claim access to 
water and the different capacities they have to enforce property rights. In the context of Nepal, 
they found a variety of top down government regulations which dictate the use of irrigation 
systems (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). At the local level, however, the capacity of the state 
to regulate local water resources was challenged and even ignored by local communities (Ibid, 
p.13). While the state did not recognise customary rights, villagers instead used local negotiation 
to regulate natural resource allocation and distribution among themselves (Ibid, p.21).  
Resource access can be sub-divided into mechanisms of control and maintenance of natural 
resource access (Ribot & Peluso 2003, p.158). Control of resource access refers to the capacities 
to mediate other people’s access, while maintenance of access refers to efforts to ensure resource 
access remains open.  Where the state has a weak capacity to govern resource access such as the 
case of water in the Dang region of Nepal, local elites remained as influential decision makers 
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when it came to water allocation. When other social factors came into play such as caste and 
gender, it could be seen how low caste people and women were often deprived of access to water 
( Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). Donor interventions to open up access to water resources 
only gave a minuscule improvement in the context of a rigidly hierarchical system.  
The issue of resource access helps us to think through the social positions of particular 
individuals or parties in controlling or maintaining the ability to benefit from natural resources 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003). Examining resource access helps to understand “why some people or 
institutions benefit from resources, whether or not they have rights to them” (Ibid, p.154). In the 
case of water rights in Nepal, Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan (2002) state that despite the institutional 
support of statutory law, the state lacked the capacity to assert a governing role over water 
allocation. On the other hand, local upper caste elites have powers to control local water rights 
over subordinate lower caste and people, including women, without necssarily such formal 
rights.  
Ribot & Peluso (2003) reveal that the powers to shape resource access determine to what extent 
they can reap benefits from the natural resources. These powers often work to exclude other 
parties (Ribot and Peluso 2003). In fact, such exclusion is almost an inevitable consequence of 
others obtaining access. In the case of Bangladesh, religious laws grant water resource access for 
all, but in reality, those local household with low economic status are often deprived of concrete 
water rights even to acquire water for drinking (Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan 2002, p.25).Actually, 
disposession of natural resources appears as a manifestation of unequal power relations in the 
case of both Bangladesh and Nepal where upper caste and elites dominate resource access. 
Political ecology will hence be used to trace the struggles of local institutions to access land and 
retain livelihoods with the onset of capitalist relations. In particular, local actors necessarily 
encounter and must negotiate with, local elites, government actors, plantation developers 
(including timber entrepreneurs) and conservationists, all within the fluctuating pressures exerted 
by markets and prices (McCarthy 2006, p.24). The outcomes and processes of negotiation over 
palm oil plantations intersect with different powers of resource exclusion in relation to other 
parties.  
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Resource exclusion can include limiting the access of original owners to their disposed land, to 
totally excluding some (marginal) actors from accessing land at all (Hall et al., 2011). Hall et al. 
(2011) underscore the importance of different actors and processes in natural resource 
exclusions. In discussing land dispossession, Rhein (2015) finds that, in West Kalimantan, a 
variety of actors have been involved in land enclosures and the allocation of concessions. In 
those scenarios, local strongmen, senior bureaucrats, and influential businessmen have 
consolidated resources to establish palm oil consortia (Rhein 2015, p.12). Using patron-client 
relationships, those consortia can shape ownership over particular tracts of land through the 
concession model. For example, in the decentralization era, the central government retained the 
broad authority to manage forest areas, while the local government had been granted the 
authority to manage non-forest areas (Resosudarmo et al 2014). Problems arose, however, when 
the local government misinterpreted this authority as an avenue to accumulate private wealth by 
using their political positions to generate revenue through the process of allocating plantation 
concessions.   
Hall et al (2011,p. 4) assert that exclusions need to be understood from political point of views, 
where resource exclusions inevitably reflect dynamic power relations and create losers and 
winner. The powerful actors consolidate more resource access through four key “powers” that 
enable land exclusion and subsequent resource accumulation. Those powers are regulation, force, 
market, and legitimisation, which will often be combined together in different ways depending 
on local contexts and relevancies.   
In their book, land markets have been used as a mechanism to transfer land access from existing 
to new owners who possess greater financial capacity (Ibid). In the context of west Kalimantan, 
for example, powerful actors such as large-scale palm oil developers attempt to negotiate land 
access with local people and with the state in terms of appropriate monetary compensation to 
obtain cheap land. As stated by Rhein (2015), negotiations will often involve patron-client 
relationships as a powerful network structure to pressure local land holders to give up their land. 
Regulations are often, but not limited to, sets of rules to govern land resource use and access 
(Hall et al. 2011, p.5).  
Furthermore, sanctions and violence can be used to exclude certain people from land. In 
contemporary Indonesia, local and national governments are constantly being monitoring by civil 
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society and being restricted by global institutions, such as RSPO, such a way to highlight any 
acts of violence. Nevertheless, Semedi (2014) finds that customary elites can also manipulate 
conditions to their own advantages in order to accumulate more land access by dispossessing 
other community members through the threat of violence. The power of exclusions in the case 
study of palm oil development emerge as a complex process involving not only formal 
institutions, like the state or capitalist actors, but also local elite involvement to exclude 
community members.  
Finally, exclusion can be affected through creating a socially acceptable basis of land claims, 
often through a dominant discourse (legitimation) (Hall et al 2011, p.131). In Indonesia’s palm 
oil contexts, corporations can work to disqualify smallholder farmers from having the capability 
of participating in palm oil development. In brief, powers of exclusions assess the interaction 
between regulation, force, market and legitimation that collectively devise the changing 
distribution of land access between social groups. 
In West Kalimantan, Semedi (2014, p.233) found that Dayaks suffered from dispossession of 
their swidden land because of large-scale agribusiness. In other settings, farmers have voluntarily 
converted their swidden or rubber plots into oil palm fields. These realities of increasing oil palm 
expansions provide a complex picture of the Kalimantan landscapes. When palm oil prices were 
high, farmers’ market access can be expanded where local communities sell their crops to 
surrounding private actors. Nevertheless, in reality, Potter (2015, p.761) notes the increasing 
competition and population expansion in West Kalimantan that has resulted in land shortages. 
From the capitalist perspective, corporations have an interest in maintaining their monopoly as a 
way to maximise their profits from large-scale plantations. In the Ngabang area, for example, 
Acciaoli et al. (2016) report on a large corporation that had been using various methods to 
monopolise oil palm production through maintaining large land concessions.  
In Kapuas Hulu, one corporation has applied their own joint venture system to manage all land 
disposed by rural people, despite these land holders still receiving monetary dividends from the 
corporation. To some extent, the smallholders’ endeavour to cultivate their own oil palm can 
interfere with the desire of corporations to accumulate local lands at a cheap price. Inevitably, of 
course, industrial actors sustain their dominance within the value chain in an attempt to 
maximise their profits (Fold and Neilson 2016). Utilising the value chain perspective, this study 
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scrutinises the linkages between industrial interests to control land access and production and the 
consequences for the participation of local resource users.  
2.3 Agrarian transition and livelihoods   
The introduction of palm oil development into rural areas has resulted in important 
transformations where there has been a major influx of capital and labour into the local 
landscape (Cramb and Curry 2012). This has important implications for rural livelihoods in all 
their different settings. In the case of palm oil development, different patterns of land, human 
resources, and capital are mobilised in different ways right across Southeast Asia (Ibid, p.223). 
In the context of the large sums of capital that are being mobilised by agribusiness, there have 
been debates about how local livelihoods have been shaped. Both opponents and proponents 
delivered their discourses to shape the palm oil agribusiness in their own understandings.  
Some activists have opposed big business due to the widespread problem of labour exploitation. 
For instance, Amnesty International (2016), in their campaign report of “The Great Palm Oil 
Scandal”, highlighted the way the industrial development of palm oil in Indonesia is often 
associated with child labour exploitation where palm oil companies have benefited from the low 
costs of child labour. The report describes labour exploitation from palm oil to strengthen the 
case against palm oil, yet it does not discuss another form of participation by the local 
communities as smallholding palm oil farmers.  
From another perspective, in Sanggau, West Kalimantan, Potter (2015b) shows that the local 
community not only participated as labour in palm oil development, they participated in 
smallholder palm oil in their own way. Potter (2015b) shows an alternative assessment of palm 
oil in Sanggau in West Kalimantan, where smallholder farmers highly value the opportunity to 
grow palm oil and have even embraced credit institutions to finance their palm oil enterprises.  
Other critics have raised concerns regarding the livelihood outcomes from tree-cash crop 
plantations. For instance, Li (2011, p.283) argues that the development of high-value commercial 
crops such as rubber, palm oil, and sugar frequently attract mega-farming investors, but she 
critiques the employment opportunities provided by such large-scale plantations as being less 
than that for other land uses. In the case of large-scale farming, investors gain substantial profit, 
while original landowners receive little or nothing (Ibid, p.284). The drawback of her argument 
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was to neglect the impact of market access made by palm oil development to local participation 
in palm oil when this is on their own terms.  
From another perspective, Mertz (2015) acknowledges the problem of land dispossession from 
large-palm oil plantations in Sarawak and West Kalimantan. Nevertheless, he suggests that palm 
oil development has tended to increase the market participation of rural communities while also 
increasing infrastructure access (Mertz, 2015, p.734). It is found that in Sarawak people living 
near palm oil plantations can gain income opportunities by engaging with the growing cash 
economy (Mertz et al, 2013, p.116). Mertz found in other areas with non-industrial palm oil 
developments that many people have relatively limited opportunity for more cash income (Ibid.). 
In his livelihood survey, those who embraced palm oil development have been economically 
better off in the last ten years, while those households without palm oil cultivations have been 
economically worse off (Ibid, p.116).  
Furthermore, Cramb et al. (2009) observe that successive booms of cash crops brought 
differentiated impacts to swidden farmers. Some swidden farmers are worse off from the large-
scale land disposession and land use-zoning (Cramb et al. 2009, p.343). On the positive side, 
agricultural transformation has progressed bringing more infrastructure in the form of roads, 
education and health care to previously isolated groups (Ibid, p.323). Hence, swidden 
communities do not simply passively resist development pressures. Indeed, local communities 
adopt new market practices as they engage with palm oil plantations, even while many still retain 
swidden practices (Ibid, p.323). Cramb et.al (2009, p.329) found that local swidden communities 
often simultaneoulsy have swidden plots and high-value cash crop plots, although in extreme 
cases, social-economic changes push youth to leave swidden production altogether. In another 
case, households concentrate on cash cropping and off-farm work (Ibid, p.331).  
Hence, when it comes to the agrarian transition, Cramb et al. (2009) suggest that local people 
diversify their livelihoods depending on their available assets. Livelihood assets refer to capital 
owned by the local households such as natural capital (e.g. land access), physical capital 
(infrastructure), financial capital (monetary assets), human capital (labour quality and 
availability), and social capital (social support to particular households) (Ellis 2000, p.11).  
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In Burkina Faso, West (2013) employs the concept of sustainable livelihood analysis to observe 
local livelihood adaptations under the pressure of extreme droughts. Sustainable livelihoods here 
relate to sensitivity and resilience. Sensitivity refers to the period that a household is being 
affected by external shocks (e.g. drought), while resilience refers to the adjustment period needed 
to adapt and recover from these external shocks (West 2013, p. 343). In this research, it was 
found that households can adapt during periods of agrarian transition if they have high resilience 
and are less sensitive to the adverse effects of such external environmental shocks (Ibid). Off-
farm labour opportunities such as work in gold mines provided a way to buy grains and 
accumulate more assets within the dry season. Through livelihood diversification, households in 
the local area could use livestock as a source of wealth that would help sustain them through 
droughts (Ibid.) 
Palm oil development can bring land dispossessions, but it can also provide new market 
opportunities for local smallholders, as well as bringing infrastructure into rural areas. Rigg 
(1998) found that increasing infrastructure access is often an important factor when it comes to 
livelihood diversification. For instance, in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the development of road 
infrastructure gave rural households access to new market and employment opportunities (Rigg 
1998, p.501). This thesis will assess the livelihood transformation and employment opportunities 
that come with expanding palm oil development in Kapuas Hulu.  
2.4 Reviews of local reactions to oil palm plantations 
This section provides a review of the local institutional reactions to large-scale palm oil 
development in the largest producer countries of Indonesia and Malaysia. This review then 
examines specific palm oil development issues in Kapuas Hulu, West Kalimantan. In the 
Indonesian and Malaysian economies, global economic forces shape land use and livelihoods for 
palm oil expansion in various ways.  
The following cases of Sarawak, Jambi and Sanggau underscore local institutional responses in 
different ways to shape land and livelihood outcomes. Cramb (2007) explains four reasons why 
Iban Dayak groups can actively participate in cash crop cultivation in Sarawak. These include: 
adaptable livelihood strategies, different land-tenure strategies, the presence of new settlers, and 
their active engagement with the market and state.   
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Firstly, Cramb (2007, p.358) states that differentiated livelihood strategies have strengthened 
Iban institutions. From his research, the cash economy does not force them to leave their 
traditional subsistence farming methods, but instead, allows them to combine traditional 
livelihoods with new ones. Previously, Iban communities had planted traditional rain-fed hillside 
rice. By the late twentieth-century, changed environmental conditions and restricted access to 
forests threatened their swidden practices, while the introduction of new crops promised benefits 
from the cash economy. Instead of entirely abandoning swidden agriculture, they employed a 
hybrid livelihood strategy. They still defended their traditional agriculture farming practices, 
although simultaneously engaged with the cash economy. With improved road infrastructure, 
more Iban began engaging in smallholding palm oil cultivation in Sarawak, Malaysia (Cramb & 
Sujang, 2013).  
Secondly, strong customary arrangements within Iban communities have played a role in their 
continuing tenure over ancestral lands (Cramb 2007). Customary institutions such as community 
longhouses, and their local territorial areas remain important for Saribas Iban and have helped 
them to adapt to a changed agrarian landscape (Ibid, p.360). The longhouse community 
constitutes an average of 15 to 20 households within a single communal territory (menoa) 
(Cramb 2007, p.53). Within this communal system, individual households still retain individual 
land rights, but these households are situated within a community territory (Ibid, p.54). With the 
influx of commercial crops, and an associated process of land increasingly being accumulated by 
outsiders, land distribution is becoming increasingly uneven. In another setting, the territorial 
principle remains a survival strategy for Iban (Ibid, p.361). They employ a range of strategies to 
address unequal land access including temporary rights transfers and borrowing and leasing land. 
In addition, these communities often place restrictions on village land dedicated to rubber 
cultivation in an attempt to limit land accumulation (Ibid, p.361). In these communities, it is 
common for households to pool their common farming land so as to establish temporary lending 
and leasing mechanisms to redistribute land amongst community members.   
With the recent expansion of oil palm, local farmers in Sarawak divide their labour time and 
resources between oil palm and swidden activities (Cramb, 2015). Yet, increasingly fewer labour 
resources are devoted to manage their own swidden plots due to the increasingly diversified 
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nature of livelihoods. Nevertheless, those who engage in swidden still hold onto a shared access 
system when it comes to hunting and gathering (Ibid, p.786).    
Thirdly, Iban communities in Sarawak have been able to adapt to a changed agrarian situation 
due to their long history of engagement with the market and state since the mid-nineteenth 
century (Cramb 2007, p.362). In Sarawak, the British-influenced legal system provides 
opportunities for Iban to articulate their claims of customary tenure through the court system. 
Customary leaders also functioned as mediators who supplemented the colonial-influenced court 
system by resolving local land conflicts (Ibid. p56). The engagement of Iban leaders at the local 
government level enabled them to articulate customary legal traditions amidst local government 
interventions. As they grew commercial crops in their customary lands, they engaged the global 
market via both Chinese and Iban traders with fewer impediments (Ibid. p.363). 
Community engagement with the state has also been supported by the common law system to 
counter top-down state policies in relation to land in Sarawak. Oil palm cultivation has been 
promoted over swidden agriculture in Sarawak since the 1980s, and numerous land projects that 
have attempted to replace swidden with oil palm plantations have been developed (Cramb, 2015, 
p. 771). However, in the common law system practised in Sarawak, the community can appeal 
through the courts to revoke or reject land commodification by the state (Cramb 2013, 4). In 
contrast, it appears that this legal recourse is not available to the legal system in Indonesia.  
Finally, with the influx of settlers to participate in various crop booms, the local inhabitants in 
Sarawak have adapted to an influx of settlers coming to accumulate land. In Sarawak, migration 
has contributed to the growth of rural and urban settlements with ethnically diverse populations 
(De Koninck et al 2011). The longhouse community demonstrates resilience amidst a mostly 
unrestrained land market (Cramb 2011, p.70). Hakka Chinese came into Borneo in the middle of 
18th century primarily for gold mining, followed by more migrant Chinese as commercial traders 
in the 19th century (Ibid, p.59). While they languished under British colonial policy (and that of 
the Brooke rule) that restricted their trade and other economies, subsequent laws to promote 
intensive agriculture attracted more Chinese to come into Southwest Sarawak (Ibid, p.59). 
During these episodes of Chinese settlement in Borneo, they expanded their participation in the 
commercial plantation boom. However, local Dayaks did not surrender their land to Chinese 
lenders, as lands were not allowed (under customary tenure) to be used for collateral when 
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borrowing money, while standing crops could be used for collateral on short-term loans (Cramb 
2011, p.70). In Sarawak, joint ventures between Iban and palm oil developers meant that Iban 
did not sell their land to the state, but provided 60-year land leasing agreements to palm oil 
developers (Mertz, 2015, p.735). For them, customary tenure was not viewed as an obstacle to 
the adoption of cash crops in Sarawak as new investments simply allowed the Dayaks to sell 
palm oil fruits to surrounding mills (Ibid, p.735).   
The situation regarding local institutional responses from palm oil development is different in 
Jambi, Sumatra, as reported by McCarthy & Zen (2016), who suggest palm oil development can 
improve the livelihoods of more prosperous farmers (often local elites) as they can reap the 
advantages of oil palm booms. Such farmers are advantaged as they have surplus capital that can 
be invested into labour and fertilisers, which means they are better able to acquire further rural 
land for oil palm cultivation (McCarthy & Zen, 2016, p.126). However, many poor farmers in 
Jambi struggled to hold on to their land as the cash economy became more and more prominent, 
especially in times of household crises (Ibid, p.129). Hence, smallholder oil palm plots are at risk 
of being sold to outsiders, while the erstwhile smallholder farmers are forced into low-skilled 
labour work.  
In the Sumatran forest frontier, local inhabitants in Jambi informally had tenure over their 
traditional lands. At the same time, there have been a massive influx of Javanese migrants was 
spurred on by the availability of day labour work, and these migrants often apply a more formal 
approach to land, over which they claim formal ownership (McCarthy & Zen, 2016, p. 129). 
With the state often ignoring local land claims, tenure security for local people is a major issue 
where people are vulnerable to outsiders acquiring their land (Ibid.) Those who do not have legal 
tenure certification are in a grey area and are often in a weak position when it comes to claiming 
land tenure and hence at risk of losing land access.  
In Sanggau, West Kalimantan, the Dayak community continues to practise swidden agriculture 
in the form of upland rice cultivation (Potter 2015b,p. 751). Nevertheless, their subsistence mode 
of production was under increasing pressure as large-scale plantations expanded in West 
Kalimantan (Ibid, p.755). As the cash economy expanded people have had to survive by 
engaging with the cash economy. Recently, the Dayak have engaged in palm oil cultivation 
themselves, and by gaining access to credit unions, they are able to finance small palm oil 
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enterprises (Ibid.p.761). Hence, they now cultivate a mix of crops including rubber, swidden and 
palm oil.   
Within contemporary Sanggau, longhouses have almost disappeared due to a policy from the 
New Order regime that attempted to ban them, while communal forests are now rare in palm oil 
dominated sub-districts such as Parindu (Potter, 2015). Unlike Sarawak, the Indonesian 
government still retains centralized authority over forest areas, such that Dayaks, who rely upon 
their customary rights to the forest, are often in a weak position to claim tenure (ibid).  New 
settlers were introduced to Sanggau through the transmigration program, which began moving 
rural people from Java to Sanggau in 1979, such that indigenous Dayaks have faced land 
pressures from transmigrants and expanding palm oil plantations in their area (Potter 2016). 
Today a high population density has meant that land has increasingly come under the cultivation 
of immigrants (Potter, 2015), as reflected in table 2-1.  
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Table 2-1 Local responses to commercial plantations in Sumatra and Borneo 
 
Factors Iban (Sarawak) 
(Cramb 2007, 2011) 
Jambi, Sumatra 
(McCarthy 2006) 
Sanggau, West 
Kalimantan  
(Potter, 2011, 2015). 
Livelihood strategy Retaining 
subsistence farming 
as a hybrid strategy  
Palm oil cultivation 
and labour work   
Palm oil cultivation and 
swidden farming  
Land-tenure strategy Strong  Weak Weak  
Engagement with market and state Active - to defend 
their customary 
institutions  
Subordinate to state 
policies and laws 
emanating at the 
national level   
Subordinate to 
government and private 
actors  
Adaptation to new settlers Strong Weak Weak  
 
 
This research focuses on a district located along the border with Malaysia in an area where large 
tracts of land have been set aside for environmental preservation. In the preceding section, oil 
palm development in Silat Hilir was understood as existing at the intersection of industrial 
agriculture and ‘traditional’ smallholder farming. In Badau, located along the border with 
Sarawak, contestation over national economic security and large-scale investment in oil palm 
plantations involves a more complex local situation. This thesis will shows how the situation is 
somewhat different to those reviewed above in their specific local settings, by mapping local 
reactions in Kapuas Hulu.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Research background 
This thesis aims to examine local responses to palm oil development in Kapuas Hulu, West 
Kalimantan. Fundamentally, this study investigates local institutional changes, land acquisition 
processes, and livelihood transformation as a result of palm oil development. To address these 
research objectives, various data collection methods were employed. 
Firstly, I collected secondary information to obtain background information on local conditions 
in the case study sites. These consisted of prior ethnographic studies and various reports from the 
different stakeholders (e.g government, NGOs). For instance, Dove (2011) presented a detailed 
ethnographic account of Dayak livelihood activities, the cultivation of subsistence food crops, 
and their use of labour and land for rubber cultivation, based primarily on fieldwork conducted in 
the 1980s (Dove, 1985). Later on, he underlines those ethnographic experiences to be relevant 
field experiences to understand the complexity of swidden farming in Dove (2011). Such 
background information helped guide me to situate my approach to local community engagement 
in a way that allowed me to more effectively explore local aspirations and attitudes towards palm 
oil development.  
My research objectives require me to attain a deeper understanding of changing local social 
relations, power relations, and livelihood transformation. Ethnographic field work has been 
applied as the suitable research strategy to address these objectives. McCarthy (2006) reveals 
how the substance of ethnographic field work involves building local contacts, mapping local 
agrarian characteristics and understanding trajectories of local institutional changes. In my case, 
ethnographic field work involved spending 8 months in my various case sites across Kapuas 
Hulu. Further details of my field work schedule are presented in the last section of this chapter.  
Other systematic data collection techniques were also used during the period of ethnographic 
field work, including: participant observation, semi-structured interviews, group discussions and 
a local livelihood survey. These methods of data collections will now be explained in greater 
detail. 
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3.2 Secondary data collection  
Roche (2005) indicates that a comprehensive review of pre-existing literature is required to track 
previous discussions of a subject area and to help identify priorities for further research. My 
study drew upon the ethnographic work conducted by Dove (2011), who examined in detail the 
swidden cultivation systems found in Kapuas Hulu. This work demonstrated how Dayak 
communities still applied swidden cultivation systems in circumstances where cash crops were 
increasingly integrated within the system, especially the planting of rubber as being 
complementary to swidden cultivation (Dove 2011). In addition, Eilenberg (2012, p.17-18) made 
some prior observations of the upland landscapes and remote village environments in Kapuas 
Hulu, suggesting that a dependence on forest resources resulted in fewer economic opportunities 
for the Dayak Iban communities who inhabited these areas. The work of Cramb (2007) also 
provided detailed ethnographic work on agrarian transformation amongst Dayak Iban 
communities across the Malaysian border in Sarawak, suggesting a relatively successful ability 
to position themselves within a rapidly changing economy. 
This study also collected various reports made by different stakeholders regarding the issue of 
land use and economic development in Kapuas Hulu, that might be considered “grey literature”. 
When dealing with such data, Roche (2005, p.183) underscores the importance of substance of 
power behind the secondary reports. For instance, in tracing various government reports, a 
distinct discourse emerged which acted to advocate for and defend the interests of large-scale 
industrial plantations. They frequently did this by proposing mostly top down regulation to 
consolidate their discourse into policy making. Similarly, there have been several critical reports 
prepared by environmental activist organisations that seek to construct a discourse of the palm 
oil industry as being both socially and environmentally destructive in an attempt to delegitimise 
the industry from a societal perspective. The sometimes contradictory information that emerged 
from such reports reflects the conflicting interests and trajectories of various institutions, and 
their ability to shape palm oil development outcomes in Kapuas Hulu.  
The Indonesian government (especially through the statistics agency, BPS or Badan Pusat 
Statistik) publishes a large volume of statistical material at various spatial scales often down to 
the sub-district level. This includes such issues as infrastructure development, economic activity, 
agricultural production, employment and various other social indicators. I have consulted this 
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data and have, at times, presented it in this thesis. However, it should be emphasised that the 
capacity of BPS to collect primary data is limited and they often draw on the data collected by 
other line agencies which is of highly variable quality. Such data is best used as a broad indicator 
of actual realities. 
Besides these reports, I collected various maps to help guide the research and to identify 
locations for subsequent fieldwork. There included various online maps available from the 
provincial government of West Kalimantan and the district government of Kapuas Hulu, which 
were complemented by maps produced by conservation organizations, such as GiZ- FORCLIME 
(Forest and Climate Change Programme). These online and institutional maps are overlaid and 
adjusted with each other to generate a more precise cartographic result. This map was used to 
demarcate the district, to determine research sites in my study. Similarly to written reports, 
however, these maps are rarely impartial spatial reflections of reality and are equally imbued 
with various attempts to construct or support particular discourses or policy narratives. 
3.3 Participant observation 
By definition, participant observation is a way of collecting information about social activities 
within a particular society using both verbal and non-verbal clues (Schmuck 1997). In practice, 
an ethnographer engages in different kinds of activities such as getting involved in community 
activities, observing, taking notes, and doing interviews (Bernard 2006). In my case study sites, 
palm oil development was introduced to a rapidly changing local landscape. Based on prior 
information, local communities used to deal with various forest dependent activities such as 
swidden agriculture, tapping rubber, and collecting vegetables and fruits from their forests. 
Participant observation was conducted to trace the day to day activities of what was currently 
happening within these changing rural landscapes. My study observed livelihood and social 
relations by recording local conversations and interacting through photos and daily notes. This 
participation observation was conducted through various stages.  
First of all, the participant observation was pursued by gaining a degree of social acceptance 
within the local communities, as it was obvious from the beginning that I was not a community 
member. Despite being an Indonesian, I am not a native to Kalimantan. To gain local acceptance, 
I needed to develop credentials as a legitimate presence in the community, as it is imperative for 
the researcher to be favourably received, or at least accepted, within the community despite the 
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position of the researcher ultimately being one of an outsider (Rose, 1997, p.312). I attempted to 
introduce myself, and to account for my presence, in a way that did not discourage community 
members from volunteering information. Here, I introduced myself to local villagers as a 
research student interested in palm oil trajectories, but who did not bring any explicit political 
agenda or interests, and who had limited direct capacity to influence their local livelihoods.  
The participant observation assisted to build a degree of intimacy with the local community as an 
outsider trying to develop trust with individuals with whom I did not have a previous 
relationship. Here, I learnt to appreciate their local perspectives, to develop empathy, and to 
improve my ability to effectively communicate with them (Allsop et al., 2010, p.211). I 
recognise that having that engagement with local villagers in Janting was particularly difficult. 
Having read their history of head hunting, I was afraid that any unintended miscommunication 
with them could have serious implications for my life. These concerns were triggered every time 
I engaged in farming activities and noticed that they always brought their chopping knife as tools 
to cut the trees and grasses in their swidden activities. However, based on past stories of their 
headhunting cultures, I was still afraid of tools used for agricultural activities. Comfortable 
conversations and mutual relationships were built when I stopped being judgemental about their 
local daily lives, and daily interaction was built by following their daily activities, such as local 
swidden cultivation (see Plate 3-1). In their interaction, I found that headhunting was no longer 
practised by the Iban nowadays.  
Furthermore, in my unfamiliarity with local Iban habits and culture, my local positionality was 
progressed by hearing more and talking less in my local interaction with them. In some cultural 
ceremonies, they liked to drink high-content alcoholic drinks that they purchased from Sarawak. 
In another field work setting, young Iban described their struggles to keep engaged in swidden 
farming when they were interested in pursuing education as a basic need for them. In these 
situations, I learnt to understand that their local culture was enriched by celebrate many events. 
My initial inability to engage in local Iban conversations meant I was limited to the use of basic 
vocabulary. Even so, the use of simple words like ‘yes’ (in Ibanic communities, aok or bise) and 
‘no’ (nadai or nisi) actually encouraged my informant to open up and supply more information 
to me. Instead of constantly emphasising their challenges in satisfying growing cash needs, I 
developed an appreciation for how they rarely complained about their financial struggles, and 
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this encouraged me to also be thankful for every circumstance I face. As I slowly developed 
more intimate relationships with local villagers, I learnt to acknowledge their rich cultural 
diversity and unique perceptions regarding their own ways of their life.  
Plate 3-1 The author participating in swidden activities with Dayak Iban in Janting village 
 
 
Establishing local trust and confidence was, perhaps surprisingly, more challenging in 
multicultural locations like in Badau and Silat Hilir. In these multicultural settings, the dilemma I 
faced was to address the uncertainty and scepticism towards the presence of a researcher, as it 
appeared as though my presence would be rejected by local communities (as elsewhere described 
by Rose, 1997). In the first three days of my visiting Badau village, there was an initial rejection 
- especially from the Dayak community. Based on their previously negative experiences of 
losing land through palm oil development, they seemed to be antagonistic towards being 
interviewed. Although this village was located next to Janting, I could not extend my local 
connections in Janting to approach these local villagers. Eventually, I was fortunate enough to 
meet and develop a friendship with one Malay resident in that village, who offered me a place to 
live and started to give some little information about palm oil. In these multicultural settings, I 
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learnt again how villagers in the riverine villages engage in daily conversation. I acknowledged 
their daily social interaction was established through daily conversation around the river such as 
during their morning shower time (see Plate 3-2). In spite of my inability to swim, I learnt to 
persevere in the water and that seemed to generate a degree of local acceptance. In that setting, I 
also learnt that cultural practices were more oriented towards various multicultural gatherings 
rather than monocultural ceremonies, and involved activities like playing cards and chess with 
individuals of different multicultural backgrounds in the village. From such local engagement, 
community members started to give me connections about key informants who were more 
knowledgeable about palm oil development. I felt thankful that this changing situation occurred 
where some villagers began to speak to me regarding palm oil development. The Malay 
individual whose house I stayed in also guided me towards key Dayak informants who were 
willing to discuss their experience of land deals and land dispossession.  
Plate 3-2 The author participating in social gathering at the river in Badau village 
 
 
In Miau Merah (my third case study village), my approach was to build rapport and trust by 
visiting villagers randomly from one house to another. By making such local visits, there was a 
face to face connection to some key informants (see plate 3-3). It became clear that assumptions 
that my respondents had familiarity with Bahasa Indonesia would be tested. For example, a 
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villager from Sebaruk claimed to be more than 100 years old and, despite difficulty speaking in 
Bahasa Indonesia, he kept using various body languages to make me understand the message. I 
was fully appreciating his efforts to enrich me with information. Through the visual expressions, 
I even captured the information needed to answer my research questions. Such interactions 
emphasised the need for me to develop a more extended Dayak vocabulary, and even though I 
never developed any real fluency, I could at least use words like drink (ngirop) and call out to 
young men (ujang) or understand when people called out to me “young man….young man”, or 
“Jang….Jang….”. 
 
Plate 3-3 The author visiting local villager's house in Miau Merah 
 
 
Gaining social acceptance within a community often requires protracted negotiations across 
space and, prior to fieldwork in Kapuas Hulu, various local contacts in Pontianak would ask 
what my research was about. When I told them it was about palm oil development, I was quite 
shocked that they frequently revealed that it would be a sensitive issue to discuss in my proposed 
case study sites. Prior to field work, local informants also spoke about conflicts between the 
villagers of Semuntik and Janting. When I arrived arriving in Putussibau (the main town in 
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Kapuas Hulu), local contacts then added their stories about some local demonstrations against a 
palm oil plantation company in Silat Hilir just prior to when I planned to go there in mid-2016. 
Prior to field work, I wondered about the uncertain responses that my presence might provoke, 
leading me to be possibly rejected by those villagers. While such information is important to 
contextualise a study site prior to field work, it can also create pre-conceptions that may not be 
helpful.  
I was told that villagers in Badau and Miau Merah were well known for not welcoming 
outsiders, especially environmental activists. To overcome that, my local strategy was to adopt a 
positionality based on the likely feasibility of being able to interact with different people in a 
relaxed and casual interaction (Allsop et al., 2010, p.214). In the process of building up trust, 
many times local communities in Janting and Badau asked me about my intentions when 
collecting data in their villages. Even though I already introduced myself as a research student, 
they were still suspicious that I may have been from an NGO, a government representative, or 
held another external role that would make them refuse my presence. I actually had to explain 
again to them that the researcher’s task was to learn local cultures not to offer some policy 
agenda, and that researchers would disseminate findings in terms of writing media and, in my 
case, this would be a doctoral thesis. To strengthen my identity, I also showed them my formal 
research permit from government, along with my participant information statement and support 
letter from the university.  
In my various social interactions, information was periodically recorded and written up in a field 
journal (as discussed by Allsop et al., 2010, p.214). In the local settings and interactions, I did 
not set a rigid time to make journal entries, as I maintained flexibility to capture information as 
convenient to respondent times. Nevertheless, there were some rules of thumb that I followed, 
such as making journal entries at least three times every week. Sometimes, in the process of field 
journal writing, drawing on photographic documentation was also useful to review information 
and observations in a way that would trigger ideas and thoughts about what I had witnessed that I 
might otherwise ignore in my field notes alone.  
3.4 Interviews  
In my fieldwork, the interview was devised to capture various attitudes and perceptions towards 
palm oil development. The information was collected by asking verbal opinions about local 
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perceptions towards palm oil development in their villages and addressing topics such as 
changing resource institutions, land acquisition processes, and local livelihood change. The 
interviews involved various stages such as establishing contact, engaging in the interview 
process, and closing the interview (as described by Dunn, 2005).  
Establishing contact involves selecting informants on the basis of their experiences and 
likelihood that they would possess specific knowledge and capabilities that could provide 
relevant information on the topics in my study (Dunn, 2005). Prior to field work to Kapuas Hulu, 
I had contact with other researchers from CIFOR (Centre for International Forestry Research, 
located in Bogor, West Java) who had conducted previous social science research in Kapuas 
Hulu, and they provided me with some local contact points and village leaders in Badau. I 
realised in the field, however, that I cannot depend solely on village leaders, and I quickly found 
other contacts during earlier participant observation who also had the capacity to provide 
important insights and information.  
The selection of informants was considered based on their ability to communicate their ideas and 
experiences relevant to my research investigation (Dunn, 2005, p.112), and this often relied on a 
“snowball sampling strategy” where I would ask my initial informant about next potential 
interviewees who had similar capabilities to provide information like them. This helped 
selectively identify informants with stronger capabilities to answer my questions. Prior to an 
interview, I arranged a village meeting to introduce myself and to give the villagers information 
about my interview topics. In addition to interviews within my three primary case study villages, 
I also complemented those with some respondents in Embaloh Hulu, where I also attended 
village meetings and discussed similar issues as I had done in my main case sites (see Plate 3-4). 
Later on, these interview topics were helpful to inform and to filter respondents about their 
capabilities to answer my interviews. All interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis, and 
involved obtaining informed verbal consent from informants. During my research, I conducted 
interviews with various stakeholders to explore local information of palm oil development. The 
types of respondents based on their locations are provided in the following table.  
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Table 3-1 Interview informants 
Place Informants 
Janting  Village heads, swidden farmers, oil palm labourers, oil palm farmers, 
customary leaders 
Badau Village leaders, migrants, local inhabitants (indigenous and migrant residents), 
oil palm farmers, labourers, local businesses/traders, local oil palm cooperative 
representatives  
Miau Merah  Village leaders, migrants, swidden farmers, local inhabitants (indigenous and 
migrant residents), oil palm farmers, labourers, local businesses/traders, local 
palm oil cooperative representatives, villager to work as local palm oil 
companies land acquisition staff 
Embaloh Hulu  Village leaders, customary leaders, swidden farmers, local businesses/traders, 
sub-district head of Embaloh Hulu 
Putussibau (capital city of 
Kapuas Hulu)  
Local NGO representatives, global donor conservation staff and representatives, 
local government representative for the district office of agriculture and 
plantations  
Pontianak (capital city of 
West Kalimantan)  
Provincial environment office/representative (Dinas AMDAL Propinsi), 
provincial forestry office/representative, Provincial land agency’s 
representative (Dinas BPN Propinsi)  
Jakarta (capital city of 
Indonesia) 
RSPO representatives, palm oil company representatives (GAPKI) 
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Plate 3-4 Local meeting in Embaloh Hulu 
 
 
Successful interviews require planning and detailed preparations (Dunn, 2005, p.101). Prior to an 
interview session, I identified that the local risks during the interview would be respondents 
misunderstanding my interview questions and delivering incorrect information. I applied a semi-
structured approach to interviews, which can give more flexibility to address research issues 
compared with structured interviews. In the structured interview, the questions are already pre-
determined, but in semi-structured interviews, I listed the topics and developed these further 
during the interview process. With that flexibility, semi-structured interviews helped me to scope 
respondents’ feedback according to the information that I needed. Another preparation was to 
select the most convenient place to do the interview. For example, when I conducted interviews 
with Iban in Janting, the most suitable place was in their houses. I found conducting interviews 
in their houses gave them more sense of relaxation than interviewing in the swidden fields. 
Interview topics are presented in Appendix A. 
During the interview, a prevalent challenge can be emotional relations and uneven power 
relationships between respondents and researchers (Dowling 2005). In Embaloh Hulu, some 
village leaders expressed their opposition towards proposed oil palm development in their village 
and, based on my assumed power as a researcher, they asked me to voice their opposition with 
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broader policy makers. This was not a position I was comfortable with. In Janting, my challenge 
was to overcome emotional situations that arose during the interview. For example, some 
respondents shared their emotional pains about the way that their land was re-allocated to large-
scale palm oil developers with very little return in compensation, and it is undeniable that these 
emotional expressions influenced my supposedly independent position as a researcher.  
To mitigate, or at least transparently acknowledge, such uneven power relations and emotional 
influence, critical reflexivity was taken to ensure self-awareness in an attempt not to exploit the 
interview process and to mute emotional influences upon the researcher (Dowling, 2005). To 
limit emotional relationships with respondents, I returned by reflecting self-awareness about my 
position and my emphasising my own limitations. The act of critical reflexivity asserted my 
position as a student researcher with limited capabilities. 
After that, closing an interview was pursued based on the sense of continuance, feedback, and 
clarification rather than simply ending the interview (Dunn, 2005, p.95). In the local conduct of 
interviews, I expressed my appreciation of the informant’s opinions and expressions and 
provided contact details if they required any further information about the purpose of the 
interview or results of the study. This act of respect was commonly returned by providing 
recommendations for subsequent interviewees in their village, such that snowball sampling 
recommendations were assisted through the act of interview closure.  
3.5 Group discussions  
Focus group consists of a small number of respondents, between six and ten people, discussing 
topics initiated by the researcher (Cameron 2005). In focus group discussions, interaction among 
group members is the key characteristic which is distinguishable with an interview (Ibid, p.117). 
It is debatable, perhaps, whether I actually engaged in “focus group discussions” or simply 
“group discussions”, but the ultimate outcomes and benefits were similar. Firstly, the group 
discussion was held to collect group responses regarding palm oil development in the local area, 
and to observe the dynamic between different individuals. Secondly, it was organized to collect 
information regarding the seasonal calendar of swidden cultivations in the respective areas. 
Focus group discussions consist of selecting participants, composing an appropriate focus group, 
determining the number of participants in the group, recruiting participants, generating questions 
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and topics, as well as conducting focus groups (Cameron, 2005). In Janting, my concern was to 
explore swidden activities (e.g. mapping their swidden seasons), to trace perceptions of palm oil 
development, and to know informants’ livelihood aspirations. With these topics, the basis of 
selecting the participants was that they were swidden farmers and that they had some local 
experience of palm oil development. In Badau and Miau Merah, I found that it was difficult to 
arrange focus group meetings given the very tight schedule of many villagers in their agricultural 
work and in their off-farm activities. As such, I did not arrange specific meetings, but followed 
their regular village meetings based on their determined schedules.  
In Janting, at first, there were six swidden farmers who matched the criteria and were able to 
participate in the focus group discussion. Later, I could not limit the actual numbers as those six 
swidden farmers also asked their friends to join in the local discussions, resulting in ten swidden 
farmers actively participating and contributing their opinions.  
During the process of a focus group, the setting can be made informally and is normally led by a 
focus group facilitator or moderator (Cameron, 2005).  I was thankful to another villager who 
assisted me by providing snacks and local foods, so the participants could enjoy the relaxing 
moments eating light brunch during discussions. In the focus group, the facilitator was selected 
on the basis of their familiarity with the research aim and focus group purpose (Ibid, p.124). I 
recruited a research assistant who could speak Iban and was familiar with my research aims from 
Putussibau, Kapuas Hulu (outside Ulak Pauk). The research assistant was actually very useful as 
a moderator to clarify participant’s expressions stated in their local language (Iban). This 
assistant helped me to moderate the focus group discussion and to write the results on the 
paperboard. In Ulak Pauk, the village head voluntarily participated as moderator to guide the 
discussion (see Plate 3-5). In the discussion, I also asked the personal opinions of the village 
head to ascertain their biases. According to Rose (1997), allowing participants to act naturally at 
social events brings to the fore actual power relations between individuals at such events.  
In conducting focus groups, Bedford and Burgess (2002) remind us of the heterogeneous 
opinions and attitudes among discussants. In Janting’s focus group, there were two persons who 
came to dominate the conversation, while others were quiet and passive. To encourage a more 
balanced conversation, I worked with the research assistant to encourage those passive 
participants to give their opinions on palm oil development. Actually, the passive participants 
46 
 
could speak openly when they were tactfully encouraged by the local moderator. Clarification 
and mediation from the other participants was also helpful to avoid unnecessarily aggressive 
debates among those dominant participants.  
Plate 3-5 Group discussion in Embaloh Hulu 
 
  
3.6 Household Survey 
Prior to the household survey, data from the official statistics agency11 revealed a large, but 
decreasing, share of labour allocated to the agricultural sector over the last five years. It 
suggested a decrease by about 6.17 percent in Kapuas Hulu between 2009 and 2014. In 2014, 72 
percent of the local population was recorded as working in agriculture, with the largest economic 
share in 2014 coming from the plantation sector. Other past studies made similar conclusions 
that farming-based livelihoods were still the dominant livelihood strategy in Kapuas Hulu (e.g. 
study by Clerc (2012) and Potter (2011)), although Dayaks in Kapuas Hulu are known to engage 
in both food subsistence farming and cash cropping (Shantiko et al. 2013). Colchester et al. 
                                                          
11 Kapuas Hulu regency in figures, 2009, 2014.  
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(2006) even reported that about 33 percent of farmers in West Kalimantan are independent palm-
oil smallholders. 
With such apparently diverse livelihoods, this study attempted to capture the change and 
adaptation of livelihoods since the introduction of large-scale palm oil development in Kapuas 
Hulu. A questionnaire approach was applied due to its ability to generate insights from a large 
number of respondents in a way that afforded a less biased set of insights across a representative 
sample of the communities. The quantitative survey operated through various stages starting 
from determining the questionnaire format, setting the sample, conducting pre-testing and 
conducting the questionnaire (as suggested by McGuirk and O’Neill, 2005). The survey 
questions were mostly closed, allowing quantification of responses and ease of coding, analysis, 
and interpretation, although extensive notes were also made on diverse topics covered during the 
survey process. The acquired information investigated the changing nature of communal land 
access, employment and living expenditure (including food and non-food needs), and general 
attitudes towards oil palm development.  
Before conducting the survey, a key challenge was the absence of any information on livelihood 
or population characteristics that could be a baseline for my case study sites. With such 
inadequate information, the preferred strategy was to conduct random sampling of all village 
households to select the respondents. This consideration followed the similar strategy of past 
surveys conducted by CIFOR and FORCLIME in other areas of Kapuas Hulu. A total of 120 
respondent 120 households were randomly selected from village office lists (using random 
programming system available in Microsoft excel), with 40 households selected from each 
village. In those cases where the randomly identified respondents had since left the village, 
another random sample was conducted in excel. 
I prepared a draft questionnaire, which was pre-testing in Nanga Awin, North Putussibau. This 
site was selected on the basis of apparently similar population and economic characteristics to 
the target villages, in terms of levels of livelihood diversification. This pre-test allowed me to 
significantly improve and refine the survey questions and format in a way that would more 
effectively capture local livelihood realities. The final format of the survey is presented in 
Appendix B. 
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Different methods for administering questionnaires have benefits and drawbacks. Bernard (2006) 
reveals those benefits and risks from self-administered surveys, which can gather large data sets 
at low costs, but with the risk that the researcher has no control over how respondents interpret 
questions, and that illiterate and semi-literate respondents will be excluded. For this thesis, my 
survey was verbally-administered directly by the researcher to respondent with Bahasa 
Indonesia. The verbal survey method gave me opportunities to clarify the questions that were not 
understood by respondents during data collection.  
3.7 Fieldwork Schedule 
In total, fieldwork took about 8 months, with 6 months spent in Kapuas Hulu (see table 3-1) in 
2016. In 2018, there was one further month of fieldwork in February to verify data obtained in 
2016. Before primary data collection was gathered, the consultation and engagement with local 
contact points and Indonesian counterparts was made. This involved clarifying conditions in the 
field and the best way to undertake data collection. In terms of sequencing, the participant 
observation was conducted in the initial stages of field research and the household survey was 
conducted towards the end once I had developed a reasonable understanding of local issues and 
attitudes. In Jakarta, interviews were made with government officials, non-government 
organizations, international donors, and other organizations related to the research questions 
issues.   
Table 3-2 Fieldwork schedule 
Tasks 2016 2018 
 Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Jan-Feb 
Consultation process with local contact points J         
Local permission & introduction to site 
location 
J & P         
Participant observation   B B B/E S S S   
Villages interviews   B B B/E E/S S S   
Focus group discussions     B  S    
Evaluation and Pre-testing       N    
Doing household survey interview       B S   
Interview with stakeholders in Jakarta & 
Pontianak 
       P&J  
Verified primary information         P, B, S 
(*) B: Badau sub-district; S: Silat Hilir; N: Nanga Awin; P: Pontianak; J: Jakarta; E: Embaloh Hulu 
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CHAPTER 4: PALM OIL DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA 
4.1 Introduction 
Palm oil is one of the cheapest oils available, being used for both food and non-food 
applications, including being used as a biofuel. Global consumption for palm oil nearly doubled 
from 23.4 to 40.1 million tonnes between 2004 and 2012 (FaoStat 2018)12. In 1965, the largest 
vegetable source was still coconut oil according to the oil crops yearbook statistics documented 
by USDA (United States Department of Agriculture)13. In their estimation, USDA found that 
palm oil supplied more edible oil than soybean in 2010 (USDA 2010). This market demand has 
promped a major agricultural shift toward palm oil in Indonesia, bringing with it significant land 
use changes, changes in production structures, and various environmental challenges. 
The chapter will firstly present the history of palm oil development in Indonesia, which over 
time has seen a gradual technological transfer to smallholders, who are becoming more involved 
in cultivating oil palm. While larger private interests have still disproportionately benefited from 
these technology transfers, smallholders have been able to take advantage of wider infrastructure 
improvements and market access, participating in oil palm cultivation in such a way that has 
supported their household economy.  
Palm oil production is part of a more complex system of production arrangements that integrate 
upstream producers and downstream corporations. While Indonesia dominates global crude palm 
oil production, much of the value-added processing activities are undertaken offshore. This 
chapter will explain the production and market structure of palm oil produced in Indonesia 
including production structures, export details and exports of palm oil from Indonesia. 
Furthermore, the rising global demand for palm oil has performed an important role in terms of 
reshaping processes of rural economic development in many regions, while at the same time 
presenting a new set of environmental challenges. The global structure of the palm oil industry, 
and the use of palm oil in various processed food products, has meant that these environmental 
challenges are being increasingly governed through a global non-state regulatory system. This 
                                                          
12 Statistics of FAO (website): http://faostat.fao.org/ 
13 https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/oil-crops-yearbook/ 
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chapter will discuss this regulation by global actors such as RSPO (Roundtable for Sustainable 
Palm Oil), and how it intersects with national and local interests in Indonesia. 
4.2 Historical developments of oil palm cultivation in Indonesia  
This section will discuss the history of plantation development in Indonesia, which commenced 
in the colonial era and evolved through state-driven plantation development after independence 
as many estates were nationalised by the Indonesian government. Meanwhile, the relative 
fortunes of the smallholder and corporate sector have shifted under different shareholding 
arrangements, and various forms of partnership (kemitraan). Such shareholding schemes were 
evident in my case studies as part of large-scale private plantation development, as described in 
the last part of this section.  
4.2.1 Colonial era introduction of oil palm to Indonesia 
Originating in West Africa, the oil palm tree grows well under humid climates with suitable 
rainfall, such as Indonesia (Berger and Martin 2012, p.397). Europeans originally brought oil 
palm to Indonesia, with the first pilot experiment conducted in Bogor, West Java, in 1848 (Ibid.). 
At the time, the “Malay world” (what would later become the independent states of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore) was governed as separate British and Dutch colonies. Britain 
controlled northern Borneo (along with the British adventurer, James Brooke) and the Malay 
peninsula east of the Malacca straits. The remainder was under Dutch authority. Rubber 
cultivation, logging, and gold mining have long been important economic activities on Borneo, 
but Sumatra was being transformed into the Dutch-owned estates (as was the peninsula by the 
British). 
Oil Palm cultivation was initiated in Sumatra in the 1800s, which at the time was considered a 
strategic location for its expansion, and was further stimulated by competition between the 
British and Dutch. In the Nusantara (present-day Indonesia) archipelago, the commercialisation 
of several cash crops greatly expanded at the turn of the 19th century. The opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869 allowed a much shorter shipping route to European markets for products from 
Southeast Asia (Breman 1989, p.177), encouraging more direct supply from those regions 
around the Malacca straits (Shien 1998, p.303). The Dutch viewed the thinly populated eastern 
parts of Sumatra as a “waste land”, since it was surrounded by thick forest, and interspersed with 
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“unproductive” swidden cultivation (Stoler 1998, p.23). From this perspective, the region could 
be profitably transformed into commercial plantations, made possible by the passing of the 1870 
Agricultural Law, which essentially opened up large swathes of “waste land” to foreign 
investment by agri-capital interests (Stoler, 1998, p.13).  
Between 1830 and 1911, global consumption of palm oil grew significantly, driven by its use in 
soap, candles, margarine, and lubricants for industrial production process (Corley and Tinker 
2003, p.4). As a result, the east coast of Sumatra to the south of Medan was developed into what 
appeared to be one large plantation, which became known as Deli (Stoler 1998, p.14). Prior to 
1911, the European investors came to the East coast primarily to develop estates for cultivating 
rubber and tobacco (Ibid.) Although the Dutch colonial government had authority over the land, 
private investment from various European investors was dominant. For instance, Belgians came 
to be important pioneers of oil palm plantation in Sumatra, one of whom was SOCFIN (La 
Société Financière des Caoutchoucs) who began investing in palm oil in northern Sumatra in 
191114.  Later on, in 1913, Franco-Belgian interests owned 97 percent of these oil palm 
plantations. Nevertheless, twenty years later, Dutch commercial interests eventually came to 
dominate in Deli, reaching about 59 percent of all palm oil investment. On the other hand, 
Franco-Belgian interests had shrunk to 33.8 percent by 1932 (Stoler, 1998, p.20). 
The Dutch formally acknowledged the rights of local rulers to manage natural resources across 
Sumatra, where they were given authority to grant 75-year land leases to planters (Stoler 1998). 
However, these rajas or sultans were often compelled by the authorities to cede land for 
European settlements and plantations (Breman 1989, p.20). Local rulers, however, often refused 
to provide labour to work on these plantations due to their inherently subversive cultures (Stoler 
1998, p.25). Stoler (1998) states that the planters were therefore forced to recruit unskilled labour 
from either the straits settlements (mainly Chinese) or from impoverished villages on Java. 
Meanwhile, management was almost exclusively European.  
In their operation, the Dutch investment bank, HVA (Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam), expanded 
their capacity by acquiring a large concession in Deli in 1916-17 (Stoler 1998, p.19). This 
investment expanded the role of downstream businesses from simply marketing to managing 
                                                          
14 http://www.socfin.com/en/locations/companies/detail/socfindo  
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plantations soon after acquiring large concession rights in Deli. The total area of land planted 
with oil palm subsequently increased from 6,920 hectares in 1919 to 75,000 hectares in 1936 
(Budidarsono et.al , 2013), just a few years before the Japanese occupation and the war of 
independence.   
In West Kalimantan, the Dutch occupied part of West Borneo (West Kalimantan) in 1848 in 
response to British expansion in Sarawak (Eilenberg 2014b). While the Dutch occupied West 
Kalimantan, they did not have a strategy to improve infrastructure. In Sarawak, the expansion of 
cash crops - in particular rubber and pepper, mainly occurred under the British / Brooke Empire, 
with the assistance of Iban in Batang Lupar territory (Ibid, p.14). In contrast to the relatively 
large-scale commercial development of industrial crops in Sumatra, cash crop development 
occurred in West Kalimantan through cooperation between Chinese and Dayaks. Being 
popularised by Chinese merchants, Dayaks cultivated rubber in their swidden fields from around 
1903 in Sanggau (Potter 2011, p.155). While road infrastructure was not well-developed, the 
merchants saw the possibility to bring rubber into Pasar Kelua, near Tanjung in South 
Kalimantan, which could be shipped directly to Singapore (Ibid, p.156). In West and South 
Kalimantan, rubber remained an important smallholder crop until quite recently (Ibid, p.156). In 
West Kalimantan, oil palm did not become a high value cash crop until the mid-1970s.  
4.2.2 The heyday of state-owned plantation development 
Following Indonesia’s declaration of independence in 1945, the Dutch returned to Indonesia and 
made an attempt to recolonise the country. After re-establishing the colonial government through 
force in 1945, they later acknowledged the independence of the Republican government through 
the Hague agreement on November 2, 194915. 
This political transition brought new resource management arrangements to Indonesia. While the 
Dutch acknowledged customary management, the Indonesian government tried to concentrate 
natural resource management within a more centralised authority. The government had affirmed 
their full authority to control all natural resources through chapter 33 of the Indonesian 
constitution, which states “[T]he land, the waters and the natural resources within shall be under 
the powers of the State and shall be used to the greatest benefit of the people”. The justification 
                                                          
15source: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/251641/Hague-Agreement 
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of this kind of centralised control is to bring welfare for the broader population. Full state control 
over natural resource management was later achieved through the basic Agrarian Law in 1960. 
This law states that all land has to be fully “controlled” by the state (Haverfield 1999, p.53) and 
that customary arrangements shall not contradict the agrarian law. 
The national elite also asserted centralised control over plantation agriculture by nationalising 
former Dutch plantations in 1958 following the West Irian dispute (Mackie 1961). However, 
government interest in expanding oil palm plantations was primarily driven by international 
influences, including the advisor of the United Nation Technical Assistance Program. They 
encouraged oil palm due to the perception that the plantation agriculture was under-developed at 
the time (the 1950s and 1960s) (Budidarsono et al. 2013, p.179).  Indonesia largely followed the 
lead of Malaysia, where large-scale state intervention had successfully encouraged the expansion 
of oil palm. Malaysia had begun to promote large-scale plantation agriculture in the 1960s by 
private companies and by government sponsored land settlement schemes (FELDA) (Cramb and 
Curry 2012, p.223). In Indonesia, right up until the 1970s, investment into large-scale oil palm 
was still heavily reliant on state owned enterprises.  
To Indonesian policy makers, plantation agriculture has long been viewed as an important engine 
of economic development due to rising global demand for plantation crops. Hence, following the 
1958 take-overs, the state-owned plantations were managed as independent plantation 
management units (Breman 1989, p.172) known as Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan (PTPs) and 
Perusahaan Negara Perkebunan (PNPs) (Larson 1996). The Ministry of Agriculture appointed 
and supervised government estate enterprises (PNPs), while government estates (PTPs) had a 
more independent structure under the Ministry of Finance (Ibid.). These eventually became 
managed as a series of state-owned plantation companies, PT Perkebunan Nusantara (PTPNs) 
under the Ministry of State owned enterprises (BUMN). 
Labour within state plantations was recruited on both a permanent and contractual basis, as 
explained by Stoler (1998). PNP board directors were appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and they then directly recruited estate managers and administrative staff (Stoler 1998). Estate 
managers were responsible for hiring temporary labour where they were required by standard 
operating procedures to recruit contractual labour through competitive bidding. Nevertheless, 
this rarely occurred.  Rather, the exchange of goods and services between managers and 
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contractors was built based on a fully-fledged exchange network. Certain contractors had been 
selected by estate managers and in exchange those contractors needed to give bribes (pungutan 
liar) to maintain “good will” with estate managers.  
In the 1970s, smallholding programs were introduced in conjunction with the state-owned 
plantations. The nucleus estate scheme was established to pursue contractual agreement between 
state-owned plantations and surrounding smallholder farmers who would grow oil palm for the 
plantation. In such agreements, farmers would commonly be required to give up 20 percent of 
their proposed land for oil palm development to the PTPN. In turn, the PTPN provided technical, 
logistical and financial assistance to the smallholders, whose fruit would be sold back to them 
(Budidarsono et al. 2013). To stimulate a greater labour supply for plantations in remote rural 
areas (such as those in parts of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua), the government created a 
population redistribution program, known as “transmigrasi” (Potter 2011). A key objective of 
this government program was to redistribute the high population density in Java into the outer 
islands. Indeed, previously, the Dutch had used a similar population redistribution program in the 
early 1900s to hire contract labour from Java for plantations in Sumatra (Potter 2012, p.281). 
Later in 1989, global donors such as the World Bank encouraged transmigrasi to specifically 
meet the labour force requirements of oil palm plantations in the 1990s (Ibid, p.159). The World 
Bank (1989, p.3) promoted more transmigration to support poor farmers or landless labourers 
from Java to benefit from commercial plantation development in the remote outer islands. They 
argued that Javanese farmers with adequate agricultural skills could effectively apply and 
transfer their knowledge in the land-abundant outer islands. Applying these skills to the 
government smallholding scheme would, it was hoped, ensure a high degree of self-finance 
amongst these communities (The World Bank 1989, p.3).  
By 1979, the government had began more actively promoting privatised palm oil development in 
Indonesia. Compelled by a desire to redistribute palm oil assets to domestic entrepreneurs, the 
government sold 60 percent of the PTPNs to domestic market actors at below market price 
(Gaskell, 2015, p.40). This policy was associated with export restrictions, which attempted to 
stabilise domestic palm oil prices in the early 1980s by controlling and restricting exports. By 
1984, however, it was estimated that these export restrictions were resulting in lost export 
revenue of approximately $369 million per year (Gaskell, 2015). Economists and donors used 
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these policy failures to promote a more comprehensive liberalization of the palm oil industry, as 
will be discussed on the following section.  
4.2.3 Private plantations & smallholder development  
The development of private plantations occurred in response to the weak capacity of the 
government to engage in large-scale palm oil development. Despite the failures of the oil palm 
plantation model in the 1980s, the government continued to support oil palm development 
through the Nucleus Estate Scheme (the Perkebunan Inti Rakyat, or PIR) in combination with 
the transmigration programme (the PIR-Trans) between 1986 and 1994 (Budidarsono et al. 2013, 
p.180). In addition, they also supplied low-interest credit loans to estate developers. From 1986 
until 1996, subsidiary loans were given at a rate of 11 percent per annum for estate preparation 
and 14 percent per annum for estates that had already produced their first harvest (Ibid). 
Bissonette (2013) provides a useful account of the PIR nucleus estate scheme applied by the 
PTPNs. This scheme consists of a core company (inti) and smallholders (plasma). Smallholders 
were beneficiaries of PTPN development programs and received technical knowledge from the 
PTPNs, as well as access to industrial processing mills managed by = the company. In exchange, 
they were bound by contract to exclusively provide all oil palm fruit to the company. Yet this 
form of contract farming provided inadequate technical support for the farmers, many of whom 
were unable to meaningful benefit from the wealth generated from oil palm cultivation.  
During this period there continued to be widespread allegations that state-controlled palm oil 
policies were fuelling smuggling, leading to inefficiencies, reducing foreign exchanges and 
contributing to inequality (Gaskell 2015, p.41). The World Bank took this opportunity to push 
the development of private plantations as a way to absorb labour that was being pushed into 
remote areas as part of transmigration policies (Potter 2011, World Bank 1989). Private contract 
farming had been introduced as a partial privatization of the sector under the advice of the World 
Bank. Yet donors criticised government interventions that provided subsidies to contract farmers 
which they saw as hindering growth of the sector. The World Bank insisted that the government 
allow market forces to dictate development of the sector and so in the context of a limited state 
budget and under pressure from donors, the palm oil sector was increasingly privatised 
(Budidarsono et al. 2013). 
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Within the new private model of corporate palm oil production, new partnerships between 
private plantations and smallholders were established, initially through a program known as 
KKPA (Koperasi Kredit Primer untuk Anggota, or Primary Cooperative Credit for Members) 
which was implemented between 1995 and 1998. In that period, the government withdrew from 
direct involvement in plantations, and instead promoted foreign direct investment for large-
agribusiness plantations (Budidarsono et al. 2013). Under this scheme, the establishment of 
large-scale plantations resulted in new institutions that reached down to the village level 
(McCarthy and Zen 2016, p.122). For instance, under KKPA schemes, land was parcelled out to 
cooperatives and the cooperatives were forced to allow corporations to manage that land (Ibid). 
In this instance, smallholders could maintain formal ownership of land which fell under 
corporate management (thereby forgoing their own management rights) and receive a share of 
profits from the corporation. Later, this system was modified into partnerships through 
agricultural regulation since 2007, where the arrangements are quite similar, but with a key 
difference being a smaller dividend sharing, at a minimum of 20%.  
This shareholding system has been applied in my case sites in Miau Merah, in Kapuas Hulu. For 
instance, in Miau Merah, a corporation (PT RAP) acquired a plantation permit over land of 4,500 
hectares of HGU (leasing rights for plantations). Leasing rights are granted to corporations to 
have exclusive land use for long term periods, e.g. ranging from 20 to 60 years. This concession 
is negotiated between corporations and the state in a predominately top down fashion. In Miau 
Merah, 40 percent of the HGU was owned by local villagers, such that a shareholding system 
was implemented. This involved the corporation fully controlling production, but whereby a 
share of financial benefits were redistributed, through a formal agreement with a land 
cooperative, to the original landholding members of the local community. It is common for 
cooperation between palm oil companies and local communities to have been arranged based on 
such shareholding relationships. Under this model, the participation of local people in the palm 
oil industry, and their relationship with downstream companies, is limited to receiving monetary 
dividends from their landholdings combined, in some cases, with employment as labour on the 
palm oil estate. In Badau, the shareholding arrangements falls under a new scheme of partnership 
(kemitraan) with similar arrangements as above, except with a smaller overall share of the land 
(20 percent). Large agribusiness firms have thus been able to control increasingly large areas of 
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land by negotiating with the government for larger shares of state land while also retaining 
control over the redistributed land they obtained from local inhabitants. In 2006, the national 
government introduced a plantation revitalisation scheme, which aimed to replant 1.5 million 
hectares of ageing palm oil plantations, whether owned by the PTPNs or by private companies 
(Zen et al.2016, p.99). During that time, private companies took the opportunity to lobby the 
government for extended land leases to be granted to them from the original land holders (Ibid, 
p.100).  
In addition to the expansion of corporate palm oil, the desire of smallholders to cultivate oil palm 
in their farms, has also contributed significantly to the expansion of oil palm across Indonesia 
(Figure 4-2). The large-scale expansion of palm oil development that took place in Malaysia and 
Indonesia between 1965 and 1980 provided transport and processing infrastructure in Malaysia 
and Indonesia that has been important for the continual expansion of the industry (Cramb and 
McCarthy 2016, p.60). In that phase of palm oil development, the Sarawak government showed 
consistent support over the decades by devoting more assistance for planting grants, inputs, and 
technical advice (Ibid, p.61). In contrast, the Indonesian government has tended to prioritise 
large-scale corporate operations, despite earlier activities (in the early 1980s) that were 
supposedly aimed at supporting smallholder farmers, such as the nucleus-estate schemes. In 
West Kalimantan, some nucleus estate smallholders had been able to expand their capital and 
even evolved into a new class of independent oil palm smallholders (Bissonnette 2013). 
Nevertheless, a process of class differentiation followed, where less successful individuals were 
dispossessed of their land and became oil palm labourers (Ibid.).   
4.3 The global value chain for palm oil  
This section will cover the issues of palm oil establishment costs, production, commodity chains 
and markets. In the first part, it will consider the typical investments that are involved in palm oil 
production. In brief, it has been found that oil palm cultivation requires more capital per hectare 
than other popular crops such as rubber and cacao. The relatively higher capital costs of palm oil 
mean that there is a tendency for it to be cultivated at a larger scale than other crops in an attempt 
to minimise per hectare costs. In the second part, however, it will be shown that oil palm 
production has not been exclusively under the control of corporate entities, but that a growing 
number of smallholders in West Kalimantan also produce the crop. The third sub-section will 
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address the global commodity chain for palm oil, and the role of downstream processing 
businesses in West Kalimantan and their multinational buyers.  
4.3.1 The economics of oil palm cultivation 
Oil palm cultivation is generally recognised as being capital intensive, requiring large amounts of 
land and fertiliser, but requiring a relatively low amount of labour compared to other cash crops 
such as rubber and cacao. Different sources provide different estimates of oil palm plantation 
establishment and production costs. Budidarsono et al (2012) estimate that oil palm 
establishment costs are typically around 22 million IDR per hectare (around 1570 USD). This 
establishment cost is indicated as negative cash flow (expenditure) in the beginning stages of 
plantation development, where it typically takes first four years to recoup the initial set-up 
expenditure (Budidarsono et al. 2012). Rhein (2015) estimates that large palm oil plantations 
cost around 25 thousand US dollar per hectare to establish16 . In 2014, the national statistics 
office in West Sumatra (BPS-Sumatra-Barat 2014) calculated average oil palm production costs 
to be 7.97 million IDR (570 USD) per year per hectare (BPS Provinsi Sumatra Barat, 2014), but 
this was presumably referring to an already established plantation. Table 4-1 below reflects the 
relatively large ratio of capital expenditure to labour costs for oil palm as compared to rubber and 
cacao.  
In table 4-1, capital expenditures of oil palm are much higher expenditure proportion than labour 
costs. For example, the cost for leasing land was higher than total labour expense of labour 
(representing 32.37 percent of all expenditure). Conversely, labour costs for rubber and cocoa 
plantations are significantly higher than other input costs (representing  48.18% and 59.54 % of 
total production costs respectively). In three respective comparisons, the costs of agricultural 
inputs for oil palm are much higher than rubber and cacao (see table 4-1). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Rhein (2015) does not specify whether this is the yearly or overall costs. 
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Table 4-1 Per hectare production costs for oil palm, rubber and cacao 
Components (per year at minimum cost)  Oil Palm % Rubber % Cacao % 
  
("000 
IDR")  
  
("000 
IDR")  
  
("000 
IDR")  
  
Agricultural inputs (total) 1471.16 18.45 273.43 3.16 1075.65 8.60 
Seeds (Benih) 159.56 2.00 104.74 1.21 217.60 1.74 
Fertilizers (Pupuk) 1168.09 14.65 106.46 1.24 677.30 5.42 
Agricultural stimulant (obat perangsang akar) 2.55 0.03 2.71 0.03 12.53 0.09 
Pesticide (Pestisida) 140.96 1.77 59.52 0.68 168.22 1.35 
Labour cost structure (total) 2575.26 32.30 4163.1 48.18 7440.16 59.54 
Managing land (mengelola lahan) 184.76 2.32 278.1 3.22 556.52 4.45 
Cultivating buffer trees (tanam pohon pelindung) 0.41 0.01 0.77 0.01 83.35 0.67 
Cultivating plantation crops (tanam sawit) 43.43 0.54 79.71 0.92 142.10 1.14 
Maintaining plantation (pemeliharaan) 512.08 6.42 505.39 5.85 1763.99 14.12 
Fertilising (pemupukan) 193.62 2.43 39 0.45 247.10 1.98 
Controlling insects (pengendalian OPT) 53.27 0.67 55.32 0.64 196.80 1.57 
Permanent labour (Permanen)  1587.69 19.91 3204.81 37.09 4450.30 35.61 
Land rents (sewa lahan)17 2581.58 32.37 2904.83 33.62 2931.59 23.46 
Other costs (total) 1344.99 16.88 1299.73 15.04 1048.76 8.4 
Equipment rent (sewa alat & sarana) 146.45 1.84 135.67 1.57 211.54 1.69 
Agricultural services (jasa pertanian) 459.91 5.77 40.08 0.46 8.52 0.07 
Other expenditures (biaya lain-lain) 738.63 9.27 1123.98 13.01 828.70 6.64 
Total production costs in IDR 7973.39 100.00 8641.09 100.00 12496.16 100.00 
Total production costs (in current US dollars) 570   617.41  893  
Source: BPS Sumatra Barat, 2014 (the estimation is assumed under small-scale comparisons by leasing other’s land) 
 
In that BPS report, the estimated figure is simulated under a scenario of small-scale oil palm 
development. Hence, if it is applied on a larger scale, it would incur far greater capital costs to 
ensure infrastructure development, such as roads, use of drones, bridges and drainage. The 
higher capital investment for oil palm has important implications for the scale of production, and 
the total area of land planted to oil palm is considerably higher than that for the rubber and cocoa 
(see Figure 4-1). 
 
 
                                                          
17 Palm oil can be planted flexibly in less fertile and less humid landscapes under tropical and constant fertiliser supply (see 
Pirker et al. 2016). This lower soil quality may affect their cheaper smallholding land leasing value to rubber and cacao.   
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Figure 4-1 Areas under Oil Palm, Rubber, and Cacao cultivation in Indonesia (hectares) 
 
Source: Ministry-of-Agriculture-Indonesia 2017); * estimated data, palm oil estate in 2005 not available, aggregate data 
 
In Indonesia, large-scale agribusiness is generally better positioned to acquire investment 
(through finacial markets) and loans (from banks) that will allow them to expand their 
plantations, which partly explains the rapid growth of private plantations over the last decade. 
However, as shown in Figure 4-2, the growth of smallholder cultivation (defined essentially as 
land not held under formal lease arrangements) has also been substantial. According to RSPO 
convention, smallholder palm oil farmers are defined to cultivate less than 50 hectares18. In my 
field work, many smallholders actually have access to much smaller amounts of land and, in 
their experience, they believe that an economic scale of smallholding oil palm would be 4 
hectares. In that smaller scale of 4 hectares, they can still largely depend on their family to 
manage it, excepted in harvest times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 See: https://rspo.org/publications/download/c654430dfcf1b9a 
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Figure 4-2 Oil Palm cultivation by ownership type (in Million Hectares) 
 
 
Source: Indonesian palm oil statistics, Ministry of Agriculture () 
4.3.2 Palm oil production 
In 2008, many advanced industrialised countries such as the United States and those in Europe 
suffered an economic downturn due to the global financial crisis, resulting in reduced economic 
growth in the years immediately after the crisis where (1.9% and -0.6% for US and Europe 
respectively in 2012). This compares unfavourably with economic growth across Southeast Asia 
(6.4 percent in 2012)(OECD 2013), where commodity production such as cash crops (especially 
for the Chinese market) served as an important economic buffer during the crisis. Between 2007 
and 2013, Indonesia and Malaysia were the main contributors of global palm oil supplies (see 
figure 4-3), collectively contributing around 80 percent of palm oil production according to the 
FAO19.  
                                                          
19 Source: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home 
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Figure 4-3 Indonesian and Malaysian Palm oil production (in million tonnes) 
 
Source: FAO website; * = estimated figure, y axis (weight in million tonnes) 
 
In Indonesia, the plantation (or industrial crop) sub-sector is the most important contributor to 
GDP from the agriculture, fisheries and forestry sectors (see table 4-2). Palm oil is also further 
processed in Indonesia into cooking oil and other industrial products and, hence, palm oil is also 
an important contributor to industrial processing in Indonesia, especially in the highly dynamic 
food processing sub-sector.  
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Table 4-2 Contribution of different sectors to Indonesian GDP (in %) 
Sectors  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Food crops  3.69 3.46 3.55 3.48 3.25 3.45 3.43 3.22 
Horticulture crops  1.61 1.6 1.45 1.44 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.44 
Plantations  3.91 3.87 3.75 3.75 3.77 3.52 3.46 3.47 
Livestock  1.58 1.5 1.52 1.55 1.58 1.6 1.62 1.57 
Agricultural services and hunting  0.21 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.19 
Forestry  0.85 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.7 0.67 
Fisheries  2.09 2.09 2.14 2.21 2.32 2.51 2.56 2.57 
Mining & Explorations 10.46 11.81 11.61 11.01 9.83 7.65 7.18 7.57 
Industrial process oil and gas 3.41 3.63 3.46 3.29 3.19 2.78 2.31 2.27 
Industrial processing non-oil and gas 18.63 18.13 17.99 17.74 17.88 18.2 18.21 17.88 
Electricity  1.06 1.17 1.11 1.03 1.09 1.13 1.15 1.19 
Recycling  0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Construction  9.13 9.09 9.35 9.49 9.86 10.21 10.38 10.37 
Trades  13.46 13.61 13.21 13.21 13.43 13.3 13.18 13.01 
Transportation and warehouses  3.57 3.53 3.63 3.93 4.42 5.02 5.2 5.41 
Accommodation and restaurants 2.92 2.86 2.93 3.03 3.04 2.96 2.93 2.85 
Information and communication services 3.73 3.6 3.61 3.57 3.5 3.52 3.62 3.8 
Financial services  3.49 3.46 3.72 3.88 3.86 4.03 4.19 4.2 
Real estate 2.89 2.79 2.76 2.77 2.79 2.84 2.82 2.79 
Corporate services  1.44 1.46 1.48 1.51 1.57 1.65 1.71 1.75 
Administration and social security  3.78 3.89 3.95 3.9 3.83 3.9 3.87 3.7 
Education services  2.94 2.97 3.14 3.22 3.23 3.36 3.37 3.29 
Health and social services  0.97 0.98 1 1.01 1.03 1.07 1.07 1.07 
Other  4.09 3.43 3.6 3.97 4.04 4.81 5.26 5.65 
Source: BPS (Central Bureau of Statistics), https://www.bps.go.id/ 
If we look at the Kalimantan provinces (see Figure 4-4), West Kalimantan has the largest 
proportion and total volume of smallholder production. Farmers here have taken advantage of 
recent access to palm oil mills, although production is constrained by the much lower yields 
compared to corporate plantation estates (Potter 2016, p.167). Compared to smallholders in 
neighbouring Malaysia, these smallholders began planting oil palm much later as they did not 
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initially have access to high-quality planting materials and other government assistance (Ibid, 
p.167).  
 
Figure 4-4 Palm oil production (tonnes) by different producers in Kalimantan (2015) 
 
Source: Plantation statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, Indonesia20. (y axis, harvest in tonnes) 
 
Furthermore, West Kalimantan is one of the five largest palm oil producing provinces in the 
country despite the relatively late introduction of technology and support, such that it currently 
surpasses Jambi (see Figure 4-5). The growth of palm oil production in West Kalimantan rose by 
28.2 percent between 2012 and 2016.  
                                                          
20 http://ditjenbun.pertanian.go.id/tinymcpuk/gambar/file/statistik/2015/SAWIT%202013%20-2015.pdf 
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Figure 4-5 Production by province (2012-2016) 
 
Source: https://www.bps.go.id/  (y-axis refers to production in million tonnes) 
 
4.3.3 Downstream processing of palm oil 
Palm oil can be considered to be a buyer-driven commodity due to the fact that downstream 
buyer groups or corporations determine the production arrangements of upstream producers (as 
described by Gereffi 1994). Considering the large scale of palm oil production in West 
Kalimantan, numerous downstream businesses have established palm oil manufacturing plants to 
transform the palm fruit into crude palm oil. This crude palm oil will be further processed by 
larger downstream corporate agglomerations. In 2016, across West Kalimantan, there were 
around 50 Crude Palm Oil (CPO) mills. About 45 of these mills are owned by private 
corporations, and about 5 palm oil mills are owned by state owned palm oil enterprises (GAPKI 
2016). These mills supply their CPO to major corporate buyer groups who then further process 
the palm oil for numerous industrial products. Table 4-3 shows the largest mills in each district 
to be extracted from that data (to have at least 30 tonnes per hour)21. 
                                                          
21 More complete crude palm oil mills can be accessed in: http://gapki-
kalbar.or.id/admin/files/Data%20pabrik%20pengolahan%20kelapa%20sawit%20di%20Prov.%20Kalbar%20(2016).pdf 
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State and private businesses that own palm oil mills typically supply their palm oil to a limited 
number of lead firms. Annual reports of these companies show that these lead firms finance 
various production arrangements to suit their needs and thus provide a good example of how 
buyers drive production processes. The table below (4-3) shows the lead firms and their 
upstream agribusinesses for each district. It has been found that SMART (Sinar Mas), Wilmar, 
Cargill, and Indofood downstream agglomerations are all large-scale buyers and have their own 
palm oil mills in West Kalimantan. State-owned corporations had contracts to supply large 
amounts of their crude palm oil to Unilever who are one of the largest downstream corporate 
buyers in the world22. 
Table 4-3 Major CPO processing mills in West Kalimantan, their ownership & lead firm 
linkages 
CPO Processing Mills  Parent 
companies/shareholders 
Major buyers/leading firms Location  Per hour capacities 
(Tonnes/per hour)  
State-owned enterprise PTPN UNILEVER 
Sanggau 225 
  PTPN UNILEVER Landak 30 
(Private companies)     
 
PT. Bintang Harapan Desa BHD Group WILMAR Sanggau 60 
PT. Global Kalimantan Makmur Provident Agro WILMAR Sanggau 60 
PT. Sintang Raya Miwon Commercial Co. Ltd WILMAR Kubu Raya 60 
PT. Mitra Inti Sejati Plantations Indofood Agri INDOFOOD AGRI/WILMAR Bengkayang 60 
PT. Sinar Dinamika Kapuas Lyman Agro WILMAR Melawi 45 
PT. Kalimantan Sanggar Pusaka Lyman Agro WILMAR Sekadau 60 
PT. Indo Sawit Kekal Cargill Cargill CARGILL Ketapang 100 
PT. Polvplant Sejahtera Cargil Cargill CARGILL Ketapang 60 
PT. Agro Sukses Lestari Gunas Investa Group SMART Sintang 80 
PT. Buana Hijau Lestari Triputra Agro Persada SMART Sintang 60 
PT. Bonti Permai Jaya Lyman Group WILMAR Sintang 60 
PT. Agrowitarama / PT. SEC Agrowiratama MUSIM MAS/WILMAR Sambas 45 
PT. Peniti Sungai Purun HPI Agro - Djarum Group SMART Mempawah 60 
PT. Cipta Usaha Sejati  AAK (NESTLE) Kayong Utara 
30 
PT. Riau Agrotama Plantation Indofood Agri INDOFOOD Kap.Hulu 30 
PT Buana Tunas Sejahtera Kencana Group SMART Kap. Hulu 40 
PT. Paramitra Internusa Pratama SMART SMART Kap.Hulu  80 
Source: Gapki Kalbar & various corporation annual reports (selected on the basis of minimum threshold of the capacity at least 30 ton per hour).  
 
                                                          
22 https://www.unilever.com/news/Press-releases/2018/unilever-ptpn-reach-agreement-to-accelerate-production-of-sustainable-
palm-oil-in-Indonesia.html 
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The major mill operators in West Kalimantan are thereby financially subordinate to much larger 
firms and financiers. Numerous influential Indonesian business tycoons are also intimately 
involved as business owners in many of these corporations (Table 4-4). For example, the Salim 
and Wijaya Families are both listed in Forbes as among the 50 richest people in Indonesia, 
having also invested in the infrastructure, properties and telecommunication sectors, as listed in 
Forbes in 2017. Some members of both families owned some capital share in downstream palm 
oil companies. They actually made positive business influence to shape rural infrastructure 
development to rural economy through their other infrastructure business groups. 
Table 4-4 Business tycoons’ shareholders 
Downstream lead firms 
Business tycoons’ founders & 
shareholders 
Data sources 
Indofood group Salim's Family  Company's website 
Sinarmas (SMART) Wijaya's Family  Company's website 
WILMAR  Kuok Groups Company's website 
Cargill  Cargill-MacMillan Family 
Forbes & corporate 
websites 
 
These same infrastructure investment patterns can also be seen within the downstream business 
policies of Indofood and SMART, both of which aim to enhance supply chain efficiency by 
investing in upstream palm oil mills. For instance, SMART have built key infrastructure such as 
warehouses, jetties and ports in strategic locations (SMART 2016a, p.34) (SMART 2016, p.34). 
More recently, they expanded into South Kalimantan in 2016, from where they have connected 
their CPO mills into downstream refineries in Belawan and Surabaya (East Java) (Ibid). The 
Indofood group also has plans to expand key infrastructure to key strategic areas throughout the 
region in order to support and facilitate the growth of their palm oil businesses (Salim Invomas 
Pratama 2016, p.29). Two of the other major firms, WILMAR and CARGIL, have also indicated 
a willingness to begin investing in roads and other transportation infrastructure in an attempt to 
minimise transportation costs.  
Actually, these investments in infrastructure run parallel to the trend amongst palm oil refineries 
which are increasingly freighting their crude palm oil to foreign refineries, as shown in table 4-5. 
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These large agribusinesses own palm oil processing refineries not only in Indonesia but India, 
Malaysia, China and Europe (e.g. Netherlands). These agribusiness expansions generally follow 
the major crude palm oil export destination to both India, China and Netherlands, as will become 
clear when I later present trends in trade data.  
Table 4-5 Some Palm oil processing refineries in different countries 
Lead firms Location of Palm oil processing refineries Data sources 
Indofood group Indonesia, China, India, Malaysia, European Company's website 
Sinar Mas (SMART) Indonesia, Malaysia, China, India Company's website 
WILMAR  China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia Company's website 
Cargill  Malaysia, India, China, Brazil, Mexico, USA, European  Forbes & Company’s website  
UNILEVER Indonesia, Netherlands, China, India Company's website 
 
4.3.4 The international trade in palm oil 
At the global level, palm oil is the most consumed oil or fat, as shown in figure 4-6 below23, 
which also shows how global palm oil consumption reached 52 million tonnes in 2013. 
Figure 4-6 Oil and fats consumption (in million tonnes, 2013 data) 
 
Source:Oil-World 2013  
 
The rising demand for palm oil in the global market is due to its comparitively low cost as a key 
material for both food and non-food products. For example, compared to other vegetable oils, 
such as soybean, rapeseed and sunflower oil, palm oil is significantly cheaper (Sime-Darby 
2014). In 2013, the global average price of palm oil was 850 US dollar per tonne, while other 
                                                          
23 Oil world statistics website 
(http://www.oilworld.biz/app.php?fid=310&fpar=YToyOntzOjI6IklkIjtzOjQ6IjYzMTQiO3M6NDoicGNpZCI7czoyOiIxMiI7fQ
%3D%3D&isSSL=0&aps=0&blub=26bc92353fe185973450e4160e44224d) 
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oils were more than 1000 US dollar per tonne (Ibid, p.3). Palm oil has been used as a raw 
material to produce margarine, ice cream, biscuits, chocolate, chips, and a range of baked and 
fried foods (Net-Balance-Foundation 2013, 15). Palm oil offers a cheap raw material for food 
processing industries. 
The largest exports of palm oil for global markets are sourced from Indonesia and Malaysia. In 
2003, Malaysia was the world’s leading palm oil exporter when it exported 6.39 million tonnes, 
but Ismail (2013) describes a weakness of the Malaysian industry as being due to its overreliance 
on foreign labour - particularly from Indonesia. High rates of urbanisation in Malaysia attracted 
workers to the cities, leaving a shortage of labour in the countryside (Ismail, 2013, p.18). 
Furthermore, increased value-adding through downstream processing within Malaysia has 
contributed to declining exports of crude palm oil products. In Indonesia, high levels of 
unemployment in both rural (including landless labourers) and urban parts of Java has provided a 
ready sources of labour for oil palm plantations in the outer islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan. 
Figure 4-7 shows that palm oil exports from Indonesia surpassed those from Malaysia between 
2003 and 2013.  
Figure 4-7 Largest palm oil exporters in 2003 and 2013 
 
Source: FAOStat (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/) 
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The largest global demand for palm oil comes primarily from five countries in Asia and Europe 
(India, China, The Netherlands, Pakistan and Germany). The largest global importers of palm oil 
were India and China in 2013, which were also the largest importers of crude palm oil from 
Indonesia. According to official government data, India and China respectively imported 5 and 
2.5 million tonnes of CPO from Indonesia in 2013. Imports to these and other countries have 
been driven by various downstream processing industries located in those countries. In the 
previous discussion of the palm oil commodity chain it was shown that lead manufacturing firms 
in consuming countries are increasingly coordinating (governing) upstream producers in 
Indonesia. There have been reports (The Edge Market 2013), however, that China may be 
shifting toward soybean as their predominant vegetable oil, and this seems to be reflected in the 
less rapid growth in China compared to India. 
While Indonesia is also a significant consumer of palm oil, production is mostly oriented towards 
the export market, where it can fetch a higher price than in the domestic market. For example, 
between 2007 and 2012, nearly two-thirds of Indonesian palm oil was sold to meet export 
demand (see figure 4-8).  
Figure 4-8 Indonesian palm oil exports and production (million tonnes) 
 
Source:  FAOStat (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/) 
 
4.4 Environmental governance in the palm oil sector 
There are various organisations and political actors who now promote palm oil in Indonesia as a 
solution to the problems of rural underdevelopment. Those who advocate expanding palm oil 
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development include both international organisations and various political and business elites 
within Indonesia. Nevertheless, there are also opponents who tend to emphasise the negative 
environmental impacts of large-scale oil palm production, and the loss of natural forest that its 
expansion frequently entails. This section will explain how responses to these environmental 
concerns became institutionalised in various ways to create a system of multi-actor and multi-
scalar environmental governance that is increasingly shaping both environmental and social 
outcomes in production sites such as Kapuas Hulu. 
The expansion of palm oil in Indonesia has been facilitated through private and public sector 
policies to encourage investment (Pacheco et al. 2017). Over the years, various international 
institutions have provided financial assistance for palm oil development, including the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which provided 35 percent of Indonesia’s expenditure 
on agricultural development and infrastructure between 1974 and 1979 (Gaskell 2015, p.38). 
During the 1997 and 1998 Asian financial crisis, government policies to limit the export of palm 
oil exacerbated Indonesia’s financial problems, but with pressure from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the government ceased this policy in the post crisis period.  
The expansion of palm oil has brought economic development to the outer islands of Indonesia, 
where there has been an expansion of  local infrastructure development and (many have argued) 
a reduction in rural poverty (Pacheco et al. 2017, p.1). While these benefits may be debated, my 
research in West Kalimantan suggests that infrastructure and off-farm income opportunities have 
indeed allowed local households to diversify their incomes and generally allowed investments 
into social services like education. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that palm oil expansion has also 
had major impacts on landscape transformation and deforestation right across Indonesia. In the 
post-decentralisation era, local governments have been empowered to provide local permits for 
large-scale palm oil plantation, and there has been a tendency towards local governments 
promoting palm oil as a strategic agribusiness investment. This has occurred to the extent that 
some national and local elites use pressing economic development needs as a justification to 
illegally appropriate land (Pacheco et al. 2017, p.4). In West Kalimantan, for instance, rapid 
palm oil expansion has seen rampant forest conversion resulting in local conflict.  
These environmental concerns have been heavily debated between proponents and opponents of 
palm oil (Pacheco et al. 2017, p.25). In the context of those debatable facts, however, 
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environmental NGOs have brought to light the negative environmental consequences of oil palm 
plantations. In Kapuas Hulu, some environmental activists have highlighted the detrimental 
impacts on the local environment (e.g. clearance forest covers) and local livelihoods as a key 
rationale of their agenda to resist palm oil. This local issue will be further discussed in chapter 6. 
Environmental campaigns aiming to limit palm oil expansion have been disputed by the palm oil 
industry in Indonesia, with the Palm Oil Business Association in Indonesia (GAPKI) arguing that 
palm oil is not the source of deforestation and even stressing the positive environmental impacts 
of plantations, such as the ability to absorb carbon dioxide (GAPKI 2013, p.32). In the context of 
this uncertainty, markets have been seeking ways to ensure that palm oil producers comply with 
environmental sustainability standards without affecting economic development goals. One  
proposed solution has been to focus on sustainability at the supply side in a way that addresses 
the interests and concerns of different stakeholders (Pacheco et al. 2017), resulting in the 
emergence of voluntary certification schemes along global palm oil value chains.  
The most widely recognised voluntary certification process became formalised as the RSPO 
(Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil) in 2004, which determines whether corporations are 
eligible to be certified as recognised sustainable palm oil producers. This international 
certification organisation consists of different stakeholders including oil palm growers, palm oil 
processors and/or traders, consumer goods manufacturers, retailers, banks/investors, 
environmental/nature conservation NGOs and social/developmental NGOs (RSPO 2013). While 
governments are not actually members of RSPO, the RSPO certification acknowledges that 
environmental regulation is an important part of their governing principles. 
Rather than incorporating RSPO into their plantation development policies and programs, the 
Indonesian government decided to instead create their own palm oil certification program in 
2010, which was named ISPO (Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil). This initiative has been led by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and was intended to serve two purposes: to enhance Indonesian palm 
oil competitiveness in world markets; and to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and address other 
environmental concerns (including reducing deforestation)24. As such, there appears to be a 
continued unwillingness of ISPO, and by extension the Indonesian government, to acknowledge 
the relationship between oil palm cultivation and deforestation (refer also to the ISPO-published 
                                                          
24http://www.ispo-org.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=209&lang=ina 
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document Oil Palm Plantation and the Wildlife 201225, which simply describes Indonesia 
wildlife without referencing any relationship to oil palm).  
Theoretically, ISPO is a legally binding system whereby certification is only issued after palm 
oil developers have been audited to comply with ministerial regulations, such as environmental 
assessments and other legal requirements (Gillespie and Harjhanti 2012). Not long after the 
launch of ISPO, GAPKI withdrew from their RSPO membership in 201126. However, the weak 
government capacity for oversight and environmental law enforcement remains an obstacle to 
the effective enactment of environmental sustainability initiatives right across Indonesia, and the 
palm oil sector is no exception. The government has a weak capacity to enforce environmental 
compliance for agribusinesses. For instance, environmental impact assessments are an official 
policy instrument to minimise the negative environmental impacts of development and, in 
Indonesia, this environmental assessment procedure is called AMDAL (Analisis Mengenai 
Dampak Lingkungan). AMDAL is required by law for all new palm oil operations (Gilbert 
2009), and an AMDAL commission had been established to review environmental assessments. 
This commission, however, has been plagued by a lack of highly skilled staff who are free from 
conflict of interest (McCarthy and Zen 2010), and the commission has tended to be staffed by 
those who primarily wish to advance their careers within the bureaucracy (Ibid.).  
Caldwell (1982, in Wallington 2002, p.22) states that the original purpose of environmental 
assessment is to incorporate environmental considerations into decisions and to democratise 
decision making. Indeed, in the absence of any public consultation with affected communities, 
palm oil projects are almost inevitably prone to conflict. The environmental assessment process 
does in fact necessitate consultation with affected local communities living around proposed oil 
palm projects. Rather than conducting democratic and proper environmental assessment, 
however, the environmental assessment process has long been viewed merely as an 
administrative procedure that proponents have to complete (Kompas 2008). In extreme cases, 
these distorted environmental assessment procedures are the only formal assessment that occurs 
(McCarthy and Zen 2010).   
                                                          
25 http://www.ispo-org.or.id/images/Wildlife2012.pdf  
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These overlapping standards, regulatory procedures and rival certification systems have caused 
uncertainty and confusion in regard to the sustainability of Indonesian palm oil products. 
Although the government certification system was formulated by copying principles and criteria 
from RSPO (Hospes 2014), the credibility and independence of the audit process is questionable.  
A key difference is in the lack of clarity in the ISPO system over public participation. For 
example, while RSPO underscores the important of FPIC (Free, Prior, Informed Consent), this 
has not been clearly defined in ISPO (Ibid, p.430). As such, many foreign buyers in the west, 
including the Netherlands government have preferred to continue requiring RSPO-certified palm 
oil products (Hospes 2011). Given the importance of The Netherlands markets as already 
discussed, the impact of this decision is important. Influential international NGOs, such as 
WWF27, have been at the forefront of both developing the RSPO standard initially and then 
lobbying both lead firms and consumers to demand products use RSPO-certified palm oil only. 
Consumer boycotts in various countries have then been just as influential as government 
regulation in driving environmental practice change in Indonesia’s palm oil sector. Legally 
binding certification (as with case of ISPO) does not necessarily lead to environmental 
sustainability as weak government capacity for oversight has led to poor environmental 
compliance. Promoting several overlapping standards may potentially create uncertainty and 
confusion for palm oil producers in their attempts to meet production standards demanded by 
global markets.  
The system of environmental governance in the palm oil industry is a combination of efforts by 
various actors, including both state-based institutions at various scales in Indonesia as well as 
NGOs, consumers and business interests within Indonesia and abroad. This combined influence 
has, over time, generally resulted in an increased demand for companies to engage with, consult 
and ensure benefits for local communities. At the same time, it needs to be recognised that these 
various environmental governance processes have often been irregular and inconsistent, and 
indeed often subservient to the needs and priorities of lead firms and other business interests 
within the industry. 
                                                          
27 http://www.wwf.org.au/what-we-do/food/palm-oil#gs.BowZrGM  
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CHAPTER 5: KAPUAS HULU - GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
5.1 Introducing Kapuas Hulu  
Kalimantan has long been famous for its natural resource wealth. “Kalimantan” is translated 
from the Malay word which means "river of precious stones", alluding to the historic economic 
significance of gold and diamonds since the seventeenth century (Heidhues, 2003, p.17). In the 
past, South Borneo in particular (or the Banjar Kingdom) was closely integrated with broader 
Chinese trade networks. However, apart from some coastal trading ports in the far north, much of 
the interior of Borneo remained isolated, with dense tropical forest inhibiting communications 
and making effective colonisation difficult due to poor access to the interior (Ibid, p.17). Long 
rivers such as the Barito, Mahakam and Kapuas were the principle mode of communication 
between coast and the interior. 
West Kalimantan province consists of several districts with very different degrees of 
accessibility to the capital city, Pontianak. Kapuas Hulu is the most remote, being located some 
700 kilometres to the northeast of Pontianak. In Malay and Indonesian language, Kapuas Hulu is 
associated with the highland areas, or at least the upstream sections of the Kapuas river, since 
‘Hulu' means upriver. People in the capital city often call Kapuas Hulu ‘Uncak Kapuas’ which 
refers to forested uplands and river networks.  
Upland landscapes are characterized by dryer sandy soil, higher-elevation, compact surface 
landscapes, and less susceptibility to floods. Before palm oil was introduced, the upland areas 
were remote with few connections to the provincial road network. During the early stages of 
palm oil development in the area (beginning in the early 2000s), new roads were initiated in the 
southern part of Kapuas Hulu (Shantiko et al. 2013).  Later on, this basic road infrastructure was 
further extended into northern Kapuas Hulu through a central government program to strengthen 
economic development in the border areas (Eilenberg 2014a, p.2).  
In the upland areas, it is generally not possible to cultivate wet rice like in Java or the delta 
regions of mainland Southeast Asia, and local inhabitants have long practiced swidden farming 
(see Plate 5-1) alongside hunting and gathering in the forest. For the Iban Dayaks in the region, 
swidden cultivation has historically been a key part of their culture, and will be discussed later in 
relation to the broader landscape changes occurring in Kapuas Hulu.  
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Plate 5-1 Swidden Plots in Kapuas Hulu 
 
Source: Fieldwork in Janting 
 
There are various unique natural features in these upland landscapes. For instance, in the exterior 
area surrounding the coast, much of the original and secondary forests have been cleared due to 
development activities, including for road infrastructure, while forest cover is much more 
widespread further inland. Furthermore, peatlands can be found in the area surrounding Kapuas 
upland watershed and are generally associated with swamp areas (rawa)28. Kettridge et al. (2015, 
p.1) describe the capacity of the upland peatlands to absorb and hold water, with biophysical 
process in the peatland slowly releasing water into the streams. Danau Sentarum is an extensive 
peatland ecosystem in Kapuas Hulu, which is now part of a National Park. Local Dayak and 
Malay communities have long used the peatlands as both a source of livelihood (fishing and 
gathering other products), and leisure. With abundant water resources, peatland forests are often 
considered to be attractive sites for oil palm plantations, which has resulted in a dramatic 
reduction in the extent of peatlands. Before 2000s, before the introduction of oil palm, there were 
some wet fields that utilised the rich water supply from their peatlands. In general, however, the 
peatlands would be dried through canaling to allow agriculture, including for flat swidden plots.  
                                                          
28 www.kapuashulukab.go.id/downlot.php?file=RPJM-bab2.pdf 
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Besides the important tropical forest and peatland ecosystems, Kapuas Hulu is also significant 
due to the small rivers and lakes that function as the headwaters of the Kapuas River system. The 
length of this river is about 1100 kilometres, according to information from the Netherlands 
research institute, KNAW (Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie Van Wetenschappen)29, making it 
the longest river in Indonesia. Boats can easily pass along the Kapuas river to Kapuas Hulu, 
except during extreme dry periods (Lusiana et al. 2008). As a result, Malay fishermen (who 
normally inhabit the coastal regions only) can be found all along the river right up to Kapuas 
Hulu where they have long settled to earn a living (MacKinnon et al. 1996). In the forested 
uplands, the influence of Malays in political decision making was historically minimal in 
comparison to the longhouse customary organization. For instance, during Dutch occupation in 
the early 19th century, the Malay Kingdom was subjected to Dutch colonial control, while the 
Dayak Iban weren’t (Wadley 2003, p.96). During 1918, Malays established permanent 
settlement surrounding Batang Lupar (Ibid, p.108), and by the period of my 2017 fieldwork30, 
Malays had strengthened their position by securing various political positions in local 
bureaucracies and parliaments, and now exert a dominant political and economic influence 
throughout the river system. 
Field work sites for this thesis are located in two subdistricts; Badau and Silat Hilir (refer to 
Figure 1-2 earlier). Figure 5-1 presents the more detailed geographic location of the field sites, 
showing the case study village of Miau Merah in Silat Hilir sub-district, and the two case study 
villages of Janting and Badau in Badau. These areas have witnessed major landscape change 
from when they were essentially remote forest areas in the 1960s, with an early road network to 
their current chequering by plantation leases (Figure 5-1). Since palm oil arrived in Miau Merah 
in 2001 and in Badau in 2007, infrastructure has been built by both the state and by private 
corporations, with the extension of the road system (both public and private roads) closely 
following the spatial establishment of major plantation concessions (known as jalan sawit). 
 
 
                                                          
29 https://www.knaw.nl/en/international/scientific-cooperation-with-indonesia/joint-research-projects/hydrology-
geomorphology-links-in-the-kapuas-river 
30 Field note participant observation in Kapuas Hulu, 2017 
78 
 
Figure 5-1 Field sites in Kapuas Hulu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*) Batang Lupar stands for subdistrict 
Source: Author 
5.2 Ethnicity and demography 
Since the arrival of palm oil in Kapuas Hulu in the early 2000s, there has also been an increase in 
migrant populations in the district (see Table 5-1). On the other hand, with a much larger area 
compared to Pontianak (the capital city of West Kalimantan), the population density in Kapuas 
Hulu remains much smaller. 
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Table 5-1 Population Size and density (2010-2014) 
Variable  Area  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Population number Kapuas Hulu  222,160 227,424 231,512 236,136 240,410 
  Pontianak  554,764 565,856 575,843 586,243 598,097 
  West Kalimantan  4,411,400 - - - 4,716,000 
Population density (per km2)31  Kapuas Hulu  7.44 7.62 7.75 7.91 8.06 
  Pontianak  5,104 5,249 - 5,438  5547 
  West Kalimantan  30 - - - 32 
Source: Indonesian statistic offices (BPS) 
 
The case study villages are home to various ethnicities and occupations as shown in table 5-2, 
with the most heterogeneous population composition found in Badau.  
 
Table 5-2 Demographic composition in the case study sites 
Features  Janting  Badau  Silat Hilir  
Major ethnic groups Dayak Iban (62.5%) Melayu (50%), Dayak Iban, Java Java (43%), Malay, Dayak Sebaruk 
Number of households  128 665 294 
Major occupations  Farmers, Non-farm labours Non-farm, fishermen, traders Farmers, Non-farm labours, traders 
Source: surveys in field locations in 2016.  
I was told different stories as to how these villages have come to have the demographic 
characteristics they have today. Janting village was apparently formed through migrations of 
Iban from Sarawak into Kapuas Hulu, with many Iban families speaking about their family 
networks in Sarawak. In the middle of the 1800s, despite the boundaries made by the Dutch and 
British, many Iban migrated between Sarawak and Malaysia (Eilenberg 2012). In interviews with 
a customary leader in Janting32, it was explained how the man’s grandfather originally came from 
Sarawak and first inhabited the border areas of Empanang in Kapuas Hulu. Before the subdistrict 
of Badau was formally established in the 1950s, influential Iban customary leaders from Batang 
Lupar requested his grandfather to stay in Janting and fight against local rebels rather than return 
to Lubok Antu, Sarawak. In return he was granted territory in Janting. Before 1964, this territory 
was named Badau Bunut and was apparently inhabited by approximately 12 households. Yet, in 
1964, they changed the name of the village to Janting33, and the population has increased by a 
                                                          
31 Total area of Kapuas Hulu is about 29,842 km2, and population density was estimated by dividing population with total area 
32 Personal communication with YE, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016. 
33 Personal communication with YE, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016. 
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factor of ten to 128 households. Most are farmers alongside some landless labourers who work 
for a local palm oil corporation34.  
In 1951, the village of Badau was also originally inhabited  by Iban groups (Desa Badau 2012). 
Nevertheless, in 1961, Malay from Pinoh and Jongkong in southern Kapuas Hulu migrated to 
Badau with the objective of trading rubber with people in Sarawak. In the early 2000s, logging 
came to Kapuas Hulu and these attracted more people to occupy this village, with population 
growth further increasing after palm oil operations commenced in 2012. Local inhabitants mostly 
worked as traders, temporary off farm labourers, as civil servants or in plantation companies 
(Ibid.), and many Malays in Badau have become river fishermen in the local area. 
In Silat Hilir, the major ethnic groups are Javanese and Dayak Sebaruk. Dayak Sebaruk are a 
sub-group of the Iban community, originally migrated from Sintang35. This village was officially 
recognised in 1975 with 30 households36, and later people from the village resettled in Miau 
Merah. In 1970, the Suharto regime provided huge timber concessions across the archipelago as 
a key part of his national development program (Wadley & Eilenberg, 2005, p.24), and these 
development projects aimed to spur on regional economic development in the remote border 
districts (Ibid). Yet, for policy makers, a major obstacle to natural resource development was 
believed to be labour shortages in these otherwise remote areas, and a major component of 
development schemes at this time was population redistribution from Java through transmigrasi 
(Eilenberg 2012, p.255).  These Javanese migrants began occupying the exterior of Silat Hilir 
around the 1980s37.  
With the intensification of oil palm cultivation in the mid-2000s, Sumatran farmers (from local 
conversation some people revealed from Riau, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra), who were 
cultivating oil palm on small crowded plots where the labour to land ratio was high, started 
migrating to Borneo where land was much more available.  Even though economic growth was 
focused on the larger towns, some Chinese migrated to the peri-urban areas of Badau, 
Putussibau, and Silat Hilir to establish their own businesses beginning in the 2000s. They were 
                                                          
34 Personal communication with numerous local community in Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
35 Personal communication with indigenous people in Miau Merah.  
36 Village’s website: https://www.miaumerah.desa.id/first/artikel/99 
37 Survey interview.  
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mostly coming from Pontianak and Singkawang to try their fortune in these rapidly growing 
semi-urban areas.  
5.3 Landscape changes 
CIFOR38 has estimated that about 18.7 million hectares of old growth forests in Borneo islands 
were cleared between 1973 and 2015 (see Figure 5-2), of which industrial plantations contributed 
to about 9.1 million hectares.  
Figure 5-2 Forest cover loss in Borneo Island 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: maps from CIFOR (https://data.cifor.org/) 
In Kapuas Hulu, land clearance has occurred in various stages as land uses have changed. 
Leonald & Rowland (2016) have examined land use in Kapuas Hulu and shown that external 
interventions of the state and capital investors have resulted in a large-scale transformation of 
swidden into oil palm plantations. Prior to the 1970s, Kapuas Hulu was too remote for 
commercial plantations, so instead most investors focused on sourcing from smallholder farms 
(Leonald & Rowland 2016, p.97). Dove (2011) demonstrated that even prior to the 1970s, Dayak 
groups participated in various high-cash crop cultivation (e.g. rubber, pepper), but their farming 
was focused around smallholder plots.   
                                                          
38 https://forestsnews.cifor.org/50454/progress-and-preservation-a-dichotomous-struggle?fnl=en 
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Prior to the 1970s, despite having a moderate impact on forest regrowth, land use change due to 
rubber and pepper was relatively insignificant at scale. Rubber cultivation was identified as a 
commercial part of a managed forest, and Cramb (2007, p.80, p.95) further explains how 
swidden agricultural systems on Borneo island allowed for the regeneration of secondary forests 
by applying a fallow rotation of at least seven years. This time period was opposed to Freeman’s 
estimation that fallow rotations at least was between 12 to 15 years (Freeman 1955)  
In the early 1970s, industrial logging operations began to occur in Kapuas Hulu (see figure 5-3), 
with Wadley & Eilenberg (2005) describing how proposals for logging plantations would be 
endorsed by national elites, corporations and the military. At the time, the Suharto regime 
allocated huge timber concessions under the national development program, which heavily relied 
upon private investors (Wadley & Eilenberg 2005, p.24). In the early 1970s, for instance, the 
national government approved large-scale timber concessions in Kapuas Hulu to a corporation 
with a strong military connection, PT Yamaker, to enact their political agenda of economic 
exploitation and delivering industrial plantation economies as a backbone for national security 
(Ibid.). 
Figure 5-3 Historical land use changes in Kapuas Hulu 
 
Source: Leonald & Rowland (2016) in page 97, Note: The y-axis shows relative increase/decrease in activity 
 
In 1997, Indonesia faced a financial crisis and, as a result, national industrial processing and 
financial sectors became less viable, as the Indonesian political elite used logging concessions to 
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raise state revenues in the context of declining economic growth. Then, in 1999, decentralised 
resource management began to deeply impact land use in Kapuas Hulu. The local Kabupaten 
government had been given authority to grant small-scale logging concessions in the form of 
joint cooperatives between local communities and logging businesses. Nonetheless, these local 
decentralised land bureaucracies were misused by various local elites in West Kalimantan who 
were engaged in log smuggling into Malaysia during the early 2000s (Eilenberg, 2014c, p.10).   
In Kapuas Hulu, overseas Malaysian logging entrepreneurs saw the potential benefits of logging 
in Indonesia, and began negotiations with Sarawak-based Iban networks to clear forests on the 
Indonesian side to supply the timber industry in Sarawak (Eilenberg, 2014c, p.26), where they 
paid local villagers between 2.52 and 4.46 USD per tree for clearing in the early 2000s. These 
entrepreneurs were operating in Kapuas Hulu until the mid-2000s and promoted forest 
conversions to fuel the logging industry. Figure 5-3 suggests that the logging industry reached a 
peak land use expansion in the beginning of the 2000s.  
Nevertheless, in that period, the central government continued to criticise local elites and 
communities who they claimed were mismanaging forest resources and exacerbating illegal 
logging and corruption (Eilenberg, 2014c, p.26), and they subsequently revoked the right of the 
local government to allocate logging permits under 100 hectares. The expansion of logging was 
stopped by sending military and police officials to crack down on illegal logging and the illegal 
shipment of logs overseas was stopped in 2005 (Ibid, p.11).  
In the post-logging environment, national elites worried about a lack of development in the  
border areas of West Kalimantan and the continued possibility of cross border smuggling 
(Eilenberg 2012). National elites endorsed large-scale oil palm plantations as a local economic 
development solution in Kapuas Hulu from the early 2000s (Leonald and Rowland 2016), but 
land conversion into large-scale plantations took a few more years to eventuate. In 2005, national 
authorities initially attempted to mobilise state owned corporations to promote large-scale palm 
oil plantation in the border areas of Kapuas Hulu, but their concessions were revoked as they 
overlapped with the Betung Kerihun National Park (Eilenberg 2012, p.248). Along with that, 
international non-government organisations, with their local allies, were beginning to step up 
their campaign criticising national elites for their promotion of an industry that was having major 
environmental impacts, such as deforestation and soil erosion (Ibid, p.249).  
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National elites turned to another strategy in response to strong pressure from international and 
local stakeholders (Eilenberg, 2012). To execute their interests of palm oil development, national 
authorities used land use policies to convert forest zones into areas designated for plantation 
development (Borneonews.co.id 2016). In Kapuas Hulu, by 2017, there has been more than 
10,000 hectares of land made available for palm oil development39. Local inhabitants stated that 
between 2006 and 2007, large agribusinesses made local surveys with the intention to push 
forward large-scale palm oil plantations. In the following years, they had successfully retained 
permits as a product of their negotiation with national and local elites. The concessions were 
carried out by converting dryland swidden plots and fallows into large-scale palm oil plantations. 
The process of land dispossession will be further discussed in chapter 7. 
As large-scale palm oil development got underway, local communities have in many instances 
continued to pursue smallholder farming practices. In Miau Merah, local smallholder oil palm 
plantations were initiated in 2010 and, even when large companies in the area rejected the fruits 
sold by smallholders, other palm oil companies outside Kapuas Hulu would still provide a 
market for their fruit40. It was not until around 2014 and 2015 that many local communities 
began converting their subsistence food plots into oil palm plantations on a more substantial 
scale. In Janting, local Dayaks initiated this trend from about 2013, and by 2017, many local 
Dayaks had converted their swiddens into oil palm plots (Plate 5-2). These conversions have had 
wide ranging cultural and economic effects as well as contributing to land use change, as will be 
discussed in both chapter 6 and chapter 8 of this thesis.  
                                                          
39 Interview with district plantation office representative, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
40 Personal communication with village leaders and local villages authorities.  
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Plate 5-2 Local Dayak planting oil palm on a former swidden plot 
 
Source: field work in Kapuas Hulu, 2016. 
 
5.4 Regional economy and livelihoods  
In the past five years, the structure of the regional economy in Kapuas Hulu has begun to change 
in quite profound ways. While the largest single economic contribution from Kapuas Hulu 
continues to be agriculture, Table 5-3 indicates a decline in the economic importance of logging 
due to the changed licensing processes outlined previously. The importance of plantations has 
steadily increased, such that it is now the largest single contributor to natural resource-based 
output in the district.  
After the fall of Suharto, right up until 2005, economic initiatives were put in place by political 
elites to open up forests through road building in order to facilitate the logging boom. By 2007, 
the slowly improving road infrastructure in Kapuas Hulu had evolved into large paved roads, a 
widespread electricity system, and cell phone towers (Eilenberg 2014a, p.22-23). By 2010, the 
expansion of oil palm plantations and new demands from migrants and manufacturing had led to 
the establishment of offices and roads around large concessions. With large scale infrastructure 
development since 2007, Kapuas Hulu economy has become more locally connected and 
provided local economic development benefits for the rural economy. The expansion of 
infrastructure can help residents access markets connected to Sarawak where they can sell their 
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farming produce and access cheaper consumer goods (Eilenberg 2014a, p.22-23). In the local 
economy, the cost of gas cylinders is cheaper across the Malaysian border, and some people use 
this opportunity to re-sell it back to Putussibau at a higher price. The strategic location in relation 
to Sarawak has meant that there is an incentive for local retailers to set up their trades in the 
surrounding area. Besides this, the development of infrastructure provides better supply chain 
connections for manufacturers to ship and to receive raw materials. Traders and manufactures 
have contributed a significant share of non-farm economic development in Kapuas Hulu (Table 
5-3). 
Table 5-3 Local economy of Kapuas Hulu (contribution to GDRP) 
Sectors 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 
Agriculture 27.50% 27.32% 27.04% 27.09% 25.85% 25.06% 
Food Crops 2.64% 2.64% 2.62% 2.86% 2.47% 2.34% 
Horticultural Crops 2.10% 2.11% 2.15% 2.14% 2.10% 2.10% 
Plantation Crops 10.30% 10.39% 10.49% 10.71% 10.64% 10.48% 
Livestock 1.77% 1.78% 1.79% 1.78% 1.83% 1.82% 
 Agriculture Services & Hunting 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% 
Forestry and Logging 7.29% 6.92% 6.56% 6.17% 5.26% 4.88% 
Fishery 3.33% 3.41% 3.36% 3.36% 3.44% 3.36% 
Mining & Quarrying  7.24% 7.31% 7.49% 7.56% 7.66% 7.74% 
Manufacturing  12.29% 12.32% 12.03% 11.88% 11.82% 11.81% 
Electricity and Gas   0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
Construction  16.07% 16.55% 16.98% 17.37% 18.05% 18.52% 
Wholesale & Retail Trade (including 
repair of motor vehicles & motorcycles)  
11.84% 11.79% 11.73% 11.73% 11.90% 12% 
Public Administration and Defence; 
Compulsory Social Security 6.64% 6.07% 5.95% 5.62% 5.54% 5.65% 
Others (or miscellaneous) 18.41% 18.63% 18.77% 18.76% 19.17% 19.21% 
Source: BPS, Kapuas Hulu (GDP at constant market price), * is estimated figure (https://kapuashulukab.bps.go.id/) 
 
In respect to local livelihoods, while the trade of vegetables and fruits has declined, numerous 
Iban and other Dayak villages near the border and surrounding the national parks (e.g. Embaloh 
Hulu and Batang Lupar) continue to practise swidden cultivation as part of their daily food 
production, many following the traditional swidden calendar presented in Table 5-4.  
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Table 5-4 Swidden calendar of Dayak Iban in Kapuas Hulu 
Source: Focus group discussion in Kapuas Hulu (Janting) 
 
Based on focus group discussions held in Janting and Embaloh Hulu, it was found that swidden 
cultivation practices between Dayak Taman and Dayak Iban are similar, but Dayak Taman begin 
their swidden work in the beginning of July. From the local conversation, Dayak Taman are 
considered part of the larger clans of Tamambaloh which originate from Embaloh Hulu and 
Hilir. Farmers stated that before land was burnt, the surrounding forest would be cleared 
approximately one month in advance. One month is required to allow the land to dry out after 
trees have been felled. In the Iban calendar this happens between May and June, but in the 
Taman calendar it occurs in July. I tried to ask the reason for time lags, but they just revealed to 
follow their grandparents regarding the swidden seasonal date. 
Prior to the clearing of weeds, Dayak communities make sacrifices to local spirits by 
slaughtering chickens as a request for good harvests and resilience against pests. In Iban culture, 
the man uses a dibble stick to seed the soil (nugal) to make planting holes, which the women fill 
it with rice seeds (menih). In swidden work, the sowers line follows after the line of the dibblers. 
Prior to collecting the swidden harvest and drying it on the upper roof of their house, there is a 
ceremony that involves slaughtering chickens and providing eggs and rice as a sacrifice (see 
Plate 5-3). Two months later they make a rice festival (Gawai) to celebrate and thank local 
spirits for the harvest they have obtained, and this has become a major cultural event for all of 
West Kalimantan.  
Swidden work May  June July August Sept Oct Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb March April  May  
Slashing the main trees (nebas)    X                       
Felling remaining scrub (nebang)     X                     
Burning (bakar)        X                   
Planting (nugal)          X                 
Weeding (menyiangi)            X X X           
Harvesting (panen)                    x x     
Carrying (niki benih)                        x   
Rice festival (gawai)  X                       x 
Starting a cultivation (Berangai ke reban)     X X                     
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Plate 5-3 Ceremony prior to carrying paddy(s) 
 
Source: taken in Ngaung Keruh, Batang Lupar, Kapuas Hulu 
 
With a growing awareness of the need for more education and other cash needs, local inhabitants 
surrounding Kapuas Hulu have diversified their economy by working as labourers in various 
sectors (see Figure 5-4). In the early 2000’s, palm oil was already produced in Miau Merah, and 
this further expanded into Badau in 2012. This palm oil establishment since the early 2000s has 
opened up more opportunities for the inhabitants of Kapuas Hulu to work as wage labourers. In 
the latest population census in 201041, in aggregate numbers, the plantation sector was the largest 
source of employment. This might be influenced by employment absorption in southern area of 
Kapuas Hulu where the palm oil was established earlier42.  
In addition, there have been other cash crops to be cultivated that require labour (e.g. pepper, 
rubber). In rubber labour arrangements, local smallholders can assist their neighbours to tap 
                                                          
41 Population census in Indonesia was held every 10 years, the next one would be in 2020.  
42 Palm oil operation in Miau Merah, Bika and Putusibau Selatan (southern Kapuas Hulu) began before 2010. 
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rubber during their off-season. Prior to 2012, the rubber prices reached 41 thousand IDR per 
kilogram (Kompas 2012) and, in Kapuas Hulu, the revenue sharing of rubber crops between 
labour and land owner had been generally favourable towards labour. Labour retains 60 percent 
from the net revenue, while the remaining share goes to the rubber land owner. A final source of 
employment was in retail, as local entrepreneurs hired local people to work in their shops in the 
commercial district. This trade sector is the fourth largest source of labour work in Kapuas Hulu 
(see Figure 5-4).  
Figure 5-4 Labour participation (population above 15 years old) in Kapuas Hulu 
 
Source: Population census, 2010, BPS (https://sp2010.bps.go.id/) 
5.5 Institutional settings 
In Kapuas Hulu, there are various formal and informal institutions that work to regulate natural 
resource access and usage. In formal arrangements, the central government has created a national 
certification system which allocates land access rights to plantation companies, which is known 
as Hak Guna Usaha (HGU). HGU is the leasing rights for individuals or parties to access land 
for agricultural use that was formerly categorised as state lands, and which are generally set for 
between 20 to 35 years, according to negotiations with local communities. This leasing right can 
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be extended upon approval from the national government, as long as the conditions set by the 
government are met43. Prior to obtaining a HGU, the local government makes local land 
allocations and provides location permits to agribusiness investors. In Kapuas Hulu, the local 
environmental office did not have permission to conduct environmental assessments, such that 
environmental assessment is still carried out by the provincial environmental assessment 
commission (KOMISI AMDAL provinsi).  
Local communities also have their own informal institutions to govern natural resources. For 
instance, local Dayaks have customary institutions such as hamlet leaders (Tuai rumah), village 
leaders (Patih), and Tomenggong (equivalent to customary sub-district leader) who all play a role 
in natural resource management. Based on local observations, rights are granted to households to 
exploit particular village lands by conducting discussions between households, Tuai rumah and 
village leaders. On the other hand, Tomenggung have the responsibility to determine customary 
forests for a particular village. 
These formal and informal institutions often overlap in complex ways. For instance, while 
customary leaders have their own specific tasks, local governments influence their resource 
management through the hierarchical bureaucracy, and while local customary leaders control 
customary institutions, formal leadership is extended through the election of local leaders who 
can push for state intervention. This has been defined by Wadley & Eilenberg (2005) as dusun-
desa political organisation (dusun stands for hamlets, and desa stands for villages). A key task of 
these type of leaders is to acknowledge informal land ownership of the local community (surat 
keterangan tanah, SKT).  
In terms of land use planning, local governments encourage the local community to have formal 
land titles through local land use plans. However, in the case of Kapuas Hulu, when the local 
community applied for land certificates, they were met with bureaucratic impediments and 
excessive costs44. Furthermore, in the forested areas, resource management is now back under the 
control of the central government (Resosudarmo et al. 2014, p.264). In this process, the Ministry 
of Forestry and Environment designated a map for forest land use decision making (Ibid.), under 
which swidden farming in secondary forests would not be allowed. Within official state maps, 
                                                          
43 See UU no.5/1960 & Permentan 98/2013 
44Personal communication with swidden farmers in Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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swidden farming has not been acknowledged as a permitted agricultural activity by forestry 
authorities. In addition, within local government maps, there have been conflicting trajectories of 
spatial commitment between conservation and land development. In Kapuas Hulu, some local 
forestry officials celebrated the symbolic effort and concern for environmental protection by 
proclaiming the district to be a “conservation district” in 2003, at the same time as another 
district institution, the district local plantation office, advocates and promotes the expansion of 
oil palm in Kapuas Hulu.  
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CHAPTER 6: PALM OIL INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING KAPUAS 
HULU 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter will give an account of institutional factors which have shaped large-scale palm oil 
development in Kapuas Hulu, West Kalimantan. In considering how institutional settings impact 
resource access, this chapter will focus on the following: i) the institutions and governance 
structures that form the global value chain for palm oil; ii) the broader external institutions45 in 
which the value chain is embedded; and iii) the local-level customary institutions of Dayak 
communities. 
In Kapuas Hulu, large-scale plantations pursue profit through cheap land deals and the utilisation 
of cheap labour. Nevertheless, local actors engage with different parts of the value chain in an 
attempt to establish beneficial relations. New opportunities to engage with other sections of the 
value chain often emerge as the market develops beyond the local area. In that context, there 
have often been conflicts between the government and environmental activists over palm oil 
development. While the government promotes palm oil development, opponents use a variety of 
local perspectives and strategies to promote environmental preservation. With their increasing 
need for cash, local communities often face dilemmas and uncertainty when it comes to the 
question of oil palm and livelihoods.   
Within these complex scenarios, numerous local inhabitants in the field sites have decided to 
voluntarily engage with the palm oil economy, as customary swidden practices around land use 
and labour have been reconfigured to incorporate oil palm cultivation. Drawing upon field work 
in Kapuas Hulu, this chapter demonstrates the way multi-tiered institutional structures involve 
negotiations that ultimately shape the nature of this engagement.  
6.2 Governance and institutions within the palm oil value chain 
The cultivation of palm oil has been a particularly attractive investment option for various 
national and global economic actors over the last few decades. Access to large areas of land at 
reasonably low cost in Indonesia, along with rising commodity prices, have seen an increasing 
                                                          
45 That is, those institutions that are not directly involved in the production process (e.g. states, NGOs, etc.). 
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number of actors investing in the sector. Prior to the recent palm oil boom, various agribusiness 
corporations had shown an interest in rubber plantations in Empanang. Yet the relatively high 
investment costs, ongoing high labour costs and price uncertainty in the global market (caused in 
part by increasing competition from synthetic rubber), have meant that further investment had 
stalled (Dove, 2011). Nevertheless, more recently, investors have been attracted back to Kapuas 
Hulu due to new investment opportunities in the palm oil sector.  
Key factors driving large agribusiness to Kapuas Hulu include the abundance of natural 
resources and cheap labour. However, in the interest of mobilising cheap plantation labour, 
market actors and their accompanying institutions have tended to marginalise the desires of 
smallholders who also want to develop their own small-scale oil palm businesses (Cramb & 
McCarthy, 2016b, p.5). Agribusiness actors have helped construct a discourse around poor 
smallholder agricultural capacity and productivity in order to accumulate land and assert control 
over, and access to, land resources. To convince the government of the superiority of large 
agribusiness over swidden cultivation in West Kalimantan, agribusiness investors present local 
swidden cultivations as useless and unproductive (Potter, 2011).This is a part of attempts to 
acquire cheap land, which is otherwise presented as ‘under-utilised’. This process of land 
dispossession will later be discussed in the following chapter.  
As stability over inventory supplies of raw crude palm oil is crucial in the vertically integrated 
agri-food supply chain, decentralising oil palm fruit production to smallholders would be a risk 
for long-term supply certainty of raw materials. At this stage, agribusiness firms seek ways to 
negotiate contractual agreements which allow them greater direct control over upstream 
production sites. This, however, has meant that value chain mechanism have attempted to 
involve local communities on the one hand (primarily as labour and gatekeepers of land access), 
while also excluding them in another sense. A common contractual form that has emerged 
between smallholder farmers and corporations was a modified version of past contractual 
arrangements between corporations and rubber smallholders in Empanang. In the past, 
corporations mobilised labour and capital in Empanang through the nucleus scheme 
arrangements (see figure 6-1), which were generally considered unsuccessful (Dove, 2011, p.29). 
Under this contractual arrangement, lead firms acquired the land of local Dayak communities in 
Empanang by enclosing some of their land and ensuring exclusive access. In return, the 
94 
 
agribusiness firm provided technological transfer, training in cultivation methods, market access, 
and other input assistances to local smallholders (plasma). Nevertheless, eventually these 
plantation firms lost interest in this plasma arrangement due to the extensive costs involved 
(Ibid.).  
 
Figure 6-1 Nucleus - rubber scheme in Empanang, Kapuas Hulu 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dove (2011), p.29 
 
In the context of oil palm cultivation, large-scale agribusiness investors desired to maintain direct 
control over agricultural production practices and this has occurred over time. For example, in 
Badau, PT BTS made a contractual agreement with the community where local farmers were 
enrolled as labourers, and where the corporation oversaw local production. Within that 
arrangement, PT BTS acquired a lease over the land of local inhabitants for 30 years under a 
HGU land lease, but, in return, the corporation provided 20 percent of dividends from all their 
harvests to community members (KOPSA-MGB - BTS, 2010, p. 4). In Silat Hilir, another firm 
was involved in a similar scheme to acquire community land where 40 percent of plantation land 
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was reallocated back to the local community (as plasma fields). Within these arrangements, the 
firm still maintains control over oil palm production in these plasma plots46. 
In that contractual engagement, asymmetric power relations began to appear as the 
agribusinesses failed to acknowledge informal power relationships within local institutions 
(Gillespie, 2016). For instance, rather than allow smallholders to autonomously cultivate oil 
palm, under the contractual agreement between the company and landholders, community land 
(plasma land) became increasingly controlled under corporate management (KOPSA-MGB -
BTS, 2010, p. 4). The autonomy of local farmers in production was restricted by corporate 
policies and procedures, and in the cases of both Silat Hilir and Miau Merah, the involvement of 
local communities began to increasingly resemble that of labour on a large-scale operation 
despite earlier land-sharing contracts.  
To sustain their control over cheap labour and land, large agri-businesses even began to reject 
palm oil fruits supplied from independent smallholders. Under Indonesian palm oil regulations, 
cooperatives should act as intermediaries between corporations and smallholders to mediate 
market access to palm oil companies47. Nevertheless, local cooperatives face a conflict of interest 
due to the weak legal and financial position they occupy relative to agribusinesses (Gillespie, 
2016). A cooperative in Badau for instance had particularly weak decision-making capacity in 
regard to these issues, and was reluctant (or unable) to deal directly with the company, and 
instead looked to the government to intervene on their behalf. Local cooperatives felt compelled 
to follow corporate policy in terms of rejecting palm oil fruit from independent smallholders: 
“We are legal entities, hence we cannot make decisions independently by ourselves….we try to endorse 
government decisions [local community selling fruit to the plantation company], yet they are rejected 
because there was no decision from government….there is no deal…even though everything should be in 
reference to government’s decision” -Interview with A, Head of plasma cooperative, Badau, West 
Kalimantan, 2018.   
Despite the existence (at least on paper) of institutional arrangements aimed at ensuring 
community participation in the palm oil sector, the reality is that governance structures within 
this strongly buyer-driven value chain (such as company policies, procedures and rules) have 
tended to dominate the prevailing institutional environment at the interface of companies and 
                                                          
46 Personal communication with H, head of plasma cooperatives in Miau Merah, 2016.  
47Peraturan Menteri Pertanian No.14/2013.  
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communities. The weak bargaining powers of cooperatives was especially evident in Miau 
Merah, where many local community members were suspicious of the financial performance, 
integrity and accountability of the cooperative, an institutional form ostensibly established to 
protect their interests48. The limited autonomy of the plasma cooperatives, and their weak 
bargaining position, had developed partly in response to high levels of indebtedness (primarily to 
the company) that the cooperatives had assumed through the development process. 
Lead firms in a global value chain will position themselves strategically amongst competitors to 
serve the interests of global consumers and to meet consumers expectations in respect to 
economic, social and environmental conditions (Neilson et al., 2018). This is often related to a 
highly buyer driven governance structure within the chain. Gereffi (1994) states that lead firms 
often enact such governance within a chain not necessarily through direct ownership of upstream 
firms, but through decentralised production settings, outsourcing and indirect control. In Miau 
Merah and Badau, the lead firms are Sinarmas Resources and Technology (SMART) and 
Indofood Agri respectively. SMART is the lead firm behind PT BTS in Badau, meanwhile 
Indofood Agri is the lead firm behind PT RAP. PT BTS was not under the direct capital 
ownership of SMART, but SMART has a contract with Kencana Agri, subsidiary of PT BTS, to 
appoint their upstream corporation as major crude palm oil supplier49, while PT RAP supplies 
CPO to Indofood Agri as a wholly-owned subsidiary (IndoAgri, 2016). Both Indofood Agri and 
SMART are important suppliers for the domestic market, for which they manufacture consumer 
products, while also exporting to various markets across the Asia Pacific and Europe, in line with 
patterns discussed in chapter 4.  
Global markets are exerting an increasing influence on the ethical practices of Indonesian palm 
oil companies, as particularly evident during the 2015 World Economic Forum, when consumer 
groups challenged palm oil companies to not only focus on cheaper palm oil-products, but to also 
address the social and environmental sustainability of upstream production (WEF, 2015). The 
most crucial concerns voiced by consumer groups and NGOs, in relation to West Kalimantan, 
are tenurial conflicts and deforestation50. Indeed, issues of deforestation and land conflicts in 
Kapuas Hulu are interrelated, as when palm oil companies appropriate fallow lands or 
                                                          
48 Personal communication with several plasma recipients, Miau Merah, West Kalimantan, 2016 
49 http://kencana.listedcompany.com/misc/ar2008.pdf 
50 https://www.cifor.org/gcs-tenure/research/research-sites/indonesia/west-kalimantan/ 
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community forests, and then subsequently clear this land of secondary forest. IndoAgri and 
SMART are both members of the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a form of 
accreditation aimed at addressing the ethical concerns of consumers through the value chain, 
such that RSPO recognition thereby helps strengthen corporate branding for palm oil companies. 
Despite this membership, these companies have struggled to resolve upstream conflicts in Badau 
and Miau Merah51. Based on a key criteria of RSPO, it is very clearly stated that corporations 
need to resolve conflicts and bring positive social economic impacts to surrounding local 
communities. 
“Where there is a conflict on the condition of land use as per land title, growers should show evidence that 
necessary action has been taken to resolve the conflict with relevant parties…” (RSPO, 2013, p.9) 
 
The failure of third-party mediation (involving both local government and NGOs) to address 
land conflicts in oil palm plantations and to achieve win-win solutions for both the community 
and company has resulted in more firm-centric approaches to dispute resolution. An alternative 
approach to obtaining ethical legitimacy, adopted by Indofood Agri, has been to initiate social 
investments through their Solidarity Programme within their upstream operations (IndoAgri, 
2016). Through this program, they have delivered improved community health and education 
facilities in an explicit attempt to improve relationships with the local community to address past 
tenurial conflicts. They present their sustainability commitments as follows:52  
“Relationships with communities and smallholders are strengthened through regular engagement activities 
under these Programmes, which aim to alleviate conflict over land rights and strengthen business 
continuity, as well as improve community health, enterprise and education. Projects under these 
Programmes are prioritised based on the findings of social impact assessments.” 
 
Such an approach is a common value chain occurrence, whereby supplier firms will implement 
upstream operations set by lead firm manufacturers (Gereffi, 1994, p. 97). In this case, PT RAP 
is following a standard social investment program that has been initiated by Indofood Agri. This 
program is an attempt to enable a long-term advantage that serves the corporate interests of 
securing and upgrading local labour supply, but it seems less likely to address the underlying 
local tenurial conflicts in Silat Hilir. For example, field observations and interviews identified an 
                                                          
51 Personal communication with some villagers in Badau and Silat Hilir, 2016.  
52 See: http://www.indofoodagri.com/misc/A.How-we-manage-sustainability-2017.pdf 
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ongoing disagreement between the community and company in relation to a lack of transparency 
in the payment of dividends in Miau Merah53. The local community had even pursued their 
protest over unresolved land tenurial conflicts to the local parliament in Kapuas Hulu (Suara 
Pemred Kalbar, 2018). 
These institutional interventions along the value chain have functioned in other ways to enhance 
local human resource capabilities and to induce rural development. It was generally 
acknowledged by local community members that the presence of these agribusiness firms had 
resulted in improved access to education and health facilities54. This social investment program 
also has the potential to make social contributions by reducing inequitable access to job 
opportunities between migrant and indigenous people, since earlier plantations in Miau Merah 
had tended to provide more opportunities to better-educated migrants55. Nowadays, with 
improved access to education and health, indigenous people are upgrading their basic formal 
education as an important pathway to accessing jobs on the estates and elsewhere. In an 
interview with a younger, high-school educated, Dayak man, having the ability to write, read and 
understand basic numerical calculation allowed him to work as a field supervisor on a plantation. 
He explained: 
“I am Dayak Sebaruk, I am 35 years old. I am engaged with swidden cultivation, work on an oil palm 
plantation, and have also planted my own oil palm. Now, I own a one-hectare oil palm farm, which I started 
to plant in 2011. I sell some [of my fruits] to improve my economic condition.” -Interview with KA, Miau 
Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
 
Furthermore, in SMART policy making, education plays an important role in securing a better 
relationship with the community, and also to secure and improve the capacity of their potential 
labour force. SMART describes the specifically standardised education facilities in their 
upstream operations:  
“Children of our employees and casual workers living in the estate receive free education from 
kindergarten to junior high school and heavily subsidised higher education. In the wider community, 
children living around our estates receive heavily subsidised education at all levels. To further encourage 
our employees to send their children to school, we provide free school bus services for all students. We 
believe that having access to basic medical care is a basic human right. To meet this need, we have built 
healthcare facilities in most of our estates and staff them with qualified medical professionals to serve our 
                                                          
53 Personal communication with K, Miau Merah, 2016 
54 Survey interview with local communities in Miau Merah, 2016.  
55 Personal communication with H, Miau Merah, 2016.  
99 
 
employees and their families as well as the local communities”, Communication Progress of SMART 
(SMART, 2016) 
 
In Badau and Janting, the local community was generally satisfied with the level of improved 
access to education and health care facilities56 despite their disappointment with previous land 
negotiations with PT BTS. In Badau, the company implemented programs to establish schools in 
the estate and a free school bus to children to come into the school. In Badau and Janting, I found 
that the younger Dayak generation (ie. less than 40 years old) was accessing labour opportunities 
through their better education levels relative to older generations.  
In addition, the institutional intervention of SMART to expand road and mill infrastructure has 
extended participation and market access of smallholders in other ways. SMART itself is a 
subsidiary of Golden Agri Resources (GAR), a Sinar Mas Group company listed in Singapore, 
which asserts a commitment to value chain development:  
“With large scale and integrated nature of our palm oil operations allow us to promote efficiency, 
productivity, quality and sustainable growth across the entire value chain. GAR has been expanding its 
downstream presence and is well positioned to grow a global, diversified customer base through strong 
distribution, branding, merchandising, destination processing, shipping and logistics. As we constantly 
develop our upstream and downstream capabilities to enhance performance, we are able to leverage 
logistical advantages, to supply our products to the world as the partner of choice”57. 
 
In my field location, in Badau, SMART had invested a large amount of money to establish 300 
kilometres of road infrastructure linking Badau and Silat Hilir (AntaraNews, 2011). Furthermore, 
its investments have included expanded mills in Badau, Silat Hilir, and Sintang, including two 
refinery mills in Badau and Silat Hilir in 2012 with a total value of 300 billion rupiahs (Ibid). 
This expanding infrastructure program has been promoted by SMART Agribusiness to serve 
their business interests to increase efficiency along their supply chain, yet local communities are 
also benefitting as they extend their fruit sales both outside Kapuas Hulu (e.g. to the more 
established mills further downstream in Sintang) and in local markets58. They use palm oil 
infrastructure without any direct financial contribution to its establishment or maintenance.  
                                                          
56 Survey interview with local respondents in Badau and Janting, 2016. See also survey responses in Chapter 8. 
57 Source: http://www.sinarmas.com/en/agribusiness-and-food.html 
58 Personal communication with J, Miau Merah, 2018.  
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Palm oil mills sourcing from an outsourced smallholder supply base depend upon a network of 
local collectors. Many community members have successfully upgraded their position within the 
value chain to occupy more lucrative positions as collectors, or middlemen59, where they use the 
improved infrastructure to supply the mills in Sintang. They act as local market channels from 
smallholders to broader value chain actors, and use their economic position to coordinate and 
increase smallholder production. These collectors obtain profits based largely on owning 
vehicles for transporting fruit, and their margin per kilogram is approximately equal to the 
transportation cost per kilo if the farmers instead want to ship the fruit themselves collectively 
with their peers. These chains continue to be effectively governed by lead firms, who create 
limiting institutions for participation, including through price and standards setting, although 
collectors also retain some autonomy in this regard. Within the field sites during early 2018, the 
official market price for palm oil fruit in Kalimantan ranged between 1600 to 1700 IDR per kilo, 
while in Miau Merah, local middlemen can push the price down to 1300 IDR per kilo60. These 
smallholder farmers sold their palm oil fruits at this lowered price due to their inability to find 
other buyers and the high costs associated with transporting fruits themselves. 
Hence, from the preceding discussion, it is found that palm oil companies in my case sites 
operate to minimise their internal supply chain risks by directly controlling, or governing, 
upstream production. Sometimes, these companies exploit local resources through contract 
farming with landholders. However, external consumer concerns over sustainability also pressure 
them to improve their brand reputations through enhanced upstream engagement with 
communities, such as the social investment programs delivered by SMART and Indofood Agri 
that go beyond formal regulatory requirements. While their intentions to resolve tenurial 
conflicts through such programs are questionable, they have delivered improved social and 
physical infrastructure, which has improved local participation in palm oil development. In a 
nutshell, this buyer driven governance has transmitted sustainability concerns and expectations 
from global consumers into specified corporate actions to voluntarily deliver public services that 
were previously unknown in this relatively remote district. 
                                                          
59 Personal communication with several palm oil smallholder farmers in Miau Merah, 2016.  
60 Interview with YI, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2018.  
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6.3 The broader institutional setting of the palm oil value chain 
The palm oil value chain consists of various direct economic actors – smallholder outgrowers, 
collectors, processors, exporters, product manufacturers, supermarkets, financial organisations 
etc. These actors, and their value-adding activities, constitute the input-output structure of the 
chain, with a buyer-driven governance structure dictated by the needs of lead firms. These 
various economic actors are then embedded within a broader set of institutions shaped by various 
external stakeholders and many of whom have a major impact on oil palm cultivation at the local 
level. In Kapuas Hulu, the Indonesian state, operating at various scales, is clearly a key element 
of this broader institutional setting, and acts to either promote or inhibit the spatial expansion of 
oil palm plantations. Meanwhile various environmental and conservation interests, including 
international NGOs, have performed a further critical role in bringing public attention to 
environmental concerns affecting the palm oil industry, and their actions, agendas and interests 
are reshaping the way smallholders engage with palm oil and their ability to develop their own 
livelihood trajectories. 
Ribot (1998, p.331) emphasises how state institutions shape access to resources, and how this 
will be influential in determining profit distribution along a value chain. In the context of palm 
oil development in Kapuas Hulu, there are various state agents including the local government, 
national and provincial land agencies, financial regulators, and conservation agencies that shape 
industry expansion. Principal amongst these state roles is facilitating the allocation of land access 
to preferred actors. National and local authorities have played important roles expanding oil palm 
cultivation by supporting migrants (transmigrasi), and providing subsidies, loans, agricultural 
extension and infrastructure. The national land agency, agricultural authorities and local 
government also play important roles in controlling land access for palm oil companies that 
operate in rural areas. The endorsement of large-scale land palm oil plantations has emerged 
from national level agricultural authorities (Permentan-98, 2013).  
The expansion of oil palm plantations has been a key pillar of state policies through which to 
promote agricultural modernisation in border areas. Simultaneously these policies have 
encouraged large-scale appropriation of land resources, as will be discussed in the following 
chapter. These local and national interventions are mediated through local government such as 
the regional development planning board (BAPEDDA), which also oversees the spatial planning 
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process. In Kapuas Hulu, palm oil companies must negotiate with these local development 
institutions to acquire large-scale land for palm oil development. In an interview with the 
plantation office, this negotiation had been conducted prior to obtaining local permits from the 
local land agency in Kapuas Hulu61. While the district head has the authority to approve 
concessions, this local development agency has strong economic influence over local land use 
decisions.  
The state land agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) is the only state institution that is legally 
allowed to issue leasing concession rights (HGU) in Kapuas Hulu, and elsewhere in Indonesia. If 
the lease area is below 1000 hectares, the authority falls upon the provincial land agency in West 
Kalimantan62. Prior to gaining concessional rights, corporations are legally required to negotiate 
first with local communities about their proposal to establish large-scale palm oil plantations. In 
these situations, state agents will often look negatively upon swidden cultivation while 
embracing and supporting the need to develop oil palm plantations. A frequent problem is that 
state agents overlook the informal rights of swidden cultivators and customary rights. Despite the 
national constitution urging recognition of customary rights, political elites have prioritised the 
accumulation of revenue over incurring costs associated with managing local customary rights. 
Certain representatives of the state were quite explicit about their attitudes towards customary 
rights, which is seen to be clearly subservient to state claims over land.  
“In here (West Kalimantan), customary rights do not exist. These would require satisfying formal 
requirements, such as the presence of local customary and collective rights. In fact, these cannot be 
observed -  they are just able to claim access to sacred forests to collect local resources. The company was 
granted the [legal] concession based on the prior legal status of that being state land.” Interview with a staff 
member of the West Kalimantan Provincial land Agency, Pontianak, West Kalimantan, 2016.  
 
These state land authorities tend to create a regulatory dichotomy between state land versus 
formal ownership rights, suggesting an absence of informal rights or customary tenure over land, 
contributing to various local conflicts, competing claims and ultimately the ability of corporate 
interests to acquire land at relatively low cost. This issue will be explained further in the 
following chapters.  
The central government has endorsed an independent authority to channel financial loans to the 
                                                          
61 Interview with PS, Plantation office in Kapuas Hulu, Putussibau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
62 Interview with the West Kalimantan Provincial Land Agency, Pontianak, West Kalimantan, 2016. 
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palm oil sector, the national palm oil funding agency (BPDP KS), which was established in 2015 
through presidential decree63, and which had evolved from a previous program to channel micro-
credit to smallholders under national financial and economic authorities. Under that decree, the 
state enforces levies upon all palm oil exports, and in return they will cooperate with state-owned 
banks to channel those funds toward palm oil development. To gain public acceptance, the 
government promoted a discourse that focused on the benefits of replanting which would assist 
smallholder farmers (Bisnis.com, 2016). While some funds do get channelled into plasma plots 
and independent smallholders, in the Kapuas Hulu case study sites, these “plasma plots” have 
long been under the direct control of large-scale oil palm plantations. At the local level, most of 
the actors that were provided significant financial assistance were financial organisations, such 
as local banks and credit unions and, with some flexibility, farmers can access fertilisers, 
herbicides and motorcycles from this local financial assistance64. 
A further role of local and national plantation authorities has been to provide agricultural 
assistance through seeds and fertilisers. For instance, in 2016, the local community in Janting 
had been provided with palm oil seeds from the national authority so they could plant their own 
oil palm65. In addition, through the local agricultural development office, the national authority 
distributed subsidised fertilisers for the intention of using on local food crops.66 Based on 
conversations with oil palm farmers, these subsidised fertilisers were widely used for oil palm, 
but were accessed through the food crop farmer groups, while swidden farmers are generally 
ineligible for accessing these subsidised fertilisers. While the government provided fertiliser 
cards to prevent misuse of fertilisers in 2018 (ie. reallocation from food crops to oil palm), the 
local oil palm farmers kept using these cards to access fertilisers to support oil palm cultivation. 
At the same time, there have been growing issues of fertiliser scarcity in Miau Merah.67 In this 
situation of scarcity and local competition for fertilisers, some prosperous farmers have 
opportunistically secured fertiliser stocks to sell to smallholder farmers in Miau Merah.68. At 
least, some informal fertiliser suppliers among farmers can add some solutions for their fertiliser 
deficits.  
                                                          
63PeraturanPresiden (Perpres) Nomor 61 Tahun 2015  
64 Personal communication with some palm oil farmers in Miau Merah and Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
65 Interview with YE, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
66Permentan 310/12/2017. 
67 Interview with J, Miau Merah, 2018.  
68 Ibid 
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In contrast, conservation institutions work to limit agricultural expansion by formalising land 
settlement through land use zoning that see large area of forests become conservation areas. In a 
conversation with the sub-district head in Badau in 2016, however, it was explained that 
corporations could still expand oil palm plantations in Badau, as zoning regulations in that area 
could still be converted to oil palm plantations despite the area surrounding Embaloh Hulu being 
demarcated as protection forest. Hall et al. (2011, p.65) have explained how the exclusion of 
local communities from accessing agricultural land can occur because of domestic and 
international actors seeking to expand conservation zones. In West Kalimantan, state 
conservation agencies appear to have overlapping authority with development agencies who 
endorse conservation. In the past, the national forestry authority had demarcated the national 
park of Danau Sentarum and Betung Kerihun National Park as a preservation area that would 
forbid any development activities. While, Badau and Silat Hilir are not part of that protection 
zone, donor conservation agencies have raised the possibility of expanding the protection area in 
the buffer conservation zone of Embaloh Hulu and Batang Lupar. 
According to some spatial plans, the buffer zone was a grey zone between development and 
protection. However, to prevent the intrusion of palm oil expansion, international organisations 
have cooperated with local forestry officials to endorse environmental restoration programs. In 
those areas, the donor agency distributed rubber, coffee and gaharu seeds as part of local forest 
restoration which were being promoted as part of a local livelihood alternative (GAHARU, 
2016). Despite fluctuating rubber prices and the difficulties of growing coffee in local soils, 
those economic alternatives are claimed as strategies which will protect local land and natural 
resources from the dangers of palm oil expansion69. 
Under the influence of conservation institutions, substitution of swidden into permanent 
agriculture was also promoted to conserve forest. For instance, in 1999, forestry officials and the 
state conservation agency in Kapuas Hulu cooperated to effectively criminalise slash and burn 
farming by making land burning an offence70. In response, local activists and community 
members protested these actions until, eventually in 2009, a new national regulation revised this 
                                                          
69 Interview with J, staff of international conservation organization, Putussibau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016. 
70 UU No.41/1999 
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ruling by incorporating provisions for indigenous farming systems71. These multiple 
interpretations created confusion and ambiguity over the different land use zones and allowable 
land use practices. 
In cases elsewhere in Southeast Asia, conservation interventions have been reported to 
exacerbate local vulnerabilities through eviction and local livelihood losses (Hall et al., 2011, p. 
61). Conservation agencies attempt to protect their conservation zones from palm oil intrusion, 
and this can often destabilise relationships between the national conservation agency and the 
local community. One such example occurred in Embaloh Hulu over the issue of timber use in 
Batang Kerihun National park. In 2010, a Dayak Tamambaloh longhouse was burnt and when 
reconstructing the longhouse, the community harvested timber from inside the national park72. 
Under customary laws, the local community have the freedom to harvest forest resources under 
the permission of customary institutions. Nevertheless, under formal forestry regulations, 
harvesting forest resources in the conservation area was strictly prohibited, and these 
contradictions evoked conflicts with the national park authority. Due to ongoing conflicts, 
community leaders decided to temporarily shut down the office of Conservation in their area73 
until the issue was finally resolved when the conservation authority gave temporary timber 
harvesting permits to local communities.  
During field visits to Embaloh Hulu and Batang Lupar (both of which surround the national 
park), the absence of oil palm in these villages was identified as contributing to livelihood 
uncertainties. Some villagers instead depended upon off farm labour work or farm work 
elsewhere, including within oil palm plantations.  
“I worked as a handyman, tapping rubber, sometime hunting for my pleasure. When there was a program, I 
once planted cocoa but this failed. Then, I planted pepper but this also failed. I depended on rubber [to 
sustain my household economy]. However, I was assisted by my adult children who lived respectively in 
Malaysia and East Kalimantan. My son has worked as a financial accountant for the palm oil company in 
East Kalimantan”. Interview with J, PulauManak, Embaloh Hulu, 2016. 
In the context of oil palm expansion in Indonesia, non-government organisations often associate 
oil palm with loss of biodiversity, soil erosion, problems of greenhouse gas emission and 
pollution of soils and waterways (Levang, Riva, & Orth, 2016, p. 284). These non-government 
                                                          
71 UU No.32/2009. 
72 Personal communication with customary chiefs of PulauManak, in Embaloh Hulu, 2016.  
73 Personal communication with J, PulauManak, Embaloh Hulu, 2016. 
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organizations, however, also expand their focus on negative impacts towards social issues to 
build up broader public opposition to oil palm development. In Silat Hilir, the downstream 
agribusiness firms was accused by one international non-government organization of exploiting 
child labour and paying low salaries, while also destroying rainforest and habitat for orangutan 
(Greenpeace, 2017). This opposition has also seen attacks on financial institutions for unethical 
investments. For instance, some NGOs have exposed the irresponsible provision of US$ 1.66 
billion of credit from the Malaysian financial bank, from 2010 to 2016, to six large companies in 
Indonesia involved in deforestation activities and sought to use the financing of palm oil as a 
critical point of leverage.  
Environmental organisations reconstruct the institutional settings of the chain at various scales. 
At the local level, non-government organisations have worked with some villagers to convey 
opposition to oil palm, and successfully reshaped local opposition towards the expansion of oil 
palm plantations (Acciaoli, G & Dewi, 2016, p. 339). In Janting, the influence of NGOs on the 
local community occurred through engagement between village activists and NGO staff, where 
the latter actively urged local villagers to refuse oil palm development in the area. For example, 
in visiting Ulak Pauk in Embaloh Hulu, local community members received small pamphlets 
from a non-government organisation in Jakarta about the negative impacts of palm oil on their 
local communities. In these pamphlets, this non-government organisation identifies lack of 
employment and dispossession from palm oil development.  
“Palm oil plantation destroys local livelihoods. The local community has been cultivating food crops for 
hundreds of years. Rotation and swidden cultivation in particular has allowed for the regrowing of forests. 
Palm oil development erased that subsistence foods and other agroforestry incomes such as rattan, resin 
rubber and pepper.” Local pamphlet from non-government organization, NN, UlakPauk, Embaloh Hulu, 
Kapuas Hulu, 2016. 
 
Such non-government actors tend to present villagers as living in harmony with the environment 
prior to the introduction of oil palm, who lived as ecologically noble savages powerless to resist 
the change enacted upon their livelihoods (as described also by Levang et al. 2016, p.284). In 
Kapuas Hulu, an influential local non-government organisation, Lanting Borneo, was involved 
with around twenty-four local communities across Kapuas Hulu.74 To portray the environmental 
                                                          
74 Interview with DU, chief of local Kapuas Hulu’s NGO, Putussibau, 2016.  
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problems from oil palm, this local activist associates the impact of marginalising customary 
communities from the challenges of oil palm plantations.  
“Currently, we advocate the endorsement of customary rights in Kapuas Hulu. With regard to palm oil 
development, we ask the customary community to calculate costs and benefits from accepting palm oil 
development. We can make conclusions that the customary community only received 0.1 percent, yet they 
lost their rights for 35 years along with their rubber. In fact, by working in their rubber fields, they can use 
it for their daily shopping needs” Interview with DU, chief of local Kapuas Hulu’s NGO, Putussibau, 2016.  
 
This approach where environmental activists advocate upholding and protecting customary rights 
appears to have gained some favourable traction in the eyes of local communities. Nonetheless, 
the inability of the NGOs to differentiate between oil palm as a smallholder crop and large-scale 
oil palm plantations meant that they can unnecessarily distance themselves from community 
interests (Levang et al. 2016, p.285). In the pamphlet disseminated by activists, oil palm was 
linked to labour exploitation, as follows.  
“In the Indonesian palm oil sector, labour rights such as decent pay, freedom, and their ability to negotiate 
are suppressed. Agreements and expectations from palm oil companies about employment are rarely met. 
Many people face a worse situation than before the arrival of oil palm.”  - Local pamphlet from non-
government organization, NN, UlakPauk, Embaloh Hulu, Kapuas Hulu, 2016. 
 
This argument seemed to ignore the existence of local participation, both as smallholder oil palm 
and as wage-earning, low-skilled plantation workers, both of which were widespread in my case 
study sites. They also failed to mention the continued mutual existence of palm oil labouring and 
swidden farming, which is often conducted simultaneously to secure an adequate income. From 
another perspective, the oppositional stance taken by activists acted to raise local expectations 
about alternative livelihood improvements, which were rarely realised (Acciaoli, G & Dewi, 
2016, p. 339). In Embaloh Hulu, for instance, local activists from various non-government 
organisations in Putussibau promoted swidden cultivation and rubber as a way to sustain their 
economic livelihoods. This discourse which also seeks to maintain rubber as a part of local 
livelihood was voiced by non-government organisations in a local seminar. 
“Rubber is not only a source of cash income and livelihood activity, but also a founding local livelihood. 
While the local community shifts to other crops, rubber plays an important role to sustain household 
economies. Rubber is the social capital for local development”  -Presentation delivered by Swandiri 
Institute in BAPPEDA office of Putussibau, April 19, 2016.  
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In addition, maintaining rubber and swidden has been promoted as the best alternative to oil 
palm by local NGOs: 
“Before the oil palm plantations came, they could tap rubber, do swidden cultivation, sell Tengkawang, 
harvest durian. They can grasp money. We asked them to calculate that, your land can be sustained for 35 
years. There will be non-government organizations to assist you in the agriculture, fisheries and other 
sectors.” Interview with DU, chief of local Kapuas Hulu’s NGO, Putussibau, 2016.  
 
Nevertheless, aspirations and monetary needs in West Kalimantan have been growing amongst 
locals, and this has resulted in greater interest in education, healthcare, and goods such as 
motorbikes and electronic equipment (Levang et al., 2016, p. 284). Involvement in new palm oil 
opportunities has offered opportunities to meet these desires and needs. In Janting and Silat Hilir, 
some local farmers acknowledged that palm oil cultivation allows them to engage in the cash 
economy. Nevertheless, in the areas that had rejected oil palm cultivation, such as the 
communities surrounding the buffer conservation area of Embaloh Hulu and Batang Lupar 
subdistricts, local people were confused about what livelihood alternatives could be pursued to 
help meet cash needs. In these communities that had closer relationships with various 
environmental activists from Jakarta and Putussibau, local people were more likely to complain 
about their economic burdens and the difficulties they faced to acquire those basic and secondary 
needs in the absence of palm oil. 
It can be seen that the broader institutional settings of the palm oil sector, most notably the 
influence of the state and environmental NGOs were creating conditions that were influencing – 
sometimes in contradictory ways – the nature of community engagement with the sector. 
6.4 Customary institutions in Kapuas Hulu 
The Ibanic community has a complex customary culture that manages natural resources and 
addresses conflicts in Kapuas Hulu (Yasmi et al. 2007, p.604).  For instance, in Ibanic customary 
culture, the community lives in a longhouse consisting of between 10 to 30 households, with a 
longhouse head called the Tue Rumah.  Between the 1950s and 1960s, Janting village consisted 
of 12 households living in one longhouse75, while Badau had 20 to 30 households living in one 
longhouse. To demarcate the territory between longhouses, it would be customary for 
                                                          
75 Interview with YI, Desa Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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communally-managed agroforests called Tembawang to be established (see Plate 6-1). Tue 
rumah imposed sanctions on any external people who collected resources without their approval, 
and the negotiation of territorial claims among longhouses was decided on the negotiation 
between Tue rumah and higher leaders of several longhouses, known as Patih.  
Customary institutions have had a significant influence on the regulation of subsistence 
cultivation, namely swidden cultivation, in allocating land access and facilitating reciprocal 
labour exchange. For instance, within Dayak communities in Badau and Silat Hilir, villagers 
would obtain exclusive rights to family land after it was transferred by their grandfather. Farmers 
would take the risk and invest energy to open forest areas for their own swidden plots, but only 
after gaining local approval from customary leaders. Clearing primary forest posed major risks 
such as being attacked by crocodiles, sun bears, or poisonous snakes. In addition, Tue rumah also 
had the role to monitor labour reciprocity among the household within the longhouse, and they 
would impose customary sanctions if the labour exchange was facilitated by monetary payments.  
In the emerging palm oil economy, there has been a shift in local preferences for individual, 
rather than longhouse, residency, although this shift is likely due to a confluence of social 
factors. In Janting, in my personal communication with swidden communities, scarce wood 
resources as well as past conflict among customary leaders contributed to the diminishing role of 
longhouse unions. Here, the role of Tue Rumah to regulate land and labour access has been 
diminishing, but now they depended for their customary decisions on the higher level of official, 
the Patih.  
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Plate  6-1 Collective forest garden (Iban: Tembawang/Tembawai) 
 
Source: fieldwork in Kapuas Hulu 
 
Local Dayak culture and institutions are strongly associated with swidden cultivation.  Dove 
(1983) highlights past studies of swidden cultivation which demonstrated its economic and 
cultural importance for Dayaks in terms of inheriting collective norms and food production, even 
as rubber has long been a complement to the cash crop economy for Dayak households (Dove, 
2011). Nevertheless, there continue to be several misconceptions from various external actors 
with respect to swidden cultivators, who are considered incapable and reluctant to engage with 
oil palm development76.  
Based on observations in Janting and Silat Hilir, local communities have largely incorporated oil 
palm cultivation into their swidden plots, revealing diverse attitudes towards both oil palm and 
swidden farming, with a marked generational pattern. For example, discussions with older 
people in Janting and Miau Merah revealed their continued commitment to swidden land uses, 
                                                          
76 Personal communication with various local government and non-government actors 
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while at the same time they had began to embrace the palm oil economy77. For example, a 59 
year old Iban man explained to me how he had started to grow oil palm in his mixed 11 hectare 
swidden. 
However, it was also found that swidden cultivation is typically valued the least in terms of 
monetary income amongst younger farmers in three surrounding villages. Due to the influences 
of urban lifestyles and mass consumerism, the youth were often less interested in swidden 
farming (as also described by Cramb et al., 2009, p. 329). In Janting, several younger Iban men 
had invested in education so as to diversify into various cash-based livelihoods. During a 
meeting with a 41 year old Iban man, it was explained how he had been able to access formal 
education and related this to the fact that he no longer practiced swidden cultivation. He had 
slowly increased both labour and capital investments into oil palm cultivation under the 
increasing affluence of oil palm growing relatives who he had previously encountered during a 
previous trip to Malaysia:  
“In 2013, I went to Lubok Antu visiting my relatives in Malaysia. He shared his story about the unpleasant 
experience of planting pepper, rubber, swidden and running a local shop. A Chinese man persuaded my 
brother in Malaysia to plant oil palm, saying it was more beneficial than pepper. I then took 500 (oil palm) 
seeds. I started to plant despite the warnings of local villagers. Nowadays, I have no longer practice 
swidden cultivation, as I expect more from the oil palm harvest” - Interview with YE, Janting, Kapuas 
Hulu, 2018.  
 
Some other Dayaks in Badau shared similar opinions about swidden cultivation. For example, in 
a meeting with a well-educated Dayak man in his mid-40s, it was stated that swidden cultivation 
had largely become irrelevant to his livelihood.78 Instead, he had invested most of his cash 
income into rental properties.  
“Ten years ago, I had followed my father into swidden farming. Yet, now I no longer do swidden 
cultivation. I realised the difficult economic situation in Badau. I use income from rubber to invest in rental 
properties. I am 47 years old now.” Interview with Dayaks in Badau, J, Kapuas Hulu 2016. 
 
Another Iban man in Badau in his mid-30s had moved away from swidden cultivation to local 
trading after receiving a university degree from Malang. He also preferred to purchase foods 
rather than grow them.  
                                                          
77 Personal communication with swidden farmers above 50 years in Janting and Miau Merah.  
78 Personal communication with Dayak, J, Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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“I was born here. I am a local trader, but not a farmer. I purchase my own food, as I cannot depend on this 
local society. I purchase from Malaysia. I cannot fully depend on the city [Pontianak].” J, Badau, Kapuas 
Hulu, 2016.  
 
In Miau Merah, it has been found that some older Dayaks, above 50 years, cultivate oil palm in 
their swidden plots. To inherit swidden, these older generations made mixed farming between 
palm oil and swidden farmers.  Yet, for younger Dayaks, swidden cultivation is often seen as the 
least productive form of income generation and has little social value79. In local interviews, one 
Dayak man admitted that swidden cultivation is a relatively marginal livelihood activity due to 
the importance of cash generating activities such as wage labour and oil palm cultivation, and he 
no longer practised swidden cultivation80. One Sebaruk farmer modified his swidden fields to 
accommodate palm oil cultivation.  
“I work in a palm oil company here… I am not involved in swidden, but my parents are. However, I am 
involved in oil palm and rubber cultivation. Palm oil has not yet been harvested, but rubber has. To me, 
swidden is insufficient for us.” (AS, Sebaruk, Miau Merah. Kapuas Hulu, 2016). 
 
Furthermore, it has been reported elsewhere how the local transition to perennial cash crops 
resulted in an increasing pattern of individualised land tenure and the weakening of community 
governance (Cramb et al., 2009, p. 331). This was observed, for instance, in Miau Merah, where 
customary institutions had traditionally demarcated village boundaries based on natural signs 
obtained from their parents. However, to their descendants, obsolete boundaries can create local 
conflicts in the local adoption to capital intensive crops as oil palm. During field work, one 
Sebaruk man explained how he preferred using GPS (Global Positioning System) navigation, 
and the use of a letter of consent from the village head (SKT), to demarcate land boundaries 
when purchasing swidden from other villagers.81  Previously, land boundaries among members 
of Iban in Janting were demarcated according to customary inheritance of natural signs such as 
rocks and rivers– techniques that are still sometimes applied, but are declining in their 
popularity. Customary leaders continue to negotiate and demarcate boundaries between 
neighbours by planting bamboo clumps, as can be seen in plate 6-2. 
 
 
                                                          
79 Personal communication with various Dayaks below 50 years old in Miau Merah.  
80 Interview with AH, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2018.  
81 Interview with YI, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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Plate  6-2 Re-demarcating with small bamboo to secure private property 
 
Source: local fieldwork in Janting, Badau. 
 
Besides an increasing trend toward perennial cash crops, declining traditional practices of labour 
exchange have also been observed (as also described by Cramb et al. 2009, p.331). In the past, 
labour exchange was employed in Kapuas Hulu to overcome labour bottlenecks during planting, 
weeding, and harvesting (Dove, 2011, p. 176) . For Dayak and Iban culture in West Kalimantan, 
these reciprocal labour arrangements are known as kabanbelayan (Sather 2006, p.90). Members 
of longhouses provided their labour to the other longhouse members in reciprocal arrangements. 
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With retaining strict reciprocity, each longhouse member is not allowed to give material returns 
or surplus rice in exchange for their labour (Ibid.). In Iban culture, cooperation between the local 
community members is particularly useful when it comes to labour intensive activities such as 
felling trees and harvesting subsistence food crops (Cramb, 2007, pp. 82–84). 
During fieldwork, it was found that instead of complying with the traditional labour exchange 
rule, many instances of labour exchange now involve monetary contributions, where labour was 
paid in cash. The wage rate is heterogeneous among different villages, and in Miau Merah labour 
can bargain higher rate due to more off-farm opportunities there, For instance, in Miau Merah, 
one Dayak paid 80 thousand rupiah per day to villagers who assisted him in his swidden farm.82 
Due to labour shortages, one Iban revealed that he needed to hire outsider labour by paying 50 
thousand rupiah per day to assist him in the harvest of paddy in Janting 83 For perennial cash 
crops, labour exchanges are usually based on monetary exchange and, in both Janting and Miau 
Merah, labour would be hired for 100 thousand IDR to harvest palm oil fruit84. 
From a livelihood perspective, the shift towards non-farm labouring work has been adopted as 
one part of a multi-pronged strategy to continue with their farm plots and can even be used as a 
strategy to accumulate resources and invest in larger smallholding plots (Rigg et.al 2016, p. 319). 
Due to the increasing pressure to generate cash to access education and health facilities, 
numerous local farmers engage in labouring work and cash crop farming. Land dispossession 
due to plantation development elsewhere has been reported to lead local communities to 
challenge the unequal outcomes of land enclosure and processes of agrarian differentiation (Hall 
et al., 2011, p. 160). However, non-farm work has played a significant role in reducing land sales 
from economically distressed farmers (Ibid, p.154). For instance, a Dayak Iban woman in 
Janting85 expressed her belief that off-farm labour opportunities were no longer restricted just to 
men. Fifteen years ago, there was no plantation, and women were almost exclusively involved in 
swidden cultivation. This young woman was divorced from her husband and had been left with a 
child. Yet, while palm oil plantations did not provide her with significant money, she found this 
work beneficial because it allowed her meet her daily cash economic needs. The advantage of oil 
                                                          
82 Interview with YI, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
83 Interview with YI, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016 
84 Interview with YE, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2018 
85 Personal communication with VM, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016 
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palm cultivation was that it provided her with the flexibility to also work on her swidden in the 
afternoons as well. 
“The advantage of working in palm oil mills is that money can be earnt while I still engage in swidden 
cultivation. I work from 7 in the morning to 2 in late afternoon. Afterwards I continue my swidden work… 
Fifteen years ago, women could not seek financial income apart from swidden, yet I can make it to work in 
the palm oil plantation.” - Interview with KA, Dayak farmers, Miau Merah, 2016.  
 
 
She revealed plans to also work as an oil palm smallholder. In Miau Merah, young oil palm 
farmers embraced various off-farm labour work as opportunities to accumulate cash incomes.86 
Indeed, many had already purchased 4 to 5 hectares of swidden lands from their neighbours to 
plant oil palm 87.  
In addition, heterogeneous local institutional formations emerge for sharing resources to lower 
the transportation costs of palm oil. Some farmers sell directly to mills in Sintang. As these mills 
are distant, transportation costs are a major burden for individual farmers. Hence, they made 
collective agreements to share transportation costs. Local farmers use the proportion of fruit by 
weight to be freighted by trucks as a new institutional arrangement.    
“For example if you, me and your friend carried a total of 7 tonnes of fruit, you,  3 tonnes, me 3 tonnes, and 
your friend 1 tonne,  there is a total of 7 tonnes which is multiplied by the selling price from the factory and 
so  the transportation cost will be discounted from the total sales revenue. It is determined how much per 
kilo, lets say about 280 IDR per kilogram. Hence, the heavier they are, the larger the transportation costs.”  
- Interview with J, Miau Merah, 2018.  
 
Customary institutions in Kapuas Hulu (such as an attachment to swidden cultivation) had once 
played the critical role in determining livelihood aspirations and engagement with new economic 
opportunities. These institutions are still important for some Dayak communities, and especially 
the older generation, and can be seen to have mediated the integration of these communities into 
the palm oil economy. Yet, over time, the influence of these institutions has tended to decline 
and the palm oil economy has become an increasingly important influence on local cultural 
institutions. 
 
                                                          
86 Interview with AS, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
87 Ibid,  
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the various institutional trajectories that have shaped the livelihood 
dynamics associated with the expansion of oil palm in Kapuas Hulu. Within the value chain 
itself, there have been various institutional forms created and maintained by various value chain 
actors, but increasingly under the influence of powerful lead firms. For example, there have been 
unequal powers to contract farming opportunities between plantation companies and local 
inhabitants as local land is incorporated within large-scale oil palm plantations. While plantation 
businesses disregard the original land owners under contractual agreements, there is another 
process of establishing palm oil related infrastructure. This infrastructure development provides 
both choices and access to local inhabitants so they can engage with the larger value chain that 
reaches beyond Kapuas Hulu, and often in quite beneficial ways. Local actors occupy different 
positions in the value chain to improve market access and strengthen their position within the 
value chain. 
State actors and NGOs can both improve and potentially disrupt local capacities to adapt to the 
presence of oil palm plantations. However, it seems that these external institutions often promote 
their own interests above the interests of people in Kapuas Hulu. Those confrontations result in 
difficulties for local community members who are faced with major dilemmas when it comes to 
livelihood choices.  
In the choice between maintaining the status quo or adopting cash crops, local institutions in the 
field study sites negotiate different social norms to embrace oil palm plantations. In fact, a new 
institutional environment has evolved to accommodate palm oil participation among local 
community members. The engagement of local communities with palm oil suggest that these 
communities are assessing the costs and benefits of palm oil and creating institutional responses 
that in many instances embrace palm oil. Due to increasing needs for education, market-bought 
foods, many in the local community are turning to the cash economy.  
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CHAPTER 7: LAND APPROPRIATION FOR LARGE-SCALE 
OIL PALM DEVELOPMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
Over many decades, policymakers in Kapuas Hulu have portrayed locally abundant land 
resources as ‘marginal lands’. More recently, these same actors have promoted conversion of 
what were earlier characterised as swidden and forest landscapes into large-scale oil palm 
plantations. According to the logic of policymakers, the state-backed conversion of frontier lands 
into oil palm can bring about numerous benefits. Those benefits include the strengthening of 
government influence in the border district as well as increased state revenue from 
agribusinesses and the generation of employment opportunities. On the downside, the expansion 
of large-scale oil palm plantations has been accompanied by the ongoing disregard for and 
marginalisation of local informal land rights and customary access institutions. 
This chapter examines the formal and informal processes through which large areas of land are 
appropriated by agribusiness investors, while local communities are effectively excluded from 
accessing that land. These processes involve a series of negotiations between investors and both 
state structures and local communities. The ensuing political negotiations can be seen as a 
process leading to the effective exclusion of certain actors (especially local communities) from 
areas designated for oil palm. In their book, Powers of Exclusion, Hall et al (2011) explain the 
complex interplay of processes that are used to exclude some actors from land while privileging 
others. They identify four powers, which can be summarised as powers of the market, powers to 
legitimate, powers to regulate, and straight out force, all of which are evident in Kapuas Hulu. 
Within broader planning processes, a political discourse of promoting and sustaining the palm oil 
sector has become enshrined within various spatial planning regulations that influence land use 
outcomes. Various international organisations also legitimate and promote policies that 
encourage the expansion of large scale oil palm plantations, with national and local elites often 
tailoring these development narratives to serve their own interests. These policies, however, have 
met with strong reaction and opposition from non-government organisations and local 
communities. Opposition to palm oil has grown substantially and, as described in Chapter 6, this 
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has been supported by international environmental organisations and NGOs and is leading to 
sustained public debate domestically within Indonesia.  
The state bureaucracy also informally promotes oil palm expansion by purposefully choosing to 
work through ambiguous legal and spatial planning categories, resulting in decisions that allow 
for the de facto expansion of oil palm. Within these “grey areas’, as stated by Sikor & Lund 
(2009), local and national governments have a weak capacity to effectively and adequately 
monitor and evaluate existing and proposed oil palm concessions. Agribusinesses are then able to 
manipulate these processes to influence the local community, partly through their ability to 
convincingly present a particular narrative of economic development related to palm oil. 
Ultimately, these distorted and opaque processes in turn tend to advantage corporate interests by 
giving them access to under-priced land. 
Agribusinesses in Kapuas Hulu, however, found that their patron-client relations with district 
elites were not adequate to provide them with unfettered access to local lands, and to gain access 
to land they also had to additionally negotiate with local customary elites. This was due to the 
nature of the institutional settings of the value chain described in Chapter 6, whereby community 
consent has become a requirement. Customary elites in Kapuas Hulu were found to use threats, 
discursive legitimation and regulatory mechanisms to ensure land was effectively provided to 
companies. This often resulted in major disagreements between different customary leaders and 
community members about the extent of land to be granted to oil palm plantations. The resulting 
pressures placed upon customary institutions has also been subsequently exploited by migrants in 
order to gain access to land. With the declining importance of customary tenure systems, a 
private land market has arisen as an important further mechanism of land redistribution and 
exclusion. 
7.2 Formal regulatory processes of land appropriation 
Areas that have been converted to oil palm plantations have continued to grow, following an 
approval process mediated by local district elites, even after the local announcement that Kapuas 
Hulu was to become a conservation district. In 1999, there were few cases of land being provided 
to oil palm plantations, but oil palm concession land had grown significantly to an astonishing 
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464,000 hectares88 by 2015. Much of this land was allocated through central land use authorities 
working in partnership with local elites, although the processes of land allocation were often 
opaque and based on securing mutual benefits for both local and national political elites and 
agribusinesses. 
The production of exclusive access rights over land is ultimately political and involves dynamic 
power relations (as described elsewhere by Massey, 2009, p. 18). In Indonesia, land use 
decisions are often made in a top down hierarchical way, involving the Ministry of Forestry and 
local governments who delineate between development zones and forestry zones (Chakib 2014, 
p.14). Spatial land zoning is a critical process that involves three tiers of government: local 
district governments make their own spatial zones (Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kabupaten - 
RTRWK); these are negotiated with forestry officials and their forestry zoning plans (Tata Guna 
Hutan Kesepakatan - TGHK); finally, these are incorporated into provincial zoning plans 
(Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Provinsi - RTRWP). This spatial plan then determines the scope 
of formally allowable activities on particular lands. As a part of these negotiations, local 
governments typically attempt to reduce areas that are zoned as state forest, thereby opening up 
land to oil palm conversion. In a general sense, forestry authorities would lose their authority 
over lands once they had been converted into designated non-forest use areas, such that 
negotiations over these forest lands becomes an institutional contest between the forestry 
department and local authorities to maintain territorial influence and possible access to rent-
seeking opportunities. 
Allocating oil palm concessions (HGU, or Hak Guna Usaha) almost inevitably results in access 
loss for local communities. In the case study sites, two palm oil corporations, PT BTS (PT Buana 
Tunas Sejahtera) and PT RAP (Riau Agrotama Plantation), were granted HGU concessions 
under different conditions and even though compensation was provided to smallholders due to 
loss of land during this process, many believed it to be inadequate. In the land titling and leasing 
system, power relations work in the favour of the government which is able to overrule the 
informal property rights of smallholders (McCarthy, 2006). While Chapter 6 described some of 
the customary institutions related to land access and use, these have generally been marginalised 
                                                          
88Data perkembangan perizinan Perusahaan perkebunan di Kabupaten Kapuas Hulu (Keadaan Tahun 2015).  
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against the overly bureaucratic land tenure systems that have been introduced by the state. The 
rationale for local government to override local customary land tenure systems is discursively 
constructed through an argument that these systems are poorly adapted to encourage economic 
development. Local policy makers have propagated a discourse of swidden cultivators as lazy 
farmers in interviews with local media (Suara Pemred, 2017):  
“We have a large amount of land, yet our farmers are the source of our problems, as the cultivated land has 
been shifted into sleeping land [ie. underutilised]. The works [of establishing oil palm concessions] should 
not be delayed and must be started as soon as possible." 
This discursive strategy is then formally complemented by a complicated bureaucratic process 
for allocated HGU concessions, as presented in Figure 7- 1. For instance, through the permit 
process, corporations have to negotiate with various state institutions and, prior to applying for a 
HGU, corporations have to negotiate with local development agencies to get information about 
land availability, obtain local permits, and undergo environmental assessment (AMDAL). After 
they meet these various requirements, they can negotiate with the national land agency (BPN) to 
finally obtain HGU leasing rights. In the complicated bureaucracies, some elites actually 
provided faster processes to applications by informal negotiation to pass some stages as mere 
formalities. These complicated settings have promoted informal patron-client relationships 
between elites and companies to ensure the process is a smooth one. 
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Figure 7-1 Permit process for oil palm concessions 
 
 
Source: Malangyudo  (2011), validated with interview and regulation review 
 
 
During the process of obtaining a HGU lease, land concession proponents are required to resolve 
pre-existing conflicting land claims and pay compensation if needed. Prior to receiving location 
permits (ijin lokasi), district elites required PT BTS and PT RAP to negotiate with local 
communities to resolve any formal or informal claims to the land these companies were planning 
on cultivating. Such bureaucratic requirements, however, were often accompanied by weak local 
government monitoring capacities, and in the case study sites, the consultation process was often 
driven by the company, such that local claims to land were effectively ignored. For instance, in 
both Silat Hilir and Badau, company representatives attempted to encourage local inhabitants to 
sacrifice their land for large-scale plantations. Simultaneously, local elites would use the 
consultation process to secure land sales to the company – often severely under-pricing land. 
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Much of the land previously accessed by the local community was not formally certified (ie. they 
did not have formal land title, or Hak Milik). One Dayak man explained that excessive costs 
prevent many villagers from going through the land certification process.89  
As local villagers have weak formal claims to land, agribusinesses are able to take advantage of 
formal land allocation systems to gain access (in processes described by Hall et al., 2011, p. 
146). For instance, in Badau, company representatives attempted to gain the support of local 
leaders by offering up-front compensation payments to village leaders90, on the apparent 
assumption that such payments would persuade influential local leaders to convince other 
villagers to give communal lands to the company. One local community member, alluding to the 
actions of company spokespersons, said: 
“They frequently came into my house to try and persuade me to give up my land by promising 
employment. I thought all my family members would become field supervisors… Yet, I am now 
disappointed that I gave 31 hectares of my land.” (NN, female, Janting, Badau, 2016).  
 
In Miau Merah, verbal promises of wealth and jobs were also given by the local palm oil 
consortia to local villagers in exchange for giving up their lands. In Miau Merah village, a local 
Dayak palm oil farmer felt deceived by a company official, who made several promises at the 
time in the formal process when local consent was required.    
“The spokesman told us that if we join the palm oil company, we will never suffer loss. We would not have 
to work, as the dividend would be delivered to us. In harvesting season, we could even purchase a 
television and receive money. We can just stay and relax in our home.” (Y, Miau Merah, Silat Hilir, 2016).  
 
However, after joining the company by leasing their land in a long-term agreement involving 
small dividend returns, the respondent felt disappointed by the lack of income he received.  
As presented in Figure 7.1, compensation should be paid to existing land users prior to an HGU 
concession being issued. This process of receiving compensation (and thereby effectively 
surrendering rights) occurred in a social environment dominated by the company. Using their 
influence over national and provincial land regulation processes, large-agribusinesses are able to 
push down land compensation prices far below market prices. During the process of establishing 
                                                          
89 Personal interview with HG, Janting, Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.   
90 Interview with B, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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the plantation,91 the company was in a strong position to dictate terms of compensation, and 
generally treated villagers as project recipients (who should be thankful for the company “gifts”) 
rather than rightful stakeholders. In Badau, villagers who supplied land to a local company for 30 
years (ie. the duration of the lease), were heavily swayed by the promises of work and income 
that were made to them during the early stages of negotiations. In return, they were paid 250,000 
IDR per hectare (19 USD) (Shantiko et al., 2013). Under a community agreement, previous land 
holders in Badau subdistrict were to be re-allocated 20 percent of the land that had been given to 
the company. Nevertheless, under subsequent developments, all plantation land, including the 
land ostensibly redistributed to the community, came under the full control of PT BTS92. 
Dividend payments provided by the company varied greatly, depending on their fruit harvest and 
production rates in that particular area, but a single villager would on average receive 
approximately 60 thousand IDR per month (around 4.6 USD).93 Although it was claimed that the 
local community had been consulted about the company’s decisions, there were few 
opportunities for villagers to meaningfully discuss their needs and aspirations.94  
                                                          
91 UU 98/2013 about large-scale plantation.  
92 Document of Plasma contracts with community  
93 Interview with B, Janting, Badau, 2016.  
94 Personal communication with J, Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016 
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Plate  7-1 Large scale oil palm concession in Badau 
 
NB: The sign reads “Take care!! Fires are dangerous” 
 
In Miau Merah, the situation was different again from that just discussed in Badau. In Miau 
Merah, the company did not initially provide monetary compensation for acquired land as 
acquisition happened 20 years ago and compensation procedures were even less effectively 
enforced at that time. Rather, the company took control by directly managing 40 percent of land 
allocated to farmers.95 Yet, farmers received regular payments for fruit harvested from their 
plasma production plots, which were calculated based on the weight of total fruit production in 
all their plasma plots. For a normal season, the total payment would be between 400 to 900 
thousand rupiah (or 30-67 USD) per month. Farmers can earn approximately 1 million (or 75 
USD) if fruit production is optimal, otherwise the rate will be lower. Through these 
arrangements, PT BTS, was able to secure over 6 thousand hectares of land under a HGU 
                                                          
95 Capturing from local cooperative financial report, 2016 
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concession.96 In Miau Merah, the company was able to secure about 4.5 thousand hectares in 
total. With these leasing rights, the company was able to assert legal authority over the land and 
how it was used, including the right to grow oil palm, and the right to redistribute plots to 
smallholders if they chose. 
7.3 Discursive Strategies to Appropriate Land 
The formal regulatory system is underpinned by various powerful discourses regarding the most 
appropriate use of land and processes for allocating use rights. Contestations over land use 
essentially arise from competing models of reality that have been assembled in order to promote 
particular interests. Here, discourse is employed by powerful actors to allow the construction of a 
particular way of framing reality that delegitimises alternative framings (a process elsewhere 
discussed by Street, 2001). The way in which different discourses are used often shows how 
power is being contested among elites. Dynamic power relations can also be observed between 
central and provincial governments as they release and reclassify forest areas for oil palm 
development. Provincial and local elites have continually challenged centralised national forestry 
authorities as those central government interests collide with their local spatial formulations for 
economic development. For example, provincial elites have employed particular narratives in 
order to resist forestry designation, including the exclusion of swidden cultivators from 
conservation areas. 
“I found that state rights for conservation zones overlap with the [informal] rights of the community. The 
local district authorities announced a conservation district, yet they also allocated oil palm concessions. The 
local community lived in the buffer zone and did shifting cultivation, while the conservation area is under 
management of the central government.”  - Interview with provincial forestry staff, Pontianak, West 
Kalimantan, 2016.  
 
While the classification of forestry land as “Production Forest” enabled some economic 
opportunities in the past largely related to logging, and National Park designation could help 
support a local tourism sector drawing visitors to the forest, for the most part forestry 
management of land is not generally presented as a very promising local economic driver. As a 
result, provincial and district governments are often keen to endorse forest conversions to other 
uses, even when this process can effectively marginalise local land use and resource access 
                                                          
96 Data of land concession in Kapuas Hulu, West Kalimantan, sourced from local plantation office in Putussibau, 2015.  
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rights. In 2016, the provincial government formally converted 13.5 thousand hectares of 
protection forests in Kapuas Hulu into non-forest areas.97 According to the political proponents 
of this process, the conversion of forests would result in new legal rights for the local 
community.98 In reality, it seems clear that the economic and political interests of district and 
provincial elites was the driving motivation in that conversion as it supported state polices that 
promoted oil palm expansion, and coalitions of businessmen and politicians would stand to 
benefit. After those forests were converted into development zones, other local elites also pushed 
the narrative of opening up ‘marginal swidden lands’. This narrative was also legitimated and 
reinforced by official development agencies at the national level, although it diverted slightly 
from a global discourse that advocated the expansion of market-based forms of production as a 
replacement of traditional farming systems.  
Various reports written by multilateral development organisations are similarly underscored by 
an agenda which promotes rural development and large-scale agribusiness as economically 
superior to swidden farming. In such reports, the concept of ‘utilising’ ‘marginal' areas or 
‘wastelands' is discursively presented as a key strategy to increase the efficiency of production. 
For instance, in the 2008 World Development Report (published by the World Bank), 
commercial crops were advocated as a key means to achieve poverty alleviation. In line with this 
argument, commercial smallholders would provide their surplus crops to local markets as a key 
way to expand commercial agriculture (The World Bank, 2007, p. 3). Furthermore, it was argued 
that smallholders can be linked to the global food market through direct partnerships with agro-
industry (Ibid, p.2). Referring to rural poverty in Africa, the World Bank (2007, p.1) emphasizes 
that subsistence farming is often the only means by which rural people can survive in 
economically difficult conditions. While this is undoubtedly true in many cases, it is also the 
case that many subsistence farmers who have low asset endowments have no option but to 
continue to endure unfavorable living conditions in subsistence production. The report also 
suggests that subsistence farmers are frequently “buyers of food and sellers of labour” and that 
the unfavourable conditions endured by many swidden farmers have rendered them incapable of 
engaging in commercial crop production. They can only function as laborers.  
                                                          
97Presentation of Provincial government to national parliament, May 30, 2016. 
98Interview with provincial forestry staff, Pontianak, West Kalimantan, 2016.  
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“Many others are in subsistence farming, mainly due to low asset endowments and unfavourable contexts. 
Consuming most of the food they produce, they participate in markets as buyers of food and as sellers of 
labour.” (World Bank, 2007, pp.5-6)  
 
Such assessments help construct a discourse around the perceived inefficiency of traditional 
swidden farming of the land, which has led to the promotion of large-scale plantation farming to 
replace local food production. As another example, Deininger et al. (2011, pp.19-21) emphasise 
the suitability of oil palm production when compared to subsistence farming and other 
competing commercial crops. They advocate the introduction of oil palm plantations in areas 
currently known as ‘wastelands’ or ‘alang-alang’ (Deininger et al 2011, p.21). The sentiment 
here is that it assumes that subsistence can be valued at market prices. In fact, different scholars 
exploring the issue have argued that swidden cultivation was used as a form of survival based on 
rural self-sufficiency (see Cramb, 2007; Dove, 2011), with surpluses sold to other areas after 
establishing local self-sufficiency (Clerc, 2012). 
In the remote frontiers of the border districts of Kapuas Hulu, the political elite have pushed for 
the widescale replacement of swidden farming with large-scale oil palm development (Eilenberg, 
2014c, p.162). During the post-new order government, national elites were aware that any 
attempt to destabilise the country’s borders could be a threat to national security. This would be 
especially so if Malaysian interests expanded their economic activities in Kapuas Hulu. To resist 
such pressures, national economic sovereignty was established in an attempt to supposedly 
maintain self-sufficiency and dignity relative to the rising economic power of Sarawak in 
Malaysia. For example, in 2005, former Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
made the following claim:  
Our plan is to develop the areas alongside the border for palm oil plantations, forestry, and tourism centres. 
If we can develop this from the west to the east, security and stability will be better. Palm oil and 
agricultural cultivation will raise incomes, absorb the workforce and increase regional taxes. Meanwhile, 
we will be able to keep on nurturing the sense of nationhood and being Indonesian.99 
 
In this context, land policies were justified to institutionalise new arrangements that would see 
the development of the border regions, with national regulations formulated to accommodate 
large-scale plantations. The President’s statement was in essence motivated from a rising 
awareness of the underdeveloped status of the border areas (Hamid & Widianto, 2001). To 
                                                          
99 Political statement of SBY as quoted in Tempo. 2005. Border integrity, Tempo, English edition No. 50. 16–22 Aug. 
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support the development of the region, a new national land policy of ‘grand design’ was made in 
2011, which laid out a 15 year master plan which included a large scale agrarian zone in the 
border areas of Kapuas Hulu (Eilenberg, 2014, pp. 157–158). The national government pushed 
the establishment of large-scale plantation estates as a part of a plantation zone (which they 
referred to as Kawasan Agropolitan). Prior to that time, in May 2005, the national grand design 
included an unlikely plan to release 1.8 million hectares of forest in thin bands (up to 10 
kilometres) along the West Kalimantan border area (Ibid, p.167). 
Nonetheless, these policies were challenged and opposed by various actors, as activists and 
affected villagers took actions to oppose these national land use plans. Opponents felt that the 
government decision to release 1.8 million hectares of land for palm oil development in the 
border areas was made without consultation and ignored the informal rights of local communities 
(Wakker, 2006). Often, this opposition was spearheaded by non-government activists to gain 
public attention, attracting sympathy and network support from particular international NGOs. In 
turn, international NGOs (along with some international donors) who were critical of these 
policies applied pressure on national elites within Indonesia in a partially successful attempt to 
change national land use policies (Ibid). In an attempt to encourage the growth of the palm oil 
industry, national and local political actors did, however, eventually modify formal planning 
processes to designate an oil palm zone in the local spatial plans in Kapuas Hulu (Eilenberg, 
2014). Local land use authorities approved the release of 360,000 hectares of ‘waste land’ to be 
converted into palm oil concessions in the border districts (Ibid, p.15). With the euphoria to 
maintain national sovereignty in the borderlands, agribusiness investors realised that the 
establishment of oil palm plantations close to Malaysia could lead to cheaper CPO transportation 
costs.  
The ability to construct a powerful narrative about the benefits of oil palm and the backwardness 
of swidden systems has been critical to legitimising the formal land appropriation process, but it 
still required the active enrolment of local community members. 
7.4 Intimate Exclusions within Communities 
Both government processes related to the formal approval process, and the requirements of 
sustainability standards such as RSPO, require that plantation companies obtain the prior and  
informed consent of local communities, and for relevant compensation to be paid. The process of 
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obtaining this consent in Dayak villages was complicated (and was arguably also facilitated) by 
horizontal conflicts amongst community members. Plantation companies frequently gained 
access to land through establishing patron client relations with customary elites, which broke the 
cohesion of longhouse communities. 
In these processes of land appropriation, customary institutions are constantly challenged by 
various external interventions orchestrated by interested parties (companies and their state-based 
allies) that frequently use customary leaders as instruments of their interests. In the first stage, 
market powers were a powerful influence over customary elites. Prior to making local land deals, 
companies negotiated with various village elites surrounding Badau. In an interview with a 
village elite, I was told how a company representative came to him in 2008 to explain about 
proposed oil palm operations.100 During that time, an ethnic Dayak leader occupied the position 
of village head of multi-ethnic Badau, and the company gave many verbal promises concerning 
future economic prosperity, if some village leaders that supported oil palm acquiesced to 
company requests. Afterwards, in 2009, the company representative took village leaders to the 
company’s other plantation in  Riau.101 Seeing the apparent material prosperity that came with 
oil palm in Riau, local leaders were convinced of its benefits.   
“About 30 village leaders were invited to a feasibility study in Riau. They were shown the development in 
the company’s concession, and in return we gave the land to them. Yet, those promises were misleading. 
What they had promised was different to current reality.” (J, Iban, Badau, 2016).  
 
Through these field trips and other activities, the company had expected key leaders in the 
village to convince villagers to agree to land transfers. After these trips, influential figures and 
local village elites were also recruited in an attempt to influence other local Dayaks to give up 
their land. As negotiations progressed, the company sought further way to influence internal 
community dynamics, and increasingly relied on patron-client relations stretching down to the 
village level in an attempt to secure the flow of natural resources from village lands. McCarthy 
(2006, p. 210) provides a similar example of such processes in Aceh, where village and district 
officials were provided with bribes in exchange for allowing the logging indutry to control local 
resource extraction. Oil palm operations in the case study villages share many similarities with 
this case and, in Badau, patron-client relations are primarily used to make informal arrangements 
                                                          
100 Interview with J, Dayaks, Badau, 2016.  
101 Ibid.   
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between the company and local elites. For instance, prior to consultative meetings, an Iban leader 
in Janting witnessed the behaviour of local village leaders:  
“They told us only about the positive aspects of plantations. However, they were lying. Before they 
acquired the local land, they gave [money] in envelopes [to village leaders]. After they got what they 
wanted they just left.”  - Interview with B, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016. 
 
 
Surrounding Badau, the company hired various village leaders to act as local representatives who 
would attempt to mitigate the effects of land dispossession in Iban communities. In Badau, Iban 
village leaders had been hired by the company to help acquire land throughout the Badau 
subdistrict. These particular figures were hired due to their linguistic and cultural affinities with 
other Iban in the area.  
“I was recruited to seek land for the company in Empanang in 2008. I had to explain to villagers the way to 
work in the plantation. In that meeting, I discussed the agenda of village representatives of UPA (Unit 
Pelayanan Anggota – A centre providing services to members). One hamlet has 3 people as a 
representative. They mediated communication with the cooperative.” Interview with J, Badau, Kapuas 
Hulu, 2016.  
 
Through what became an influential patronage relationship, the various powers of exclusion (as 
presented by Hall et al., 2011), including regulation (e.g.as legal basis power for disposing 
informal rights), force, markets and legitimation were combined by those customary interests to 
pursue the enclosure of common land. For example, it was stated by other Dayaks in Badau that 
some village elites came to ask his kin in Badau to join the list of villagers willing to sell their 
land to the rubber company prior to oil palm establishment in 2013. In Kekurak village in Badau 
subdistrict, it was stated by villagers that some local elite had deceived their kin into selling land. 
As land conflicts emerged, customary elites from Kekurak met with NGOs and media 
organisations to discuss the problem of land dispossession (Chamim, et al, 2012). At the time of 
the meeting, it was alleged that some local leaders (apparently supported by the company) were 
intoxicated and acted aggressively toward the activists, damaging their cars and threatening them 
with violence while riding their motorcycles aggressively nearby. Later, Dayak thugs made 
explicit threats that the activists would be harmed if they did not leave the local territory. 
Customary elites recruited to promote company interests visited their kin in order to deceive 
them into giving up land. They emphasised that large oil palm plantations would bring financial 
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prosperity to those who supported them and labelled anyone who rejected this opportunity as 
foolish and backward.  
“In the beginning we rejected oil palm, but there were two people who urged the local people to accept. 
They said we were stupid when other villages had opened up to large-concessions, but we had not. The 
company has extensive financial resources that they can use against local people in the court. I think they 
are impatient, as I suspect they are bribed. They came to other villagers’ houses to urge land sales.” 
Interview with YI, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.   
 
In another instance, I was told how oil palm supporters in Janting village would threaten 
villagers who refused to support the company, and re-asserted national regulations to strengthen 
their argument (ie. scaring them with the prospect that they might be violating the law)102 .These 
customary leaders stated that the land they occupied was state land and threatened local people 
that if they did not cede access over this land they would later lose it to the state.103 In this case, 
regulatory forces (and their possible enforcement) have been mobilised to intimidate fellow local 
Dayak villagers. 
In various interviews with Dayak community members, it was revealed that many people had 
hoped that the establishment of oil palm plantations would improve their household economies. 
For instance, in an interview with local inhabitants in Janting, one Dayak community member 
sold large tracts of land with the expectation that their children would be given supervisor jobs 
within the company104. They later discovered that these promises were not fulfilled and greatly 
regretted the loss of their land.  
On the other hand, those who rejected oil palm were often forced to leave their longhouse 
community to form new longhouses. Social pressures from large-scale oil palm supporters were 
imposed upon those who rejected oil palm in such a way that they eventually left the longhouse. 
Swidden farmers who rejected these schemes were often influenced by NGO activists, such as 
farmers in Janting, who explained the local influence of environmental activists from Jakarta 
who had been publicising land issues associated with oil palm cultivation. Highly exaggerated 
claims were often made by such activists, such as the claim that oil palm plantations have “worse 
                                                          
102 Personal communication with YE, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
103 Personal communication with YE, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016. 
104 Interview with M, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016 
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labour conditions than the past Japanese occupation [during WWII]”105,  when forced labour and 
physical torture were widespread.   
Village communities, then, are presented with highly divergent narratives from external agents 
about future prospects should they choose to cooperate with oil palm companies, resulting in 
divided aspirations, sometimes leading to serious horizontal conflicts and even violence. During 
one interview, one local Dayak man revealed that his father in law had opposed the oil palm 
company on the basis that the terms and conditions of the agreements were both unclear and 
fluctuating106, such that he was subsequently verbally abused as a result. In another instance of 
intense debate, one man who supported large-scale palm oil ended up in a sword duel (using the 
machete like weapons known as mandau) with another man who was opposed to the company. 
Other similar conflicts within Iban villages between supporters and opponents of palm oil were 
commonly reported.107 Such conflicts can sometimes lead to imprisonment, such as a case in 
Janting, when an Iban man contested his neighbour’s recently placed boundary markers for land 
sold to the company, leading him to physically threaten a company representative with his 
mandau.108 The Iban man was later sentenced to jail: 
“My older brother was convicted by the law because of that conflict over the land (boundary). He cannot 
find a legal solution to that issue. He brought his Mandau, and the company representative claimed he was 
attempting to kill him. He was prosecuted in Putussibau.” Interview with N, Iban, Janting, 2016.  
 
Conflicts can also occur between communities, and are often related to communal and customary 
territorial claims, such as occurred along an ambiguous boundary between Janting and Semuntik 
villages. According to Janting villagers, the Semuntik villagers had sold the communal forest of 
Janting villagers to the company without their permission or discussion which immediately 
resulted in conflict. This occurred despite various kin and cultural relationships between Dayak 
Iban villagers of Janting and Semuntik.  
“We had a local conflict with the villagers of Semuntik. Prior to oil palm arriving, there was collective land 
between Semuntik and Janting. However, they pursued their interests to sell communal land to the 
company. Because their land was very small, they also took our land. Hence, we have a conflict with the 
villagers of Semuntik over the large-scale oil palm operation.” Interview with R, Iban, Janting, 2016.  
 
                                                          
105 Interview with YI, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
106 Personal communication with TT, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
107 Interview with YE, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
108 Interview with N, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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In Janting, after customary institutions were challenged, those who rejected palm oil plantations 
imposed social sanctions upon those who supported previous land appropriations. This included 
not inviting, or excluding, those who stayed in the longhouse community from attending certain 
customary meetings to make some local decisions. As a result, several meetings related to oil 
palm have been shifted to other venues. Similarly, during field work in 2016, longhouse 
residents in Janting could be very unwelcoming towards external guests if they were staying with 
households known for their opposition to oil palm. Usually, longhouses were important sites for 
various social gatherings (as I observed was still the case in Embaloh Hulu), yet the local Iban 
community in Janting was not really functioning in this way due to increased intra-community 
conflicts. In Janting, I observed that social gatherings were made in more distant sites away from 
the longhouse, and longhouse remained comparatively underused (see plate 7.3). Such tensions 
had become a common feature within community life, and could make field research especially 
difficult at times. 
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Plate  7-2 Underuse and partial abandonment of a "modern" longhouse in Janting 
 
NB: Some of the longhouse walls have been renovated with cement to reduce any future risk of fires 
 
These and other conflicts within Dayak communities were frequently perceived, by local 
migrants and non-Dayaks, as a sign of weak customary institutions that could be exploited to 
gain access to resources. Some Malays in Badau, for instance, would eagerly disregard the 
legitimacy of swidden lands and any remaining customary institutions on land conflict 
resolutions to present a narrative of swidden as ‘dead land’ that should be converted to oil palm. 
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One such Malay informant even rejected the legitimacy of oil palm smallholdings and insisted on 
the large-scale plantation model.  
“I can see here much dead land, with no real oil palm plantings except those by the company. We shall 
manage those dead lands to become oil palm. It is better to be converted to oil palm plantation rather than 
being left to local land management. Beside it can give additional local revenue, it can extend the local 
employment.” Interview with B, Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
 
Furthermore, another Malay villager complained about the malfunctioning of customary 
institutions and their inability to resolve any conflicts external to the longhouse clans.  
“Here the local land conflict was usually resolved through customary institutions rather than through the 
police. However, in customary land tenure, there are so many rules and a confusing bureaucracy. It is better 
to apply [formal] policies.” Interview with Z, Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
 
In Miau Merah, Dayaks constitute a smaller proportion of the local population compared to 
Malays and other migrants, such that these migrant groups have more comprehensively 
challenged the customary practice of swidden farming by the Dayaks. They argued that swidden 
was a destructive agricultural practice that causes smog in neighbouring countries. The official 
Village Head (kepala desa) explained: 
“I need to explain the effect to indigenous farmers. I already tell them the smog will go overseas [to 
Malaysia]. I did not blame the swidden, but just the way to convert them with slash and burn practices. We 
find no progress to reduce slash and burning farming. It took two months to socialise that to farmers.” (N, 
the village head, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2016).  
 
The decline in customary resource tenure institutions has also facilitated a further powerful 
mechanism driving exclusion and unequal land possession among villagers – that of the market 
itself. Growing numbers of villagers of Badau and Silat Hilir have become engaged in land 
markets associated with oil palm, such that increasing local economic differentiation has evolved 
as a result of oil palm development.  
7.5. Exclusion and differentiation through market processes 
Individuals who have succeeded and possessed large-amount of cash income, either through 
early adoption of oil palm and hard work or, more commonly, through privileged access to local 
natural resources, have expanded their interests to acquire more land through local market 
transactions. In Miau Merah, a younger Dayak man had access to various forms of off-farm 
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income, including a salary as a field plantation supervisor, and obtained revenue from his 
planting of rubber and palm oil crops109. As a result, he purchased a further 5 hectares of 
swidden land from his relatives to be converted to oil palm. In Janting, one Iban man I 
interviewed had accumulated financial wealth through his own oil palm harvest, as a relatively 
early adopter, thus allowing him to purchase a further 10 hectares of land from fellow villagers at 
a relatively low price110.  
At the same time, those who lack initial income or other forms of capital, or whose farms are 
poorly maintained, or who are exposed to sudden price volatility for their outputs, find 
themselves forced to sell their land into the hands of wealthier villagers. While a land market 
accommodates the successful actors to accrue assets, the market also works to exclude those who 
have been made vulnerable by their fluctuating, but ever-increasing, cash needs. Financial 
distress caused by the need to pay electricity bills, or to meet various social expenses such as 
health and education, was a common cause of land sales amongst households I interviewed. In 
Miau Merah, for instance, where the palm oil economy was more advanced, I met an old Dayak 
farmer, who claimed to be 101 years old and who was in poor physical condition. He had sold 
his plasma plot entitlements to other villagers and was subsequently forced to seek off-farm work 
in and around the village111. In a similar case in Janting, a 65 year-old Iban farmer had sold his 
four hectares to other villagers as he did not have access to sufficient financial capital to properly 
invest in oil palm, and was reduced to seeking odd jobs in the village112. Oil palm cultivation 
tends to require much larger upfront access to financial resources than some other crops, and is 
less amenable to intercropping. As such, processes of social differentiation seem to occur much 
more rapidly in oil palm frontiers than for other commodity boom crops, and land dispossession 
amongst kin and community, often based on voluntary negotiations and market forces, is a 
common pattern. 
The process of converting customary tenure towards individual property rights is a complicated 
one, and no doubt highly varied, but one such mechanism was presented to me in Badau when a 
Malay man sought to purchase land held under customary tenure. He was unsure of the 
                                                          
109 Interview with AS, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
110 Interview with YE, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
111 Personal communication with R, Dayak, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
112 Personal communication with R, Dayak, Miau Merah, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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customary land demarcation and the rights of dispossesion held by the Dayak individual with 
whom he was negotiating, such that he called customary elites and various other villagers to 
determine the new boundary of the land113. He effectively bribed several influential individuals 
to secure his claim: 
“Previously, I used to only deal with land holders in purchasing land. Now, I need to bring 10 neighbours 
where my land is located. I give them cash of say 100 thousand IDR [10 USD]. I want to hinder any 
external parties claims, so that I insist that they collectively point out the boundaries. After that I propose 
for SKT (land claim letter from the village head) to approve with those signs of those neigbours.” Interview 
with A, Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
 
This engagement may actually suggest an increasing influence of customary land institutions 
over time (compared to the informant’s behaviour in the past) that need to be accommodated by 
potential new resource users. However, it also demonstartes the relative ease through which land 
exclusion can occur through the marketisation of land. In Miau Merah, some local migrants 
would attempt to shore up their claims by obtaining formal land certificates as soon as practically 
possible to avoid any future customary claims on land that was previously made by land tenure 
customary institutions. In local land market transactions, they instead invited the customary 
leader as a formality and as a reference to the past history of that land. In fact, the decision to 
determine local land sales and purchases was depended more on the voluntary transaction 
between local buyers and sellers in Miau Merah. In these various cases, it can be observed that 
customary land institutions were subservient to processes of market-based exclusions, and to the 
certainty of regulation (formal land certificates), and appeared to be becoming increasingly 
irrelevant in the regulation of local resource access. 
7.6 Chapter conclusion 
Large scale oil palm development has resulted in land appropriation and the exclusion of some 
individuals from accessing land. This has occurred as a result of various mechanisms, including 
the regulatory processes associated with spatial planning, formalizing private concessions 
(HGU), through discursive strategies and through establishing local networks with customary 
elites. While local communities have, at times, been able to call on external institutions to 
mobilise support for their struggle against land appropriations, sometimes making an impressive 
                                                          
113 Interview with B, Kapuas Hulu, 2016 
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resistance movement, they are engaged in a negotiating space with highly unequal power 
relations. National and local elites have more successfully configured alternative strategies to 
incorporate regulations, force and market pressure to achieve their aims. The outcome of this 
process has been large-scale landscape transformation across Kapuas Hulu away from a mosaic 
of forests, agroforests and swiddens towards a mostly monocultural oil palm plantation, although 
this process remains incomplete.  
Formalizing the process of allocating large-scale concessions combines regulation and discursive 
narratives to accommodate the interests of global markets. These interests are able to concentrate 
land resources into their hands through regulatory mechanisms that ensure that this is achieved at 
a relatively low cost. They rely heavily on negotiation and networking with various national and 
local elites within the state apparatus. While there has been a countermovement from 
environmental activists and other NGOs to recognise customary rights and to reject oil palm 
expansion, this countermovement has largely failed to take into account the reality that many 
community members are actively embracing the crop and engagement with the broader oil palm 
economy. Many swidden farmers expressed disappointment towards environmental advocacy 
groups in that they have been largely unable to generate alternative income-generating activities 
for the community. As a result, many have established their own oil palm smallholdings in an 
attempt to secure a cash income. 
To acquire local land from customary Dayak communities, large-scale agribusinesses have 
cooperated with some customary elites to enable the dispossession of previous land users. In that 
process, customary elites have themselves drawn upon regulation, legitimation (through the 
construction of a dominant discourse and the manipulation of customary institutions) and even 
threats to make that happen. The ensuing horizontal social tensions and conflict within Dayak 
communities has led to the fracturing of customary longhouse institutions in some cases. With 
weaker customary institutions, land markets have accelerated as an alternative to facilitate 
“voluntary” land dispossession, resulting in increasing social differentiation in village society. 
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CHAPTER 8:  LIVELIHOOD TRAJECTORIES IN KAPUAS 
HULU 
8.1 Introduction to Livelihoods 
This chapter aims to evaluate changing livelihood trajectories which have resulted from palm oil 
development in Kapuas Hulu. According to the common narratives of environmental activists, 
the expansion of oil palm results in both rural land dispossession (which was described in 
Chapter 7) and negative livelihood disruptions. The latter claim is based primarily on the logic 
that local livelihoods are largely dependent on natural resources and subsistence agriculture. This 
chapter will assess the changing livelihood patterns resulting from the expansion of oil palm 
through three village-based case studies. This study suggests that natural resources are of 
declining overall significance as the sole livelihood asset of villagers. Rather, local people have a 
range of income generating strategies to allow them to access education services, health services 
and consumption goods. Ellis (2000) describes the various household assets (also known as 
capitals) commonly accessed to construct a livelihood strategy as consisting of: natural assets 
(e.g. land holding); their human capabilities (skills, education, health); financial assets (including 
financial cash asset); access to physical capital (including infrastructure); and their social 
networks. Ellis (2000, p.7) underscores the importance of examining various household 
capabilities and assets to understand their livelihood strategies. In fact, rural dwellers can utilise 
various livelihood strategies to sustain their household economy in various circumstances 
(Scoones 1998). 
This study will examine local livelihood responses to the expansion of oil palm in Kapuas Hulu, 
West Kalimantan, and draws primarily on household surveys conducted across three villages 
(Miau Merah, Badau114 and Janting) that show different levels of engagement with the oil palm 
economy. Firstly, oil palm development in Miau Merah was the earliest in comparison to other 
case study villages, where it started in the early 2000s. Due to the early establishment of oil 
palm, the local community has had a longer time to learn cultivation methods and take advantage 
of infrastructure development to sell locally cultivated oil palm. Independent smallholder oil 
palm cultivation began in Miau Merah in 2010. In Badau and Janting, large-scale oil palm 
                                                          
114 Badau is both the name of the case study village and the sub-district (Kecamatan) 
140 
 
cultivation has only occurred since 2012, resulting in similar infrastructure developments as in 
Miau Merah, although the establishment of independent smallholders occurred relatively quickly 
(by 2013).  
There are major demographic differences between Janting, Badau and Miau Merah villages. In 
Janting, the majority of people are Iban, which means the village is more culturally homogenous 
(see table 8-1), while the other villages are more multiethnic. In Miau Merah, the multiethnic 
structure was driven primarily by government transmigration policies from the early 1980s115, 
while many migrants moved to Badau to pursue logging and then palm oil work. In a story I was 
told by an Iban man in Badau, Badau village used to be open fields with very few longhouses 
established prior to 1960s when Iban occupied the areas as part of their swidden cultivation 
cycle. 
Table 8-1 Ethnic composition of each village 
Villages  Ethnics  
Janting Dayak Iban (62.5%), Malay (22.5%), Others (Java, Batak, Chinese, 
Dayak Suruk) (15%) 
Badau Malay (50%), Iban (30%), Others (Java, Sundanese, Arabic, Padang, and 
Dayak ahe) (20%) 
Miau Merah Java (42.5%), Dayak Sebaruk (27.5%), Malay (15%), others (15%) 
Source: survey in Kapuas Hulu 
 
 
In this study, I have attempted to understand the differential impact of the oil palm economy on 
different wealth groupings within the villages. Table 8-2 shows the criteria used to determine 
relative wealth (asset-based and access-based), and the average (and median) reported incomes 
from each group. The following discussion is based largely on a household survey that covered a 
total of 120 households (40 selected randomly from each village on the basis of household lists 
provided by local village offices). 
                                                          
115 Personal communication with Javanese villagers in Miau Merah, 2016.  
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Table 8-2 Wealth based income categories 
Households’ characteristics  Poor households Middle households Rich households  
Criteria No electricity OR 
No toilet OR No 
motorbike 
 
 
Own at least 1 
motorbike, 1 
electricity and 1 toilet 
Own at least 2 
motorbike, 1 television, 
or own car or 
refrigerator, and have 
electricity access and 
have own toilet. 
Average annual household cash income (IDR) 16,100,000  35,500,000  150,000,000  
Median annual household cash income (IDR) 15,400,000 30,000,000 107,000,000 
% of Survey Respondents 28.33% 55% 16.67 % 
Source: Survey in Kapuas Hulu 
 
The chapter will explain the different assets villagers have, income diversification, land use 
change and livelihood outcomes. In particular, the study will examine how the community 
continues with subsistence livelihoods, engages with cash crop cultivation and off-farm 
livelihood activities in the context of palm oil development. In addition to the three case study 
villages where the formal survey was conducted, I will also make some livelihood comparisons 
with villagers living in Embaloh Hulu, where large scale oil palm plantations have not yet been 
established (and so provides something of a control village). The results show that while oil palm 
has generally reduced natural resource assets, it has led to the development of human and 
physical capital that have provided income diversification opportunities for villagers and 
subsequent development of financial capital. These patterns are markedly different from 
Embaloh Hulu.   
8.2 Natural assets  
Before the survey was conducted, I conducted a 10 day visit to Pulau Manak and Ulak Pauk 
villages, both located in Embaloh Hulu. Those who rejected palm oil development in these 
villages were influenced by NGOs as well as the obvious environmental impacts of polluted 
water, and local land dispossession.116 Discussions were held with villagers about their 
livelihood situation in the absence of palm oil development. Many villagers rejected oil palm 
plantations in order to retain ownership over communal forests and prevent environmental 
pollution and degradation of local ecosystems. Yet, some of them also acknowledged that in the 
                                                          
116 Interview with S, Dayak Tamambaloh, Pulau Manak, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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absence of oil palm, they would have to migrate in order to find employment.117 In Ulak Pauk, 
respondents stated that they still needed food, and they also consumed high-value products and 
petrol, and purchased gas for cooking.  
Prior to the survey in Janting, there was a focus group session to map the condition of local 
natural assets and livelihood diversification.118 When asked about natural resource loss, 
participants wanted to focus on local land dispossession, loss of communal forests and 
decreasing fish resources. Yet, they also found more labour opportunities and other income 
opportunities from their engagement with oil palm plantations.   
Furthermore, in specific interviews about changes to natural assets, respondents in the case study 
expressed major concerns about loss of land and poorer soil quality. In Miau Merah, some 
Javanese migrants obtained 2 hectares of land from the government in 1983.119  After the 
establishment of oil palm, one migrant sold 1.75 hectares of land to a oil palm plantation, but 
later purchased another 0.75 hectares of land to cultivate rubber. In Janting, swidden farmers 
sold large amounts of swidden land to oil palm plantations - 31 hectares in one case.120 In other 
circumstances of limited land and growing aspirations for cash needs, swidden farmers cultivated 
various cash crops on their available land. Survey respondents reported a decline in land access 
across all three villages (Figure 8-1) over the last 15 years, which had reportedly made it difficult 
to continue subsistence food production as their primary livelihood activity. Instead, their 
livelihoods adapted to encompass both on-farm and off-farm income generating activities. 
"I cannot make swidden due to losing land to the companies –  now I only do fishing and take some 
remaining forest… Previously, (with large amounts of land) swidden rotations would be 8 years, but now 
they are only 1 to 3 years…. We also faced difficulties in following government suggestions to certify the 
land due to the difficulties with the bureacracy." (HG, Iban, Janting, 2016). 
 
                                                          
117 Personal communication with some villagers in Pulau Manak and Embaloh Hulu, 2016.  
118 Focus group discussion in Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
119 Personal communication with K, Java transmigrant, Miau Merah, 2016.  
120 Personal communication with M, Dayak swidden farmers, Janting, 2016.  
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Figure 8-1 Total of Area of land accessed in all villages 
 
Source: survey, 2016. 
 
When asked about changing soil conditions over the last fifteen years, there was a widespread 
perception that soil fertility had declined significantly (Table 8-3). The higher migrant 
communities in Badau and Miau Merah were less interested in subsistence agriculture and had a 
greater focus on trading and fishing. In the past, local Dayaks employed indigenous knowledge 
to improve soil fertility, most notably through an extended fallow, but these  
methods are no longer effective (or possible due to land constraints) to remediate poor soil 
fertility. Hence, they increasingly use synthetic fertilisers to mitigate poor soil condition in their 
plots (see table 8-3), including on their swiddens. This fertiliser use was highest for Janting, 
where in fact swidden is still widespread and suggests a decline in both the quantity and quality 
of this key livelihood asset. During field work, it was observed that swidden farms would be 
scattered in upland locations, while rubber fields are typically located alongside rivers (see Plates 
8-1 and 8-2). 
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Table 8-3 Perceptions of Soil Degradation (% of participants) 
Perception Janting Badau Miau Merah 
Less fertile today compared to 15 years ago 79.49 50 64.86 
More fertile today compared to 15 years ago 0 0 2.7 
Similar fertility 15.38 25 10.81 
Not living here 15 years ago 5.13 18.75 21.62 
 
Table 8-4 Fertiliser Use in Different Field Sites (in %) 
Fertiliser usage Janting Badau Miau Merah 
Not using 37.50 64.86 47.50 
Using 62.50 35.14 52.50 
Source: survey, 2016. 
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Plate  8-1 Upland Swidden Farming with new rubber plantings 
 
Plate  8-2 Established Rubber trees near river 
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8.2 Physical assets  
Despite the degradation of natural assets, palm oil has brought about physical and social 
infrastructure to the villages that have accepted oil palm plantations. Investments in 
infrastructure are made by both the state and directly by companies, who justify it as a means to 
improve supply chain certainty and social legitimacy, as described in Chapter 6. Roads, mills and 
transportation infrastructure allow for the harvesting of non-storable fresh fruit bunches.  
There are important observable differences in levels of infrastructure between villages which had 
accepted oil palm plantations, and those that had not, and infrastructure development in the latter 
was noticeably worse. In the case study sites, there was extensive development of physical and 
social infrastructure. For example in terms of road infrastructure, during the focus group 
discussion in Janting, Dayak participants acknowledged that an extensive road network had been 
built by the oil palm companies. In personal communications with villagers in Miau Merah, they 
also acknowledged the increase in road connections surrounding their village. In contrast, it was 
not possible to drive a car to enter the village Ulak Pauk. The contrasting poor condition of these 
roads is presented for Miau Merah (in Plate 8-3) and Ulak Pauk (Plate 8-4).  
There were also contrasting claims from villagers regarding access to clean water, with villagers 
in Ulak Pauk and Pulau Manak claiming that it was possible to drink water from the Embaloh 
River (a claim made without any water standard tests), while in Miau Merah, villagers believed 
that the water from the river located near the plantation was no longer safe for drinking.  The 
perceived decline in river water quality in Miau Merah noted earlier was compensated for by the 
provision of a piped water system (Plate 8-5), which could be interpreted as the substitution of 
natural capital (Plate 8-6) for physical capital (Plate 8-5). In Janting and Miau Merah, local 
private sector water provider was responsible for delivering fresh water to local villagers, 
although in Janting, they needed to pay 3000 to 4000 IDR (about 0.2 USD) per household per 
month to obtain fresh water. This water infrastructure system was not present in Embaloh Hulu. 
Rather, villagers still obtained water from the Embaloh River, which inhabitants used water for 
washing clothes, cooking and bathing. 
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Plate  8-3 Road Conditions in the Area Surrounding Miau Merah 
 
 
 
Plate  8-4 Road conditions in the Area Surrounding Ulak Pauk 
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Plate  8-5 Piped water system in Miau Merah 
 
Plate  8-6 Direct Water Source in Embaloh Hulu 
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In terms of education, Ulak Pauk has an elementary school (SD), but no high schools (SMP or 
SMA), and many villagers complained of a lack of teachers in the local school, such that many 
students need to go to more distant schools, such as in Banua Martinus. In the oil palm case 
study sites, basic education is readily available in elementary schools near the villages, and Miau 
Merah also has specialised vocational high school supported by the plantations (Plate 8-7). The 
majority of respondents in the case study sites were generally satisfied with both education 
services (see Figure 8-2) and with health facilities (see Figure 8-3). In contrast, social facilities in 
Embaloh Hulu were less well developed, such as in Ulak Pauk, where patients were required to 
travel to the capital city of Embaloh Hulu to receive proper medical treatment. I was told that 
prior to the establishment of oil palm plantations the poor condition of unpaved roads meant that 
even motorbikes could not be used and villagers used expensive river boats to access nearby 
villages. An extensive road system had since been built, and many households used this to 
pursue various livelihood activities. 
Plate  8-7 Vocational plantation high school in Miau Merah 
 
Source: fieldwork 
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Figure 8-2 Satisfaction with Education Services in Oil Palm Villages 
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Figure 8-3 Satisfaction with Health Services in Oil Palm Villages 
0
20
40
60
80
NS NeutralSatisfied NS NeutralSatisfied NS NeutralSatisfied
Miau-Merah badau janting
P
er
ce
nt
Health Service Delivery
Spatial Category
 
151 
 
 
Extensive physical infrastructure development has allowed local villagers to diversify their 
ownership of various economic assets. According to various livelihood studies (e.g. Ellis, 2000, 
Scoones 1998, West 2013), the ability to diversify economic assets is often a factor of wealth 
gained from income generating activities, although these will vary with different classes of 
wealth. While middle and rich households (who comprised more than 70% of my respondent 
households) were all able to purchase motorcycles, many poor households also owned 
motorcycles (See Figure 8-4). The majority of respondents also accessed information through 
television media and through their mobile phones, which also allowed access to information 
about palm oil prices and job opportunities outside their village. With the availability of power 
generators in their villages, the majority of respondents use electrical appliances (see Figure 8-4), 
although internet usage was still quite low due to weak telecommunications signals. Motorbikes, 
mobile phones and electricity were considered vital physical assets that improved the livelihood 
capabilities of households. 
Figure 8-4 Ownership of Household Economic Assets of Respondents in All Three Villages 
 
 
8.3 Financial Assets  
Financial capital is important to households in their various livelihood trajectories, and it is 
equivalent to monetary investments or access to finance that can be used to increase the 
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productive capacities of particular households (Ellis, 2000, p.8). Financial capital might include 
livestock that is easily converted to cash and used a mode of savings in many rural communities. 
Before financial institutions came to the villages, local villagers raised livestock and sold them to 
acquire cash when needed. To most Dayak villagers living in Janting, livestock has a dual 
function of being both a monetary asset and used within customary ceremonies. In the case study 
villages, the most popular livestock are chickens and pigs, which can be sold in the market with 
approximate prices displayed in Table 8-5.  
Table 8-5 Price of Livestock (estimated with mid-value)  
Livestock Approximate weights Mid-Price per kg Mid - monetary value (IDR)  
Pork  30 - 60 kg (mid-45 kg) IDR 70,000 3,150,000 
Chicken (consumption) 2 - 3 kg (mid-2.5 kg) IDR 35,000                87,500 
Source: local market price in Pontianak, West Kalimantan (http://www.antarakalbar.com/; http://pontianak.tribunnews.com) 
It was found that most Iban respondents (especially those in Janting) owned livestock (Table 8-4) 
as both household economic assets and for sacrifices in various customary ceremonies (e.g. rice 
harvest festivals, marriage ceremonies, etc). Across all villages, however, the majority of 
households owned livestock.  
Figure 8-5 Livestock Ownership in each Village 
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Despite this high dependence on livestock as a financial asset, I also identified increasing access 
to formal financial services, which appears to have occurred in parallel to the growing 
availability of financial products associated with the palm oil economy. This is suggested by the 
increasing access to financial institutions for those villages (Miau Merah) that have been 
integrated in the palm oil economy for a longer period (Figure 8-5). Since 2001, local financial 
institutions have provided various services to those broadly engaged with the palm oil industry. 
In Miau Merah, plasma dividend payments were redistributed to land holders through the 
mediation of local banks.121 In Miau Merah, greater financial access is required by local villagers 
when buying and selling palm oil from mills in Sintang, and when acquiring the inputs required 
for oil palm cultivation. The majority of households in Miau Merah now access financial 
institutions (see Figure 8-6). In Badau subdistrict, where palm oil development began in 2012, 
and where recruitment into the plasma scheme was initially conducted through an informal third 
party (mandor)122, fewer villagers access financial institutions.  
 
Figure 8-6 Villagers use of financial products from financial institutions (i.e: own a bank 
account) 
 
 
                                                          
121 Interview with H, local cooperative, Miau Merah, 2016.  
122 Interview with T, Janting, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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With the emergence of financial institutions (banks and credit unions), people choose different 
organisations for particular reasons. For instance, while it is a one-hour motorcycle trip to 
Sintang, it offers many local banking branches which serve various financial needs, while 
banking in Badau is limited due to the smaller population and local banks have cumbersome 
requirements when providing loans to households. Villagers often struggle to access credit due to 
not having formal land tenure and hence collateral for loans, while fieldwork in Janting 
suggested that many people were accessing the less-restrictive credit unions (see Figure 8-7). 
Figure 8-7 Preferences for Accessing Financial Loans 
 
 
In West Kalimantan, the main credit union was initiated by a foundation from Pontianak, 
Yayasan Pancur Kasih, in 1996, and most of its users are farmers (Giring 2013). In 2001, 
Yayasan Pancur Kasih established a branch in Kapuas Hulu to deliver a variety of financial 
services to rural communities and since that time there have been an increasing number of credit 
unions serving rural households. The requirements to access credit from credit unions are much 
less restrictive than other mainstream financial institutions, and many credit unions are directly 
approaching longhouse or Dayak communities to offer financial services (CIFOR ASFCC Team 
2014). With expanding loan disbursement, these local microfinance institutions increase 
accountability and remain under the supervision of relevant financial authorities. In 2015, their 
performances were monitored and under the surveillance of the government’s financial watchdog 
(OJK) (Bisnis Indonesia 2015).  
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8.4 Human Capital  
Within the literature on livelihoods, education and health are recognised as a part of human 
capital, and Ellis (2000, p.5) underscores the importance of education and health as a basis for 
livelihood diversification. Well educated and healthy individuals are able to more easily switch 
between non-farm and on-farm activities (Ellis 2000, 66). Younger population structures are also 
generally more productive and able to contribute to household livelihood strategies. Table 8-6 
presents the age distribution of all individuals within respondent households across the three 
villages, suggesting that Miau Merah has the highest proportion of young people as a result of 
higher in-migration.   
Table 8-6 Age Structure in Three Case Study Sites 
 
NB: This refers to all family household members (total: 473 individuals) 
 
With the relatively lower proportion of aged individuals, respondents in Miau Merah also have a 
higher chance of having obtained formal academic qualifications as compared to villagers in 
Janting. Table 8-7 shows that the school accomplishment rate is much higher in Miau Merah 
than in Janting, where a full 31% of individuals have no education and no intention of future 
study. With greater human resources, people in Miau Merah have more opportunities to switch 
between farming and non-farming sectors, while in Janting, villagers are heavily dependent on 
family members to enter into the cash economy.   
Age range groups  Janting  (%) Badau  (%) Miau Merah (%)  
0-20  31.21 36.69 37.13 
21-40  36.31 31.36 37.13 
40-64 26.11 28.4 21.56 
above 64  6.37 3.55 4.19 
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Table 8-7 Academic Enrolment and Accomplishment 
Formal Education  
Miau Merah (%)  Badau (%) Janting (%) 
District 
Average 
Does not possess any formal qualification & 
no longer studying 
14.37 16.27 31.01 28.07 
Not yet reached school age 11.38 1.81 3.16   
Studying in elementary school 13.17 18.07 12.03   
Holds elementary school certificate & no 
longer studying 
16.17 21.08 18.99   
Studying in junior high school 7.19 6.02 5.7   
Holds junior high school certificate & no 
longer studying 
17.97 13.25 10.76 26.1 
Studying senior high school 1.8 3.61 3.16   
Holds senior high school certificate & no 
longer studying 
13.17 15.06 12.03 13.24 
Studying for diploma or bachelor 1.8 0.6 0.63   
Holds diploma or bachelor certificate 2.99 4.22 2.53 3 
NB: all family household members (total: 473 individuals), the district average are cited from BPS Kapuas Hulu 
(https://kapuashulukab.bps.go.id/) 
 
8.5 Social Capital  
Social capital is defined as social support from social networks as well as the claims, affiliations 
and associations that are used to pursue various livelihood strategies (Scoones, 1998, p.8). In 
Kapuas Hulu, there exists social support from the government to poor households, such as the 
subsidised provision of rice to the poorest households (based on an official list of poor 
households made by the government). Observations during field work revealed that these lists 
have been controversial among rural villagers as lists are often outdated and invalid, with 
reportedly very poor targeting and distribution in the program. Through the program, eligible 
households can purchase rice at the highly subsidised price of 2,500 IDR per kilogram. My 
household survey also found apparently poor targeting within the program, with a relatively even 
distribution of participation rates across all three wealth categories (Appendix C). Otherwise 
wealthy households were also benefiting, suggesting that they probably possessed important 
social capital, such as social connections with village elites involved in the original listing 
process. 
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Local villagers also form extended households as a way of exchanging social support among 
different generations. According to West (2009) an extended family is defined as two or more 
nuclear families living together in one house, suggesting that such configurations offer enhanced 
flexibility and support among household members to pursue their livelihood strategies. West  
(2009, p.279) suggested that extended families also include the married children with spouses 
who live with their parents’ house. This includes a more flexible internal distribution of labour, 
with support for productive-age individuals to find off-farm wage work, while elderly family 
members often reciprocate by contributing to housework. With constrained human resources 
capabilities, Ellis (2000) reveals the possibilities of specialization of each member according to 
their human resources to the advantage of larger household sizes. Based on observations in 
Kapuas Hulu, households in Janting depended more on using younger family members to find 
off-farm work, while leaving farm work to older family members.  
Respondents in Janting village depended more on these extended family exchange mechanisms 
compared to other villages, but they are still quite common across all villages (see figure 8-8). 
Households took advantage of having large numbers of family members by diversifying into off-
farm livelihood activities. There were numerous Dayak respondents in Janting with between 7 
and 12 people within one household. It seems that poorer households are more likely to depend 
on such informal social networks than wealthier households, and that increasing involvement in 
the cash economy (away from subsistence agriculture) was also associated with declining 
numbers of extended family households. Poorer households were more reliant on family 
transfers (Figure 8-10). 
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Figure 8-8 Nuclear & Extended Families across the Three Case Study Sites 
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8.6 Changing Food Production & Cash Income Diversification 
Recent agrarian studies show that swidden communities are increasingly less reliant on 
subsistence forms of production (e.g. studies by Cramb (2015) and Potter (2015b)). These studies 
indicate that livelihood activities have shifted to both cash crop cultivation and off farm 
livelihood activities, and reflect patterns also observed in my case study sites. With the 
emergence of cash crops, there has been increasing environmental pressure affecting swidden 
farming systems. In an interview with an Iban farmer in Badau, he explained that ten years ago 
he followed his parents into swidden farming, but he no longer considered swidden production 
the best way to meet his food needs, but was now devoted to pursuing various off farm 
159 
 
businesses.123 In fact, harvest failures, pest threats and increasing consumerist values have been 
strong reasons for farmers to move out of swidden farming.  
With their smaller landholdings, and with new environmental pressures, farmers in the case 
study sites have faced major difficulties in producing food. The exception was Miau Merah 
where Javanese migrants were engaging in more intensive forms of production that offset small 
land sizes and contributed to a surplus of vegetables (see figure 8-9), some of which was sold 
into local markets.  
Figure 8-9 Annual Subsistence Production & Consumption Per–village  
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(Y-axis refers to aggregated annual production in kilograms, (sample per village = 40, total sample 120) 
 
Where off farm income opportunities were more available, people tended to purchase processed 
food. To them the risk of seeking a cash income was much smaller than the risk of harvest 
failures, and cash incomes are seen as crucial for the purchase of higher value consumer 
                                                          
123 Interview with J, Badau, Kapuas Hulu, 2016.  
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products, while also allowing for the education of family members. In the three case study sites, 
the presence of infrastructure has allowed them to access markets to purchase higher value 
consumer products such as televisions and processed foods. In fact, in Janting, there has been a 
growing concern that households are increasingly dependent upon cash in order to meet their 
basic needs124. Due to concerns over the low level of educational attainment, many families 
invest in the education of their children and siblings.  
Various non-agricultural income sources were identified across the case study villages (see 
Figure 8-10), and were strongly correlated with particular wealth groups. Interestingly, the sale 
of certain agricultural produce (pepper, fish, palm oil and rice) was only really important for the 
middle wealth group (many of whom had invested their off-farm income back into agriculture), 
while both poor and rich income classes were more reliant on non-agricultural income. Rich 
households, however, obtained higher incomes from trade, non-agricultural work and plasma 
dividends (ie. those well-connected individuals who benefitted from earlier land appropriation 
processes), while poorer households were comparatively more reliant on casual (non-permanent) 
work as plantation labourers.  
Before oil palm was introduced to Kapuas Hulu, many rural villagers had migrated overseas to 
seek remittances to support their family members in their villages. Since palm oil was 
introduced, there have been some opportunities for younger family members to share their 
domestic wage with other family members (through local family transfer). 
 
 
 
                                                          
124 Personal communication to various swidden farmers in Janting, Kapuas Hulu.  
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Figure 8-10 Cash Income Sources of Different Households 
 
8.7 Analysis of Land Use Changes and Livelihood Outcomes  
The introduction of large-scale oil palm cultivation into the case study sites has had major 
implications on local land use. Prior to oil palm development, local communities in rural forested 
areas faced major difficulties in purchasing food. For instance, swidden farmers faced difficult 
mountainous footpaths to reach Sarawak, which was less than 50 km away. In 2001, most of 
their land was used for food subsistence and rubber crops (see Figure 8-10), with rubber planted 
in response to the presence of middlemen in their villages. When oil palm was established in the 
region, there were already existing market structures, but they were relatively limited and often 
acted to supplement subsistence food production at a time when cash needs were less intense. 
The widespread access to assets such as mobile phones, electricity and motorbikes (which all 
have high ongoing maintenance costs) have all contributed to the rapid rise of these cash needs. 
Nevertheless, the presence of industrial plantations resulted in a major shift in agricultural 
production (Mertz, 2015, p.734). On one hand these plantations saw farmers alienated from their 
traditional lands, but on the other provided them with new opportunities to access the market. 
Figure 8-10 suggests that shifting livelihood strategies have been paralleled with a shift in 
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dominant land uses. With the introduction of oil palm, land use within villages has also visibly 
changed, with a major shift away from rubber across the three villages. The largest percentage of 
households who participated in oil palm cultivation was in Miau Merah which was due to the 
early arrival of palm oil and extensive infrastructure development. Oil palm cultivation appears 
to have occurred amongst those households who previously claimed to have access to large 
fallow areas of land. More than 30% of respondents who cultivate oil palm have plots less than 3 
hectares (see figure 8-11). Due to the more recent arrival of oil palm in Janting, fewer people 
cultivate oil palm, although those who cultivated oil palm (in Janting and Badau) tended to be 
households who have land above 3 hectares.  
 
 
Figure 8-11 Household Land Use between 2001 and 2016 based on land size 
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 (Note: 1 is <=1 ha; 2 is 1.01-3ha; 3 is 3.01-10ha; 4 is >10 ha) ; y axis refers to the percentage of households for which that land 
use is dominant. In the 2016 survey, the random sample in Miau Merah did not select any respondents with land use of more 
than 10 hectares. Refer to Appendix E. 
 
These results demonstrate that the increasing adoption of oil palm by smallholders, and this 
(along with corporate plantation-scale developments) is profoundly reshaping local land use 
patterns. Rubber has often been portrayed by conservation and non-government organisations as 
an important source of cash income for local inhabitants, and that interventions such as a 
certification program was responsible for increasing rubber prices from between 5000 to 6000 
IDR per kilogram, to 14,200 IDR per kilogram (Bisnis.com 2017). Other local activists insisted 
that rubber played an important role acting as a land buffer and protecting water reservoirs125, 
although rubber is planted along waterways and in various upland areas (see plate 8-8). 
However, other actors (including some politicians) were more sceptical of the capacity of rubber 
to satisfactorily meet livelihood aspirations, due in part to unstable pricing. One politician 
claimed:  
                                                          
125 Local NGOs presentation in Putussibau, April 2016.  
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“Rubber cultivation has been popular in the areas surrounding West Kalimantan. Yet, the factory was 
located in Pontianak [700 kilometres from Kapuas Hulu]. Farmers faced discounted price due to high 
transportation costs. If the price goes down, it exacerbates poverty in West Kalimantan.” Interview with 
politician during a media visit to Kapuas Hulu.126 
 
In the case study sites, rubber was commonly identified as the cash crop of least economic 
importance for local inhabitants, and far less important than both pepper and oil palm. Farmers 
tended to only harvest rubber during periods when they urgently needed cash, as suggested by 
one farmer who stated: 
“Even though I have rubber, I have not yet tapped it. These days I am more comfortable to cultivate padi 
(swidden) and working as a palm oil labourer… I follow other people to work as a palm oil labourer… 
working in oil palm plantation is not complicated, just chopping down [fruit bunches]. Previously I got rid 
of the [rubber] bark and would harvest… but today I am chopping down.” (TT, Iban, Janting, 2016)  
 
Plate  8-8 Rubber Cultivation in Upland Areas 
 
Source: local fieldwork in Janting 
 
Along with a broader agrarian transformation, positive contributions appear to have occurred 
towards local well-being over the last 15 years, at least as reflected in survey responses (Table 8-
                                                          
126 http://www.dpr.go.id/blog/kegiatan-detail/id/1558/berita/1232 
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8). Moreover, the vast majority of respondents believed that the palm oil sector had had an 
overall positive effect on their quality of life, and this was highest in Miau Merah, where the 
sector was more established. While a majority of households in Janting were also positive about 
the effects of palm oil, there was also a sizable number who were more sceptical and this may be 
related to the ethnic composition of the village (predominately Dayak Iban). Focus group 
discussions in Janting suggested that households were most positive about the potential of oil 
palm to provide cash income, housing and improved educational opportunities, but many were 
also concerned about potential changes to their culture and lifestyle. To other locals in Badau and 
Miau Merah, the palm oil economy has been seen more emphatically as a way to boost their 
economic well-being. As presented by a younger Dayak man (less than 45 years old) in Miau 
Merah:   
“there are no significant yields for planting swidden… with expanding palm oil local people can have 
better purchasing power…they can purchase motorcycles… while there is natural resource 
degradation…but there is economic improvement as well.” (D, Dayak, Badau, 2016). 
  
Table 8-8 Household Well-Being & Attitudes toward Oil Palm Plantations 
Well-being over the last 15 years (%)  Janting  Badau  Miau Merah  
Getting worse  5.13 12.5 7.5 
Similar  48.72 40 50 
Better/improving  46.15 47.5 42.5 
Positive response towards the effects of palm oil (%)   
Yes  65 80 90 
No  35 20 10 
Note: (sample per village = 40, total 120) 
 
8.8 Chapter Conclusion  
Large-scale oil palm operations in Kapuas Hulu have seen the establishment of primary 
production for a global value chain in an otherwise remote rural space. The dominant role of 
downstream lead firms in promoting production of palm oil has proven to be an almost 
irresistible force reshaping landscapes and livelihoods. A particular type of agrarian 
transformation has taken place, whereby households have reduced access to natural assets 
(especially land), but have also seen new economic opportunities and improvements to rural 
infrastructure.   
166 
 
The improvement of infrastructure in particular improves the capability to diversify into off-farm 
income, allowing households to use various productive assets to improve their prospects of cash 
income generation. Market connection has been a crucial factor in the pursuit of smallholder oil 
palm cultivation. Local communities prioritise better education, health and consumption goods 
and, in these pursuits, middle and rich households have been most successful in diversifying their 
income from both on-farm and off-farming sources, often drawing on pre-existing assets. Having 
the advantage of greater economic assets, some middle income and rich households are 
cultivating oil palm in small plantations, while households with limited access to various 
economic assets mostly earn income as temporary labourers. 
However, the extensive and dramatic nature of changing land use dynamics has prompted a 
battle among environmental activists (many of whom promote the maintenance of rubber as a 
source of cash income) and palm oil proponents (including many within the communities). 
Environmentalists claim that rubber cultivation fits with local land uses. Indeed, local 
communities seem hesitant to harvest rubber in the context of fluctuating local rubber prices, and 
many simply maintain rubber as a backup in the case of urgent cash needs.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of respondents have perceived improvements in their well-
being over the last fifteen years at the same time as oil palm cultivation has expanded. Local 
aspirations toward well-being in the survey are based on preferences to improve cash income and 
improve basic needs (e.g. education, health).  
In brief, this study reports on a profound agrarian transformation in Kapuas Hulu that has both 
landscape and household-scale implications, finding that the boom in oil palm cultivation is 
radically reshaping livelihood opportunities and aspirations. This study has considered various 
aspects related to changing livelihood trajectories, such as the local capabilities to diversify 
livelihood assets, apply different livelihood strategies, and to change land uses practices in 
response to palm oil development. In the three case studies, palm oil development has induced 
changes that provide opportunities for local households to diversify their livelihood assets, earn 
cash income and participate themselves in palm oil cultivation. While the advance of oil palm 
cultivation in Kapuas Hulu is certainly not occurring without some resistance and community 
opposition, the generally positive community attitudes are found even when a loss of natural 
assets is also acknowledged. Communities within the three case study villages were generally not 
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opposed to oil palm – as a commodity – and indeed, most viewed the nature of changing 
livelihoods as positive, but they expressed a desire to be in far greater control of the conditions 
under which they became involved in the sector. This finding highlights the vital importance of 
the institutional settings (described earlier in Chapter 6) in providing the framework through 
which community engagement takes place. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
9.1 The Research Problem 
This research has examined the processes through which a profound agricultural transformation 
is unfolding as a result of the spatial expansion of the palm oil economy in Kapuas Hulu. It has 
addressed both the institutional drivers of this transformation and the institutional, community 
and household responses to a highly dynamic situation. The research objectives evolved from 
within a framework of political ecology scholarship where resource management and rural 
development problems are not considered solely technical issues, but are often a product of 
political economy. This thesis applies such an approach to trace the cause and effects of these 
problems. 
Political economy explains specific processes of agrarian transformation processes and social 
differentiation between (predominantly, but not exclusively) rural households and capitalist 
industries. Political ecologists underscore the importance of unequal power relations between 
those actors within a capitalist system (Neumann 2009, p.228). The political ecology approach 
suggests a need for important discussions around diverse cultural adaptations, social relations, 
control over natural resource access and the nature of social relations of production under 
capitalist markets, and for these to be examined at various scales. 
In the Kapuas Hulu case studies, various natural resource management challenges have emerged 
as a result of land use competition between agribusiness industries and smallholder farmers. 
With the growing commercial attractiveness of palm oil as a commodity, the agribusiness 
industry is strongly driven to acquire access to large areas of land for primary cultivation and this 
often involves the appropriation of land previously claimed and accessed by local communities. 
The appropriation of smallholder lands is widely achieved with the explicit support of various 
state institutions in such a way that local communities have very little opportunity to dictate the 
terms through which their livelihoods and land are being fundamentally reshaped within the 
palm oil economy. 
Frontier lands in Kapuas Hulu are discursively presented as natural resource abundant areas in a 
politically-important border location, making it a spatial battleground over which national elites 
are attempting to assert control. In the ensuing agricultural transformation, the processes of 
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establishing large-scale oil palm operations in the rural spaces were followed by attempts to 
suppress smallholder capabilities and their active participation in the emerging economy. Yet, at 
the same time, frontier communities have not been passive in this process, and my research 
presents the way communities have worked within the broader institutional constraints of the 
palm oil value chain to respond in sometimes surprising ways. In the process, Dayak Iban 
communities are actively reshaping the constellation of institutional constraints to reposition 
their engagement with the expanding palm oil economy.  
Through the case sites of Miau Merah, Badau and Janting villages in Kapuas Hulu, my study 
scrutinises institutional changes, power structures and livelihood changes amidst the spatial 
penetration of the palm oil economy. Specifically, I formulated three research questions to 
examine the broad processes of political ecology in Kapuas Hulu: 
1. What role do institutions perform in shaping the spatial expansion of oil palm cultivation?  
2. What are the processes involved with land conversion and land appropriation that enable the 
ongoing spatial expansion of the oil palm economy? 
3. How is the spatial expansion of oil palm transforming rural livelihood aspirations and 
strategies? 
 
Ethnographic field work was undertaken in the Kapuas Hulu District to examine these complex 
ecological and institutional problems, and involved a combination of field interviews, participant 
observation, focus group discussions, household surveys and discourse analysis. 
 
9.2 Institutions and Oil Palm Expansion  
Prior agrarian research suggests that the incorporation of rural communities and households into 
large-scale oil palm development has adverse impacts (e.g. Hickey and du Toit (2007)). 
However, a starting point for my study was that the impact on communities and households is far 
from homogenous and is difficult to predict, and it appears to be highly contingent on place-
based contexts. This is suggested, for example, in the diverse outcomes reported in Jambi, 
Sumatra (by McCarthy, 2010) and in West Kalimantan (by Potter, 2011), where local 
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engagements as land managers and contract farmers were reported. In response to these findings, 
I sought to understand the specific institutional framework that shapes the engagement of local 
communities with the palm oil sector, and I understood this framework to be multi-scalar. I 
therefore applied a multi-scalar institutional analysis that borrowed from the Global Value Chain 
(GVC) framework and examined the institutional settings generated: i) from within the value 
chain by lead firms (and generally understood as chain governance structures); ii) from the 
broader influences of non-firm actors along the entire value chain; and iii) by local informal, 
customary practices within Kapuas Hulu. 
This case study indeed finds that the institutional settings that mediate the relationship between 
agribusiness firms and the local community in Kapuas Hulu are multi-scalar and while the 
dominant consequence of these settings is that local communities are mostly constrained in their 
room for action, the settings also provide some opportunities for community negotiation to 
define the terms of engagement. Various formal and informal institutional codes and agreements 
(including corporate policies, the political economy of firm-state relations, the state regulatory 
system, and indeed some customary land tenure systems) are constantly changing, but tend to 
limit the degree of autonomy and control communities have over decisions that shape land use 
futures. 
This approach extends the existing scholarship within studies of political ecology by 
incorporating the tools of global value chain theory that underscore the powerful influences of 
both firm-level governance and institutional settings, and examining how these interact with the 
local household economy. In this study, it was found that leading palm oil companies (many of 
whom were strongly vertically integrated from plantation through to branded manufacturing) 
extended their reach into local communities through the establishment of physical infrastructure - 
by extending road and manufacturing mill investments. These policies were driven by both firm-
specific corporate attempts to increase efficiencies, reduce costs and shore up supply certainty, as 
well as by an attempt to establish ethical legitimacy for their branded consumer products in 
diverse markets. This extension of infrastructure has played a key role in opening up livelihood 
and market opportunities within communities. 
In their value chain study, Bolwig et al. (2010) emphasised how rural households with adeqaute 
capability assets can configure their straegies to simultaneously engage in multiple value chains 
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in a way that enhances inclusive participation. Even with restrictions being placed by some 
plantation companies on the supply of fruit from smallholder oil palm farmers, infrastucture 
improvements allowed access to alternative palm oil factories elsewhere (eg. in Sintang). 
Furthermore, engaging in the value chain as labour on a plantation was often a means to 
accummulate capital that could be re-invested in oil palm plots and to change their value chain 
function to one of oil palm fruit supplier. Prosperous farmers in Badau and Silat Hilir had also 
transformed themselves to assume further value chains positions, for example as middlemen 
providing a link between farmers and factory. The ability to assume multiple value chain 
positions in these cases enabled wider market access. 
In local Dayak Iban cultures, social values related to collective resource management approaches 
were customarily closely associated with swidden cultivation. While swidden systems have been 
maintained by some Dayak communities (particularly the older generation), there has been a 
shift towards the planting of oil palm on swidden alongside or following rice, which will 
presumably have longer term implications for fallowing and soil  regeneration. There was an 
important intergenerational difference in responses and attitudes towards swidden cultivation, 
with older villagers (above 50 years old) desiring the continuation of swidden practices due to its 
importance to cultural ceremonies, while the younger generation is less committed to swidden. 
Even so, many of the older generation maintained that the fallow phase of swidden cultivation 
could be utilised by practiced through a mixed agroforestry garden including oil palm. However, 
there are challenges to this strategy and, indeed,  the younger generation have tended to entirely 
replace swidden lands with oil palm as subsistence production was considered an obsolete 
livelihood activity. Associated with this shift away from swidden, traditional labour institutions 
based around reciprocity have been signifcantly monetarised (something which was taboo in the 
past). Labour reciprocity, however, has not totally disappeared, but this particular social 
institution has evolved and adapted to oil palm. Households from various multi-cultural 
backgrounds are pooling collective resources in new ways within the palm oil economy, such as 
for the purpose of transporting palm oil fruits to Sintang. Similarly, smallholder institutions 
(formal farmer groups as stipulated by government) have emerged to enable access to subsidised 
fertilisers from the government, which are used for both food crops and for oil palm.  
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The global value chain approach is thereby helpful in allowing a multi-scalar analysis of the 
institutional settings that shape local household participation in the palm oil economy. This 
ranges from the governance strategies of multinational corporations through to state regulatory 
structures, NGO codes of conduct, and customary institutions related to labour and land access. 
These institutions mutually interact to create a set of livelihood possibilities for rural households 
in Kapuas Hulu. As such, I argue that a specifically value chain informed approach to political 
ecology, one which examines corporate strategies as an important institutional form, presents 
numerous opportunities and insights that are likely to be helpful for future studies in political 
ecology. 
9.3 Processes of land appropriation 
To understand the actual processes through which land appropriation and conversion to oil palm 
occurs, this research has extended and adapted the powers of exclusion framework developed by 
Hall et al. (2011). I do this by presenting three fundamental processes of appropriation: spatial 
planning and formal regulation; discursive strategies that legitimate oil palm expansion; and 
informal intimate exclusions within the community, including market forces. 
In the political ecological scholarship, struggles over the control of resource access have been 
discussed as the attempt to suppress traditional livelihood strategies in favour of large-scale 
industry. For instance, in Aceh, political ecology was applied by McCarthy (2006) to highlight 
the challenges facing the local agricultural system in the face of powerful industrial logging 
interests. In Sarawak, national authorities suppressed the ability of swidden farm systems to 
pursue traditional livelihoods when confronted with the interests for large-scale oil palm 
operations, constructing a discourse in which local Dayaks were presented as incompetent, 
lacking the capacity and skills to properly manage local resources (Cramb 2016). 
This thesis has added a research contribution to these processes by presenting a case study of 
how discourses of national economic sovereignity have been further employed to support and 
legitimate large-scale plantation development policies. This reflected an attempt to resist possible 
foreign economic claims in Kapuas Hulu and integration within the Malaysian economy, 
legitimating the establishment of oil palm plantations as a political imperative. The formal 
regulatory and spatial planning processes in Kapuas Hulu that enabled the establishment of HGU 
plantation leases were strongly supported by legitimating discourses, especially in regards to the 
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supposedly unproductive, backward, and inefficient swidden systems. National elites integrated 
their agenda of national economic control with the interests of large agribusinesses, as they 
attempted to erase and exclude informal land access through spatial regulations and policies.  
During the formal process of gaining plantation concessions, this study finds that these narratives 
have a dual function to both suppress swidden farming through formal regulation as well as 
manipulating the aspirations of local communities. It was found that market actors devised subtle 
narratives to encourage more local people to “freely” dispose of their land in the interests of 
palm oil operations. By enticing local communities with dreams of a comfortable and prosperous 
life, company representatives were also able to convince many local people to give up their land 
for plantation development following a social approach of repeated village visits. Yet, these 
verbal discourses were frequently not accompanied by written agreements, and market-based 
processes in this social and discursive environment meant that land deals were made that enabled 
companies to effectively access land at relatively cheap prices.  
The literature on the political economy of agrarian change (e.g. Neumann 2009, McCarthy 2006) 
has frequently identified intimate partnerships between local district elites and industrial actors 
as a powerful mechanism for local land dispossessions. This research presents another avenue 
through which industrial actors cooperate with various local customary elites to further their land 
dispossession agenda. The role of local village elites in Kapuas Hulu was quickly exploited by 
corporate interests to draw upon the powers of force and intimidation to pressure villagers not to 
oppose oil palm development. 
Land dispossession also occurred in Kapuas Hulu through what might be considered a voluntary 
market-based process, although this needs to be understood in the context of strong legitimating 
discourses and promises of life improvements. Nevertheless, many Dayak villagers in my case 
study were genuinely interested in embracing the palm oil economy, believing that it offered 
themselves and their families the best life opportunities, and made market-based transactions 
over their land. Differing opinions and attitudes towards oil palm within the community often 
resulted in heated debates and social tensions, sometimes rising to threats of violence and 
physical conflict. Those supporters of oil palm supported their case through the force of national 
regulatory frameworks and other legitimating discourses. They threatened and mocked those 
who rejected large-scale oil palm, while counter mobilisations were also pursued by those 
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rejecting oil palm expansion, including social exclusion from longhouse organizations and forms 
of civil disobedience towards the state.  
The emergence of local people as a smallholding oil palm supply base in Kapuas Hulu has 
facilitated further land exclusions, as local processes of accumulation have driven the more 
successful smallholders to buy up land from their neighbours. The palm oil economy has thereby 
facilitated an intense process of agrarian economic differentiation among villagers, as those with 
financial and social capital are able to accumulate more land. On the other hand, the losers have 
sacrificed their access to physical and natural assets in an attempt to meet their growing cash 
income needs for their households. Hence, the land market itself has functioned as a process of 
appropriation causing unequal land holdings and “voluntary” land dispossession among 
villagers.   
9.4 Rural livelihoods in the palm oil economy  
Different agrarian studies have presented a variety of livelihood implications resulting from palm 
oil development. This scholarship tends to emphasise the deterioration of natural resource assets 
and a broader shift towards the adoption of oil palm smallholdings in West Kalimantan (for 
example, the study conducted by Potter 2015b; Potter 2016). My research contributes a further 
detailed picture of the increasing diversification of livelihood assets, strategies and outcomes in 
Kapuas Hulu, which was supported through a household survey approach. 
In other past studies, Dayak Iban were assumed to highly value their land as an important symbol 
of prosperity, wealth and cultural identity (Cramb 2007). Hence, an egalitarian ethos and a 
commitment to self-sufficiency (in nearby Sarawak) resulted in the sustenance of swidden-based 
rice hill cultivation. Nonetheless, in my livelihood survey on the Indonesian side of the border, 
there appear to be much stronger pressures working against the Iban communities to preserve 
natural asset based livelihoods like swidden. Decreasing land holding size and poorer soil 
conditions were identified as strong driving forces, which were partly addressed through the 
application of fertilisers, but this drew households further into a cash economy and the gradual 
adoption of “modern” agricultural techniques. Although a comparative study of Iban responses 
in Sarawak and Kapuas Hulu was beyond the scope of this thesis, the comparison of livelihood 
strategies with Cramb’s work in Sarawak supports my argument that livelihood responses are 
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strongly shaped by the prevailing institutional settings operating at multiple scales, as already 
discussed. 
In the current institutional context of Kapuas Hulu, many respondents felt positive benefits 
resulting from oil palm development, especially regarding the extension of physical 
infrastructure (such as roads), and social infrastructure (e.g. schools and health facilities) which 
would otherwise be poorly provisioned. With the increasing availability of these infrastructure 
facilities, many households developed capabilities to broaden market access and diversify their 
cash incomes. 
In previous studies, there has been much discussion about the shift from swidden into various 
cash income opportunities, such as palm oil labour or cultivation of oil palm (e.g. Potter, 2015b, 
Cramb, 2015). This study provides a further explanation of how the adoption of particular 
livelihood strategies is closely related to wealth income categories among households (as 
determined by asset ownership and access in the survey). In my case study villages, middle and 
rich households tended to have the economic capabilities to engage with their own oil palm 
cultivation, and obtain employment in the palm oil industry in skilled positions. The wealthier 
households were also associated with investments in small businesses and trading opportunities, 
many of which had emerged along with the multiplier effects of the palm oil economy. However, 
poorer households found themselves depending to a greater extent on casual manual labour on 
the plantations as they became drawn into the cash economy from a less advantageous position.  
My research also tracked the land use changes that accompanied shifting livelihood outcomes 
across the three case studies, finding that both rubber and oil palm were increasingly planted 
within and alongside swidden fallows, although each crop seems to serve a distinct livelihood 
function. Despite relatively extensive areas of land planted with rubber in the case study villages, 
rubber was not generally identified as having strong economic-development prospects. Instead of 
offering a genuine pathway out of poverty, it was often considered to offer a complementary 
source of cash reserve during times of emergency. This was in contrast to oil palm, which was 
planted with the hope of generating wealth, but a higher risk strategy (whilst rubber plots 
generally required far lower investments of capital and labour). As such, rubber was rarely 
converted to oil palm, although interestingly swidden plots did seem to be converted. This 
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differentiated livelihood role is somewhat problematic for opponents of palm oil development 
who advocate rubber as an environmentally-friendly alternative to oil palm.  
In my survey, livelihood outcomes were also evaluated by assessing perceptions of changes in 
well-being over the last fifteen years, finding that households generally perceived substantial 
improvements over this time. For many respondents, these improvements were associated with 
the introduction and expansion of oil palm (despite an apparent loss of natural livelihood assets 
due to land appropriation). Most importantly, these perceived improvements were driven by the 
enhanced availability of social and physical infrastructure (education and health) in their 
communities along with the availability of various income-earning opportunities. 
Therefore, this thesis has uncovered the processes of political economy driving land 
appropriation (and dispossession) in Kapuas Hulu and the institutional structures that are 
instrumental in shaping outcomes for local communities. However, in the livelihood survey, I 
also found that the natural resource base of livelihoods was no longer considered important 
relative to cash income opportunities from off-farm economic activities. There has been a clear 
shift whereby natural livelihoods assets (access to land and forests) are being substituted by 
financial (cash income) and physical capital assets (infrastructure), which collectively facilitate 
improvements in human capital (health and education) – or at least improved access to these 
social facilities.  
9.5 Implications and limitations of the study 
The study extends the finding of other case studies examining agrarian transformations and the 
palm oil economy (such as those in Sarawak, Jambi and Sanggau), which highlighted the various 
livelihood complexities and spatial process of differentiation. A common thread through these 
studies, supported by my research in Kapuas Hulu, has been that those individuals and 
households with initially weaker access to livelihood assets tend to more rapidly and 
comprehensively marginalised. Consequently, less well-endowed households have struggled to 
seize the opportunities available in the palm oil economy, suggesting the need for compensatory 
social support systems – possibly provided by the state – as access to natural assets had 
previously performed a similar social security function. However, in the different political 
economic and institutional setting of Sarawak, it appears that households were more empowered 
to actively engage with the palm oil economy on their own terms.  
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My case study exhibits more complexities in the local adaptations that incorporate oil palm 
cultivation within livelihood strategies, and a key distinction with previous studies was the way I 
incorporated modes of value chain governance as an institutional form that shaped outcomes in 
Kapuas Hulu. For some local households, global governance structures and their reach into 
Kapuas Hulu had provided opportunities for market access and infrastructure development.  
Field work observations also developed an appreciation of local responses by households to 
engage with multiple value chain positions as they participate in oil palm cultivation in more 
inclusive ways. This finding is in contrast with certain policy assumptions that smallholders are 
incapable of effectively participating in oil palm cultivation. Smallholder households are clearly 
not just functioning as development recipients, but are actively escalating their roles as producers 
and contributing to the local economy. Hence, in the process of making local economic 
development decisions, this research recommends policy makers to listen to the aspirations of 
smallholders as engaged stakeholders in the development process, thus allowing them to improve 
social welfare outcomes. A key limitation of this research was that, due to limited resources and 
time constraints, my research does not explore the roles of financial institutions to improve rural 
livelihoods in Kapuas Hulu in any detail, despite the potentially transforming effect that financial 
access could have for local livelihoods. By using livelihood methodologies and approaches, 
future research can offer other insights into those rural financial institutions to uplift livelihood 
changes in the local emerging palm oil development.
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Appendices 
Appendix A Interview Topics 
List of interviewees and interview topics  
1. Community Members 
a. Local community demography & social economic characteristics  
b. Community perceptions toward large-scale palm oil development 
c. Changing land access, employment and living expenditure (including food and 
non-food needs)  
d. Land tenure systems & organizations  
e. The consultation process & involvement from palm oil development  
 
2. Government officials  
a. Perceptions toward palm oil development    
b. Land use planning and allocation processes in Kapuas Hulu  
c. The formal procedures and rules for palm oil permit  
d. The information dissemination & consultation process of large-acquisition 
process to publics  
e. Palm oil’s decision making process and hierarchy  
 
3. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)  
a. NGOs codes of conduct & structures  
b. NGOs perceptions towards the palm oil development  
c. NGOs program and interventions in Kapuas Hulu  
d. NGOs external relationship and cooperation  
 
4. Plantation Companies 
a. The rationale to develop palm oil business  
b. The financial sources & investments  
c. Human resource recruitment, wages and  Standard Operating Procedures 
d. The application process to obtain concession 
e. The consent and information dissemination in acquiring land  
f. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs  
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g. Industrial relations to external stakeholders  
 
5. International organizations 
a. Organizational structure and codes of conduct  
b. The perceptions toward palm oil development  
c. The program and interventions in Kapuas Hulu  
d. The rationale for that program in Kapuas Hulu  
e. Consultation process and engagement with external stakeholders   
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Appendix B Household survey to track farmers' livelihood change in Kapuas Hulu 
 
1. Interviewer and date  
1.1. Interviewer’s name  :  
1.2. Interview data  : 
1.3. Household number  :  
2. Respondent characteristics  
2.1. Name    :  
2.2. Age    :  
2.3. Gender   : 
2.4. Ethnics    :  
2.5. Where do you live  : 
2.6. When did you live in this village: (a) Since I was born (2.8) (b) migrant coming in  
2.7. Where did you live before if you are migrant? 
2.8. Are you household head? (a) Yes   (b) No (2.8)  
2.9. What is your relationship with the household head? (a) Children (b) Wife (c) other relationship, please state.......... 
2.10. Who are living in your home? (a) one nuclear family (b) extended family (more than 2 nuclear families, or any other 
relatives)  
2.11. How many are the household members in your house:  
3. Household memberships 
No Relationship with you Gender (Male/Female)  Age Education 
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4. Household assets  
Assets or facilities Units  When it was purchased/accessible  
Car   
Motor cycles    
Television    
Computer    
Mobile phone   
Chainsaw   
Refrigerator    
Rice grinding machine    
Personal toilet/bathroom   
Electricity     
Internet access    
   
   
5. Livestock 
5.1. Do you have livestock? (a) Yes (b) No (6)   
5.2. How many livestock do you have over five years?  
Livestock Units in 2011 Units in 2016 
Fighting chicken   
Chicken   
Pigs    
   
   
6. Land ownership and acquisitions   
6.1. Private land rights  
6.1.1.   How many hectares (or plots127) of land of your private land in 2001:       2016:  
6.1.2.   If in plots, how much in average of hectare is in one plot: (a) 0.5 hectare (ha) (b) 1 ha (c) 2 ha (d) 3 ha (e) others, 
specify............... 
                                                          
127 Some people of Dayak Iban did not understand hectare in previous interview, so they measure their fields by plots (bidang)   
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6.1.3. Describe  your status and their areas (in hectares or plots):  
No Certified Area in 2001 Area in 2016 
1 Ownership right certificate (SHM)    
2 Lease right (HGU)    
3 Right to build (HGB)    
4 Statement of land rights from village head (SKT)    
5 Private plots (not having any acknowledgement letter)    
6 Government assistance land titling schemes (PRONA)    
7 Others    
Total land ownership   
6.2. has there any parties who acquire your private land since 2001:   (a) Yes   (b) No (6.5)  
6.3. Who now has access to land that you previously had access to?  
6.4. Please inform me how it was acquired    
No Mode of acquisition Hectares/plots When it was acquired  Financial payment per ha or plots  
1 Acquired by palm oil through long term leasing    
2 Sold to other individuals      
3 Donated to family or others     
4 Others     
Total     
6.5. Is there any land that you accumulated/added since 2001?: (a) Yes    (b) No (7)  
6.6. did you accumulate or add more your private ownership 
No Mode of acquisition Hectares/plots When you get the land Financial payment per ha or plots 
1 Purchasing from other people or entities     
2 Inherited from your family or  relatives    
3 Donated by other parties        
4 Opening primary forests (rimba)     
5 Donated from government     
6 Others     
Total     
6.7. Do you occupy or borrow any communal rights? (a) Yes   (b) No (7)  
 
6.8. What types and how many hectares/plots are communal rights you can occupy or borrow?  
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No Types of communal rights  Area in 2001 Area in 2016 
1 Extended family rights (tanah kongsi)    
2 Communal customary rights (tanah adat masyarakat)    
3 Others.....................................................   
    
    
Total land occupation    
7. Land use change 
Land use Land use in 2001 
(Hectares/plots) 
Land use in 2016 
(Hectares/plots) 
Land status 
(Code 1) 
Swidden cultivation (food crops)      
Fruit garden      
Vegetable garden     
Pepper garden     
Rubber tree plantation      
Palm oil     
Idle or unused land     
Garden.............    
    
    
Non-agriculture fields      
Total land use      
(1) Used by individuals (private property)   (2) state property (used by state)  (3) Communal or extended family ownership (tanah kongsi milik  keluarga besar)  (4) used with permission 
(borrowing) (5) used without permission  (6) belongs my wife  
8. Adapting to environmental change    
8.1. What did the condition for soil fertility surrounding your fields in the last 15 years?  
a) The present soil fertility is better than that 15 years ago 
b) The soil has a similar fertility in the last 15 years  
c) The present soil fertility is worst now than that 15 years ago  
d) I did not live in this village 15 years ago, so I cannot give comparison 
8.2. Do you use fertiliser to enhance your soil fertility? (a) Yes  (b) No  
8.3. How do you find access to have fertiliser to restore your soil fertility?  
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a) Rare fertiliser shop or availability in my village  
b) Fertilizer is too expensive 
c) I do not have any money to buy fertiliser 
d) I do not need fertilizer due to good soil fertility  
e) using fertiliser is not allowed in my village due to customary rules 
f) Government supplies fertiliser support to me 
g) I can get fertiliser due to assistance from my relatives or other parties  
h) I can buy fertiliser with a competitive price  
i) Another condition, please 
state......................................................................................................................................................... 
8.4. What were the functions of river water resources surrounding your village fifteen years ago? (select more than one)  
a) Taking a shower  
b) Washing clothes 
c) Drinking  
d) Fishing  
e) I did not utilise it for any purposes  
f) I did not live in this village fifteen years ago  
8.5. What are the current functions of river water resources surrounding your village? 
a) Taking a shower  
b) Washing clothes 
c) Drinking  
d) Fishing  
e) I cannot utilise it for any purposes anymore 
8.6. Describe any alternative water resources for your different uses  
Water resources  For what uses Since when Free or pay 
Water pump    
Piped water from hill     
Paid water.................    
Other resources..............    
8.7. Have ever you find any pest in your farming in your fields in the last ten years? (a) Yes (b) No (9)  
8.8. Do you find pests threatening your farming yields?         (a) Yes (b) No  
8.9. Do you use pesticide (anti-pest medicine) to kill pests in your agricultural farming? (a) Yes  (b) No  
9. Income   
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9.1. Have you done any subsistence farming (or other own provisioning such as hunting, fishing, collecting) in 2016: (a) Yes    
(b) No (9.3)  
9.2. Could I know your annual subsistence production and consumption in the last crop year?  
No Subsistence crops Annual harvesting How long it runs out for consumption 
/ or % of total needs throughout the 
year 
 Paddy    
 Aquaculture   
 Wild fishing   
 Hunting   
 Collecting................   
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Do you have any source of cash income? (a) Yes  (b) No (10)  
9.3. Could I know your source of cash income? 
No Source of cash income Cash income status 
(permanent =1, temporary = 2) 
% of total cash income Estimated annual income 
1 Selling food crops     
2 Selling rubber crops    
3 Selling palm oil crops     
4 Selling fishes     
5 Cash crop 1...............    
6 Cash crop 2...............    
7 Cash income from contractual plasma     
8 Wage or salaries (permanent as.............................)      
9 Casual wage earnings (temporary as......................)     
10 Cash remittances from family      
11 Pensions    
12 Government allowance (e.g.: Cash Transfer (BLT))     
13 Rice supports from government (RASKIN)     
14 Income from household business (.........................)    
15 Selling rattan     
16 Selling swallow bird nests (sarang burung walet)     
17 Selling honey     
18 Selling livestock    
19 Other incomes    
     
     
     
Total cash income   100%  
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10. Financial and non-financial supports from relatives or families 
10.1. Is there any support from your families or relatives who are not live together in your house (a) Yes   (b) No (13)  
10.2. Please state financial or non - financial supports that they provided  
No Relationship with you Occupation Residential place Supports (code 2)  Frequency (code 3) 
      
      
      
      
      
      
Code 2 :Financial assistance = 1, labour support = 2, foods =3, other assistances = 4 
Code 3: weekly=1, fortnightly =2, monthly = 3, every six month = 4, yearly= 5, if it is needed (random) = 5 
 
11. Farmer’s organisation  
11.1. Do you belong to farmer’s association or cooperatives? (a) Yes  (b) No (12) 
11.2. What is your farmer’s association/cooperatives name?  
11.3. What kinds of benefits do you receive from that particular association or organisation?  
a) Access to technical assistance and training from (Government / other organisation) 
b) Access to inputs (seeds or fertilisers) from (Government / other organisation) 
c) Access to capital  
d) Labour-sharing 
e) Others, please specify.................................. 
12. Access to financial services  
12.1. Are you member/customer of a particular financial institution?   (a) Yes   (b) No (13)  
12.2. What are the financial institutions you join at?     (a) Credit Union   (b) Bank  
 (c) Cooperative  
12.3. What are the services that you can access in a particular organisation?  
a) Saving account 
b) Access to loans  
c) Access to insurance (e.g.: agricultural insurance, school insurance, etc)  
d) Access to financial management trainings  
e) Other access, please specify.................................................................  
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12.4. If applicable, what are conditions that must be met to access such financial services?   
a) Saving account    :  
b) Loan access    :  
c) Insurance     :  
d) Financial management training  :  
e) Other services (   ) : 
13. Access to public services and infrastructure  
13.1. What kinds of school are available in this village?  
(a) Kindergarten (b) Elementary school  (c) Junior high school (d) Senior high school (e) Academy/university  
 
13.2. Does your household able to access those formal educations? (a) Yes      (b) No  
13.3. How do you perceive those academic services? (a) Satisfied  (b) unsure (neutral)      (c) Not satisfied 
13.4. What is the road infrastructure that available in your nearby village? 
a) Local road network (jalan desa, e.g.: sealed access road or 4WD access) 
b) Provincial road network (Jalan negara, e.g.: sealed road network)  
c) No road infrastructure in my village  
13.5. Who did build that road infrastructure? A) Local network:   b) Provincial road network: 
13.6.  How do you perceive the road infrastructure near your village?  
a) The road has been overlaid with  impermeable asphalt or cements and in good condition  
b) It has been overlaid with asphalt or cement, but it has been permeable (broken)  
c) The road has not been covered with asphalt or cement and in bad conditions (broken)   
d) The road is not even accessible to motor cycle or cars  
13.7. Is there any government-mandated community health clinics (PUSKESMAS)  in your village: (a) Yes  (b) No 
(13.10)  
13.8. How far away is the nearest PUSKESMAS from your house? 
13.9. What is your opinion regarding the health service in your village: (a) Satisfied   (b) Unsure (neutral) 
 (c) Not satisfied  
13.10. Can you access telecommunication signal in your villages (a) Yes   (b) No (13.12)  
13.11. What  is the signal condition (a) Weak signal  (b) Strong signal  
13.12. Can you access electricity in your village: (a) Yes   (b) No  (14)  
13.13. Does that electricity facility available for 24 hours: (a) Yes (b) No 
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13.14. How often do you experience electric power failure? (a) Never (b) at least once a month   (c) others................................. 
14. Well-being perspective 
14.1. How do you feel your well-being has changed over the last 15 years  
a) I have a better well-being over the last 15 years, because..................................................... 
b)  No significant change 
c) I have worse well - being over the last 15 years, because...................................................... 
14.2. How do you think your well-being (and your family’s) will be in another 15 years  
a) I think it will improve in another 15 years 
b) I don’t it will change significantly 
c) I think it will be worse in another 15 years 
15. Palm oil perspective 
15.1. If you don’t currently have any oil palm, would you like to plant palm oil in the future?   (a) Yes (b) No 
15.2. If you have already planted oil palm, would you like to increase you planted area in the future?  (a) Yes    (b) No  
15.3. Do you think the expansion palm oil plantations in your village would benefit the community?  (a) Yes (b) No 
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Appendix D Land use in Kapuas Hulu 
RTRWP (in Hectares) in %
2,144,713.06 69.2%
Conservation area 935,512.03 30.2%
Protection forests 701,402.48 22.6%
Limited production forest 472,341.92 15.2%
Production forest 35,456.63 1.1%
Convertible production forest 0 0.0%
953,859.32 30.8%
3,098,572.38 100.0%
Non Forest area
Total district area
Forest area 
Designated area 
 
Sources: BAPPEDA Kapuas Hulu (2011)  
 
Appendix E Households (HH) by total land-use plots in 2016 
Total land uses  % HH in Miau Merah % HH in Badau % HH in Janting % HH Aggregate 
 0 - 1 ha  57.5% 72.50% 30% 53.33% 
1.01 - 3 ha  25 % 5% 22.5% 17.5% 
3.01- 10 ha  17.5% 12.5% 32.15% 20.83% 
> 10 ha  0 10% 15% 8.33% 
Source: local field survey, 2016 
 
 
